While staying committed to talks, India must explore all possible alternatives to save itself from the spoilers at large by strengthening its security machinery and enhancing co-ordination among different branches of Government to deal with the threats emanating from Pakistan
Every relationship has its own dynamics, and India-Pakistan relations too have their own. The way it is working, ever since Narendra Modi assumed the charge of Prime Ministership, it proves the point that the two neighbours have a long way to go before the relationship could be normalised.
The recent Pathankot terror attack, as well as the assault on the Indian consulate in Afghanistan, in the immediate aftermath of PM Modi’s surprise stopover at lahore and ahead of proposed talks between the Foreign Secretaries of the two countries, was immensely predictable.
So was the previous attack on Gurdaspur that had come 17 days after the two PMs met at Ufa on July 10, 2015. The latest one happened after eight days of Modi’s pit stop at lahore on Christmas day on his way back from Afghanistan. The pattern is so obvious. You could predict it, even if you did or did not believe in astrology.
To understand the situation we just need to remember incidents that took place in the last few months and years so as to get a clear picture of the accident-prone engagement process between India and Pakistan.
The rigmarole: A spoiler-led process
The spoilers have been at work uninterruptedly for almost eight years now (of course they have been there for years but the focus here is post-2008), ever since the leadership of the two countries decided to pick up the dialogue process from where it was left in 2007.
Crafted to perfection, on the day the new democratically elected Asif Ali Zardari Government sent its Foreign Minister to New Delhi, terrorists struck in Mumbai. All efforts of the Zardari Government to even out the wrinkles left by 26/11 were scotched by, what is called the deep State, in Pakistan.
There was a tentative dialogue — the so-called “resumed dialogue” to be distinguished from “composite dialogue” attempted earlier — not moving anywhere during 2011-2012.
Then the Zardari Government wanted to accord Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to India in 2011. The spoiler lobby geared into action immediately. How can a “dushman mulk” (enemy nation) be a “pasandida-tareen mulk” (most favoured nation)IJ The spoilers asked. The vernacular media was up in arms. Most of the Urdu newspapers sang the same “scripted” tune. You know by whom. The stamp of the GHQ was so clear, people in Pakistan would aver!
Enter Nawaz Sharif
Incidentally, ahead of the May 2013 elections, when Nawaz Sharif articulated his desire to normalise relationship with India if he comes to power, the ceasefire violations along the line of Control and even International Border along Jammu & Kashmir were quite frequent.
In fact, the loC skirmishes have continued for almost over two years now, following beheading of two Indian soldiers on January 8, 2013. Analysts would tell you, all this was being done to drive a clear message to the civilian leadership in Pakistan — beware! Shun the path of engagement with India or else…
After Sharif came to power in Pakistan in June 2014, he wanted to reinstate the lahore process he had started with Atal Bihari Vajpayee in February 1999. But how could he have taken up anything attempted by either Pervez Musharraf, his onetime nemesis, or Zardari, his opponentIJ
Indians looked on. Sharif and Manmohan Singh met in a New York hotel in September 2013, disregarding a terror attack in Kashmir that came on the eve of it, and ignoring the “dehati aurat” (village woman) remark purportedly made by Sharif about the Indian Prime Minister.
They had, as was ritually stated, a “useful and constructive” discussion primarily focusing on reducing tension along the loC, but also aimed at reviving dialogue. The situation along the loC escalated after the meeting. Sharif is said to have admitted that he did not have as much control over his Army as Manmohan had over his.
There were again reports of Sharif persuading Manmohan to sign a wide-ranging trade agreement for Non-Discriminating Market Access (NDMA), a la MFN, before he went for elections in May 2014. That was not to be. Both countries awaited a regime change in New Delhi.
There was a change. A right wing leader was in power in India with a decisive popular mandate. The expectations from media analysts in Pakistan suddenly hit rock bottom. Modi’s invitation to Sharif, along with other South Asian heads of Government, to attend his swearing-in disproved, to some extent, the contention in Pakistan that he would not be favourable to the idea of normalisation of relationship with Pakistan.
