Xi’s India visit following his tour to the Maldives and Sri lanka broke a conformist signal in Chinese diplomacy that Pakistan is the sole factor in Beijing’s diplomatic tactic to check India’s influence
Has the dynamics between India and China entered a new genre of power politics with President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to IndiaIJ The developments that took place around his visit to India and other South Asian countries indicate that a delicate power balance and a new mode of power politics is taking shape between India and China, comprising three ‘Ps’: partnership politics, power politics and patrolling politics along the border. Tangibly, during President Xi’s visit, the two countries signed a number of agreements and MoUs that expounded a case that both countries are emerging as “strong partners”. But the positivity of this engagement suffered a setback when a fresh incursion by the PlA soldiers was reported along India-China border. Also, to India’s disquiet, Xi’s visit to the Maldives and Sri lanka before arriving in India marked a new mode of power politics, which is designed to help Beijing enhance its foothold in South Asian affairs. Meanwhile, the Indian President’s visit to Vietnam during President Xi’s India visit was meant to pass on a signal to China that India does carry certain strategic interests in Southeast Asia, which may not necessarily be favourable to China’s strategic outlook. In the background of these developments, India-China dynamics seem to be emerging within a broad premise of being partners, while at the same time being two important power poles. The incidents of border incursion where troops have patrolled on both sides of the border manifest the other constant premise.
The immediate magnetism of Xi’s India visit was that India and China are partners in bilateral economic affairs. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi subscribed to this view. President Xi expressed the view that ‘as engines of Asian economy, India and China need to become cooperation partners spearheading growth’. Prime Minister Modi acknowledged that the newly signed agreements and MoUs would further the efforts to strengthen India-China partnership. These expressions convey the expectation that there is a massive scope and space for India and China to emerge as great neighbouring partners. Besides agreements like opening a new route for the Indian pilgrims for the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra, strengthening cooperation in the field of railways, five-year plan trade and economic linkages between the two countries, collaboration in customs matters, space cooperation, sister-city and provincial-level cooperation and establishing industrial parks are certain advanced steps for promoting the bilateral partnership. Beijing’s offer to India of $20 billion investment and greater market access to Indian products has also been perceived as a positive step to address the existing trade imbalance between the two countries. These addressed partially India’s concern for greater market access and investment opportunities for Indian companies in the Chinese domestic market. The pledges of these agreements point to the fact that India and China are greater economic partners at the bilateral level, and possess the capability to push forward a resolute partnership to regional level.
Hitherto, however, the strategic aspects of these proposals are not very encouraging. Even though the two countries have expressed an interest in increasing the bilateral aspects of their relationship, the regional aspect of the India-China economic partnership is one aspect that remains the spotlight of bilateral relations. Greater ideas and subjects like Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC), Maritime Silk Route (MSR) and Asian Investment Infrastructural Bank (AIIB) are new ideas and matters of discussion between India and China today. But will these necessarily foster a cooperative regional partnership between themIJ
Not really. let’s take the example of BCIM-EC. The idea of this sub-regional economic convergence is linked closely with the boundary as well as bordering problems between the two countries. Can China publicly renounce its claim over India’s state of Arunachal PradeshIJ This seems most improbable. The Chinese claim over Arunachal Pradesh has expanded over the years. That has made India virtually cold-shoulder the BCIM-EC proposal. Security conditions in northeast have induced India further to remain cautious about the BCIM. Moreover, bilateral economic enthusiasm has its own limitations that are connected with the mutual suspicion between the two neighbouring powers, which is bound to affect their regional cooperative drives. Similarly, China has invited India to join the AIIB for sometime now, but the proposal has still not been enunciated with sufficient clarity. Whether India and China have a cooperative role to play in AIIB is still being debated. The Chinese would like others to believe that their proposal would inspire infrastructural finance and connectivity among the Asian countries. It looks, however, that the prime Chinese intention behind the AIIB proposal is to sideline Asian Development Bank (ADB), in which Japan has considerable influence. Partially, this proposal is also intended to signal to the US that the global financial order needs to be reformed, as new financial influences like the AIIB and BRICS Development Bank have arrived.
likewise, Beijing has invited India to join its proposed MSR. This invitation was extended to India during their Special Representative-level talks in Beijing under the previous Indian regime. In deciding whether to accept this offer, the main test before India is to understand the scope and extent of the MSR. The Chinese notion of MSR was originally mooted in the ASEAN context and now extends to South Asia, the Indian Ocean Region, the Gulf region and the African coast. Such extension of the vision of the concept has obvious serious implications for India and the rest of Asia.
The longstanding boundary dispute, Chinese antipathy towards India on the Tibetan issue, including on the Dalai lama, and border issues such as the Chinese construction activities in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and the emerging conflict over water in the bordering region have prompted competitive features in India-China ties. These bilateral security complexities have also prevailed over full-scale economic engagements. These bilateral complexities have extended to different parts of Asia, including in the South Asian region where China’s rising presence has been an imminent concern for India. Given this aspect, the South Asian or sub-regional context of Xi’s visit to India was interesting, as it implied a new genre of Chinese diplomacy and move in the regional context. Xi’s India visit following his visit to the Maldives and Sri lanka broke a conformist signal in Chinese diplomacy that Pakistan is the sole factor in Beijing’s diplomatic tactic to check India’s influence. It was a signal that other South Asian countries apart from Pakistan are important factors if China has to deal with India’s primacy in South Asia as well as in other parts of Asia. President Xi expressed the view during his press briefing with Prime Minister Modi that China wants India’s greater involvement in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) but in return China targets to play a greater role in the SAARC. The Chinese strategic interests in South Asian region were apparent in Xi’s expressed views.
Between partnership politics and power politics, President XI’s visit to India witnessed a case of ‘patrolling’ on both sides and China propelling simultaneously another tension in the border region through a fresh incursion. This incursion along ladakh was not only a substantial one by the PlA, but also an orchestrated one to possibly pass a message to the current Indian leadership that India must take the border problem seriously. Besides, it seemed to be a pointer that India must take a pause in building roads, construction activities and other developmental works near the border region till the two countries solve the boundary problem. There was also an obvious message that the stated economic partnership should not get confused with security and strategic facets. The Chinese message probably is to the extent that the boundary between the two needs some serious attention and India must be considerate to China’s demand. “Patrolling” troops, even though peacefully, along the border region is becoming almost a routine occurrence, suggesting that the India-China bilateral ties are much more complicated than they appear on the surface.
To see holistically, themes linked to regional economic engagements, maritime politics and greater convergence of interests in Asia need serious attention too. The future course of India-China relations will depend heavily upon these aspects. A lot will depend upon how the new leaderships in India and China address these issues. Modi and Xi must outline and decide the order of India-China ties. The upshot of being “partners”, being two important “powers” and the mode of “patrolling” the troops along the border are key aspects of India-China ties that need greater debate and discussion. Greater wisdom, leadership eminence as well as a liberal mode of thinking would hold the key to sustaining and enhancing the relationship.
(The writer is Research Fellow & Centre Coordinator, East Asia, at IDSA, New Delhi)