India has made clear that separatists aren’t stakeholders in the Kashmir dispute. Now, Pakistan needs to decide on how it wants to deal, if at all, with non-state actors
Prime Minister Narendra Modi's decision to call off the Foreign Secretary level talks with Pakistan, scheduled for August 25 in Islamabad, in light of the Pakistani High Commissioner's meeting with Kashmiri separatists conveys India's Pakistan policy — that business is no longer usual with this beleaguered neighbour. The decision reflects a departure from soft diplomacy, towards deft diplomacy, adopted by the new Government vis-à-vis Pakistan. Yet many believe that dialogue with Pakistan is the only option that India has to solve controversial bilateral issues. But are talks possible despite Pakistan's heavy-handed attitudeIJ Why would the Pakistan High Commission invite separatist leaders for talks just a week before the formal talk with the Government of IndiaIJ Even if it is a long-standing practice, as claimed by Pakistani authorities, how does it impact Secretary-level talks with IndiaIJ To answer these queries, it is important to understand why India and Pakistan want to talk and from where they desire to start the dialogue process.
The Modi Government is keen to engage with Pakistan but the latter is reluctant to explore new opportunities with India. Instead, it seeks to test the Modi Government's possible reaction to so-called ‘outstanding issues' such as Kashmir. The Pakistani military wants to understand how the Indian Army, under the new political leadership, will react, if it is provoked, either diplomatically or militarily. It’s spy agency is eager to know the new Government's game-plan in Kashmir. Unfortunately, the political establishment in Pakistan is confused about how to engage with it's now politically wilful neighbour. Interestingly, Kashmiri separatist leaders are hopeful that Mr Modi will adopt former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's approach to Kashmir.
Pakistan's policy has always been guided by its ‘proxy thinking', driven by non-state actors. Be it confrontation or diplomatic engagement, successive Governments in Pakistan have relied heavily on ‘non-state actors' to the extent of even bringing the latter’s agenda to the table and blatantly ignoring the collective interests and aspiration of the people of Pakistan, which may be otherwise.
Mr Modi's decision to call-off the talks, therefore, is an absolutely appropriate move for three reasons. First, the present security situation is not conducive for Secretary-level talks since the Pakistani Army's ceasefire violations at the line of Control and the Indian border continue unabated. Second, the domestic political situation in Pakistan appears fragile. There can be a coup at any time. Third, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif may not be keen on talks with India and instead prefer to divert the attention of his domestic audience towards India through diplomatic and military provocations such as these meetings. This will help Mr Sharif reassert his political mandate ostensibly to safeguard the country from an (perceptibly) aggressive India.
The current posture of the Indian Government has sent a stern message to the politically-fractured separatist elements in Jammu & Kashmir, that the new regime will no longer consider them to be a stakeholder in the Kashmir issue, since they hardly represent the collective will of the people of Kashmir. What is likely to happen in the future is the marginalisation of separatists from the peace process between India and Pakistan. It is time to realise that the India-Pakistan peace process should not be merely Kashmir-centric, rather it must address broader issues including concerns about regional stability such as in Afghanistan.
There is no doubt that Pakistan was shell-shocked by the Modi Government's stunning reaction to the meeting. The ball is now in the red zone of Islamabad — the leaders there must choose whether to first talk to the Government of India or non-state actors. For India, it is better not to talk to this deleterious neighbour than to talk on farcical matters and that too with a fragile Government which is likely to concede its foreign and security policies to the Army.
(The writer is Assistant Professor of National Security Studies at the Central University of Jammu.)