However, Hawks in Islamabad warned against falling into the trap. Sharif took on the challenge and overruled the suggestion, reportedly from GHQ, to travel to New Delhi to attend the swearing-in. Smiles and warm handshakes followed and the Foreign Secretaries were to meet in August 2014 to flog the dying, if not dead, horse of a dialogue. Expectations rose on both sides, only to fall again in the wake of the Modi Government’s decision to change the rules of the game.
Pakistan was asked not to confer with Kashmiri separatists as was the tradition earlier, before the August talks. Pakistan dithered. The talks were off. The loC remained tense.
Kathmandu, Ufa and beyond
Fast forward to November 2014 in Kathmandu where the SAARC summit witnessed stiff faces, there was no exchange of smiles between the two PMs in public. little did the world know that both of them were meeting in a hotel off the media glare, facilitated by a steel magnate from India. The media could only catch a glimpse of a thawing handshake in the Dhulikhel retreat, the day after the SAARC summit meet.
Then, there was the cricket diplomacy. In February 2015, on the eve of the cricket World Cup, Modi called up all the heads of Governments of all cricketing countries in the region to wish their team good luck. This could have certainly helped in breaking ice between Modi and Sharif.
In the beginning of March, India sent its Foreign Secretary on a “SAARC Yatra” to four countries, including Pakistan. As always, his visit to Islamabad drew disproportionate attention. The media latched on to it; sensed some attempt by Modi to make up for missed opportunity in August 2014.
Four months hence, in July 2015, Modi met Sharif on the sidelines of the SCO Summit in Ufa (Russia). The two PMs decided that the NSAs of the two countries would meet in New Delhi “to discuss all issues connected to terrorism as well as to ensure peace and tranquility along the loC and the border”.
Pakistan took 22 days to finalise the dates of the meeting
Finally the reply came on August 14 that the NSA-level talks would take place on August 23-24, 2015 in Delhi, and the talks between the DGs of BSF and Pakistani Rangers would take place after NSA-level talks on September 6, 2015.
Sensing that the talks would finally take place, the spoilers swung into action. On July 27, there were attacks on a police station in Gurdaspur. Three terrorists probably affiliated to leT (hardly matters from which of the many groups nurtured by Pakistan military) killed seven Indian, including the local SP, before being neutralised.
A few days later on August 6, they struck again. This time two terrorists attacked a bus carrying BSF personnel in Udhampur. One of them was caught alive and spewed venom againstkafir Indians, who were legitimate targets, or wajib-ul-qatl, as they say in jehadi literature.
The incidents queered the pitch for NSA-level talks. As if this was not enough, the Pakistani High Commission in New Delhi, trying to test the limits of Indian patience, again hobnobbed with Kashmiri separatists. There was also assertion by the Pakistani media to explain the agenda of the talks. The Pak foreign office, perhaps under pressure, expanded the scope of the Ufa consensus by including Kashmir in the agenda. India wanted explanations from Pakistan to this effect. Pakistan unrelentingly stuck to its Ufa-plus agenda — Kashmir and separatists had to be part of the framework. The talks were predictably doomed.
The two countries showed some doggedness nevertheless, as if to provoke the spoilers again. While, the NSA-level talks were called off, the talks between Director Generals of BSF and Pakistani Rangers were held as per schedule on September 9-12, 2015. Modalities of interaction between the forces operating along the border to ensure tranquility were discussed. New lines of communications were proposed.
Come September, talks of meeting between the two PMs on the sidelines of UN General Assembly meeting in New York appeared in the media. Reports suggested Indian High Commissioner in Islamabad met Pakistan Foreign Secretary and pushed for meeting between the PMs in New York only to be told that meeting between the two Foreign Ministers was more apt instead.
The September meeting did not materialise. Analysts suggested that there is no forward movement because of the fact that the military in Pakistan was not backing the talks and it was futile to expect talks with the civilian NSA that Sartaj Aziz was, to succeed.
Pak military roped inIJ
In October 2015, retired lt Gen Nasser Khan Janjua was appointed the new NSA of Pakistan divesting Sartaj Aziz of one of his two responsibilities — for he had doubled up as both NSA and Adviser to the PM on foreign affairs. It was also noted that Janjua’s office was to be based at the PM Secretariat instead of at Foreign Office, signaling an effort in Pakistan to rope in the Army into the dialogue with India. Was it going to workIJ
It seemed to work initially. The two PMs met again for less than three minutes on the sidelines of COP21 at Paris on November 30. The two NSAs met immediately afterwards in Bangkok on December 6, 2015. Officially, they focused on peace and security, terrorism, tranquility along the line of Control, and Jammu & Kashmir.
Indian outlook on re-engagement
Close on the heels of this meeting, on December 8-9, Foreign Minister Shushma Swaraj travelled to Islamabad to attend the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Heart of Asia Istanbul Process. She met Sharif and her counterpart Sartaj Aziz. It was decided bilaterally to restart dialogue under a new rubric — “Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue”. The Foreign Secretaries were tasked “to work out modalities and schedule of the meetings under the new dialogue”, Sushma Swaraj noted in her suo moto statement in the lok Sabha later.
The Modi Government laid out its approach in the Foreign Minister’s statement which is worth quoting, “The new dialogue with Pakistan has twin aims of removing hurdles in the path of a constructive engagement by addressing issues of concern, and at the same time, of exploring and establishing cooperative ties. Initiatives on trade and connectivity, people-to-people exchanges and humanitarian issues will contribute to welfare of the entire region, and promote better understanding and mutual trust. The new dialogue, we sincerely hope, marks a new beginning also for peace and development in the whole region. I am confident that we have the support of the entire House in this expectation.”
Modi’s pit-stop: A friendly act or provocationIJ
The process of re-engagement received yet another boost when on December 25, 2015, on his way back from Afghanistan, Modi made a two-hour long stopover at lahore and visited Sharif’s Jati Umra residence to attend his 66th birthday celebration. Sushma Swaraj tweeted, “That’s like a statesman. Padosi se aise hi rishte hone chahiyen.”The peaceniks in the two countries were eagerly looking forward to the Foreign Secretary-level dialogue scheduled for January 15, 2016. The pace of engagement took one by surprise.
The acceleration was so unreal or surrealIJ
Was it going to go uncheckedIJ Sceptics had already started alerting to the absence of the Pakistani NSA in the pit-stop meeting between the two PMs in lahore. There were also talks of the military not too happy about the acceleration and the sudden spurt of euphoria about the surprise visit by Modi.
The electronic media in Pakistan ran edited video extracts from Modi’s address to the Afghan Parliament hours before his visit to lahore, implying his visceral hatred of Pakistan. In reality, to be fair to the Indian PM, he had indirectly referred to external manipulation of the crisis in Afghanistan and contrasted it with the constructive approach that India adopted vis-à-vis Afghanistan in clear contrast.
This was perhaps warranted, keeping in mind the Afghan expectations from India to play a more active role in Afghanistan. In Pakistan, it was marshalled as a case of double-speak and deception. What would you expect from the spoilers nowIJ A week hence Pathankot happened.
Pathankot and after
Did the two leaders apprehend something like Pathankot attack and almost simultaneous attack on the Indian consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif in Afghanistan, when they accelerated the pace of engagement all of a suddenIJ Perhaps they did. Perhaps they did not. If one were to go by the reactions that came from both the Governments in the wake of the attack, one would imagine, they were perhaps ready for such an eventuality. We should not quite underestimate the political leadership of the two countries. Modi called it an attack on humanity. His Government did not accuse Pakistan for the attack, even if the media in India was belligerent.
On the Pakistan’s side, some of the commentators in the electronic media, in an offensive-defense mode, called it an act orchestrated by spoilers in India — may be by Shiv Sainiks or RSS guys. Those in the vernacular print media were more inventive. You can give it to them for their links to you-know-whoIJ One of them said the entire act was stage-managed by the Indian intelligence through some of the unaccounted Pakistani militants who were transported to India from Kunduz way back in December 2001 and kept in lucknow!
The Pakistan Government in a welcome departure from the past chose not to bury itself in plausible-deniability. Remember Mumbai attacks of 26/11IJ There were immediate denials. Kasab was not a Pakistani. Pakistan was not involved in any way… and all that stuff. This time, the Government was quick to condemn the act. Nawaz and the NSA of Pakistan spoke to their counterparts and assured action. Some arrests were made. Investigations are on. All this could not salvage the scheduled FS-level talks, however. The two NSAs agreed to postpone the meeting, and there we are.
What nextIJ
It is useful to dwell on the spoiler dimension of the problem — forces that want the two countries to stay apart. Who could be orchestrating the attacks which are coming now in quicker succession than in the pastIJ What are the different hypotheses about itIJ
There are three different hypotheses. It flows from the conventional wisdom in India and Pakistan that the deep State in Pakistan was averse to Sharif’s bid to normalise relationship with India. One, the jehadi groups in Pakistan have assumed as autonomy of their own and they did it on their own without the knowledge of the military.
Two, the lower cadre in the military conspired with the jehadi elements and executed it while the top leadership remained happily ignorant of it.
Three, the top military leadership was very much in the know of it and wanted to signal its disapproval of the peace process being envisaged by the Sharif administration yet another time again.
Whichever way you look at these three hypotheses, it does not augur well for dialogue between India and Pakistan; and especially so for Pakistan itself. It means the military of Pakistan is either not in sync with the civilian administration and continues to nurture and use good jehads for its own interests, or it is fast losing its control, even over India-focussed jehadi groups. Either way, it is dangerous for Pakistan especially when it is facing an existential threat from its own version of Taliban — the TTP.
As much as the pro-military analysts in Pakistan attribute TTP’s consolidation to external encouragement and patronage, the rot lies deep within the thinking of the Pakistani military itself. They have to disabuse themselves of the paranoid thinking that they could manage the TTP threat by diverting the attention of local jehadis towards India or Kashmir.
The literature circulated by TTP and its affiliates suggests that they consider the whole concept of Pakistan faulty, premised on the imperial policy of divide and rule, turned into a spurious movement in the name of Islam, by agents of imperialism like Syed Ahmed, Jinnah, liaquat Ali Khan and others. They want Pakistan to shun the Constitution and adopt Sharia. They want Pakistan to go the whole hog and be a theocratic State. India is a threat they will deal with later.
Against this backdrop, the military of Pakistan, which is at the helm for all practical purposes, has to come to terms with reality, and read the writings on the wall. It has, through its policy of subversion and use of terror as an instrument of its foreign and security policies, hurtled Pakistan on a path of destruction.
The thinking in Rawalpindi that it is a low-cost strategy to keep India in check has led to a situation where the long-term unintended social consequences of such a strategy, in terms of sectarianism and radicalism, have far outweighed the material costs that they incurred.
Will there be a course correction after PathankotIJ It is far from probable. When you move towards the abyss, you are often blinded by your own specious reason.
And what is to expect on the Indian sideIJ Bitten multiple times over, never shy. It is true that rapprochement with Pakistan will unleash the hidden potential of India, Pakistan and the region to ensure healthy, prosperous and peaceful lives for the people in entire South Asia and have a balm effect on society at large suffering the scourge of radicalism.
However, when those in the driver’s seat in Pakistan look the other way when faced with challenges of epic dimension, you have little hope of the situation faring for the better. While staying committed to talks, India must explore all possible alternatives to save itself from the spoilers at large by strengthening its security machinery and enhancing co-ordination among different branches of Government to deal with the threats emanating from Pakistan.
(The writer is coordinator and fellow, South Asia Centre, IDSA, New Delhi)