Cyber and outer space, alongside land, air and water, make for the five threat domains that exist today. A strategist who understands them all is needed to script a comprehensive defence policy
During the recent Army Commanders’ conference, Union Minister for Defence AK Antony exhorted the officers to be ready to face any external threat. Experts agree that to meet the military challenges posed by Pakistan and China — countries that share an unholy nexus and disputed borders with India — reforms in higher defence management are an absolute necessity. At the top of list is the need for a single Armed Forces Commander working at the strategic level, as opposed to the three Service chiefs who at the operational level, remain responsible for the conduct of war.
Such an officer could be the Chief of Defence Staff or the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, or at a more humble level, the permanent Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, as proposed recently by the Naresh Chandra Committee report tasked with a 10-year review of the 2002 Group of Ministers recommendations mooted by the Atal Bihari Vajpayee Government. What has escaped the notice of experts is that the meaning of a strategic commander in 2013 is different from what it was a decade ago. A single Armed Forces Commander, while still needed, will no longer be a strategic player. And herein lies the rub.
To understand the need and requirements of a successful strategic player, let us look at the external military environment that India faces. Before the 1998 nuclear tests, the country could do with the existing Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee system, where all three Service chiefs are equal, and the senior-most chief, in rotation, dons the additional charge of the Chairman. Though imperfect on numerous counts, it did not seriously impair war-time operations.
Once India declared itself a nuclear weapons state, the Vajpayee Government took two laudable steps. It created the post of National Security Adviser and formed a task force — one of four — on reforms in defence management. While the need for the CDS was emphasised, the Government settled for a watered-down version. It announced the creation of a vice CDS, who was soon renamed the Chief of Integrated Staff to Chairman, reporting to the Chiefs of Staff Committee. lt General Pankaj Joshi became the first CISC in 2003. Because the Chiefs of Staff Committee could not fulfil its mandate, the CISC, despite efforts for over a decade, has remained practically ineffective.
The CISC’s job was simple: In addition to land, sea and air forces (responsibility of the three Services), the nuclear capabilities too needed to be managed. The latter were to be handled by the NSA and the CDS. While being the single-point military adviser to the Prime Minister, the CDS was also to be kept in the nuclear weapons execution loop with the NSA at the top end, and the Strategic Forces Commander (also created by the Vajpayee Government) at the lower end.
A strategist in 2002 needed to understand what was tactically and operationally possible in all possible domains of war, namely, air, sea, land and nuclear. This way, he would become the bridge between the use of military force and political purpose. The Naresh Chandra panel recommendations submitted to the Government in August 2012, unfortunately, reviewed only those military threat domains that were available in 2002.
A decade later, the number of threat domains has increased and the occasion now requires synergy in five areas: land, sea, air, nuclear, space and cyber. Also, do not forget that the ‘land threat’ has twin dimensions: conventional warfare and externally-aided terrorism. A good strategist thus needs to be a master of all these domains to understand the complexity of war.
Moreover, stated bluntly, at the strategic level a lot more can go wrong than at the operational level where the Services routinely plan, equip, train and prepare for war. The space and cyber domains of warfare assume added significance as China has made massive strides in both; so much so, that it even has the US worried. By demonstrating anti-satellite capability in 2009, China has made space-based assets vulnerable in the case of war. In the cyber domain, it is indeed ironical that the US, which invented the internet, is today struggling to formulate an effective cyber deterrence policy against China. Needless to add, in the case of India, China will assist Pakistan by lending its asymmetrical capabilities.
What can India doIJ Many things, but, more to the point, it needs an NSA who can deliver. This is not to belittle the incumbent adviser, who is working within his political constrains. It is hardly a secret that he does not enjoy the freedom that was available to the country’s first NSA, Brajesh Mishra. The latter had enormous authority granted to him by the Prime Minister, wherein he could even summon the political and administrative heads of various Ministries. Mishra delivered well on his responsibilities as he understood matters of war in all its domains at that time. There is some truth in the assertion that with the exception of Mishra, all NSAs have delivered little, being just the diplomats and policemen that they were.
Ideally, between the Prime Minister and his NSA, it should be possible to devise a successful strategy to meet military challenges from Pakistan and China. This will involve synergy between various Ministries such as Defence, Home Affairs and Communications and Information Technology. There has to be also a focus on the Department of Space alongside collaboration with the Defence Research and Development Organisation.
For example, India needs to craft a cyber-policy that will meet the burgeoning Chinese challenge. While the incumbent NSA, Mr Shivshankar Menon, has delegated this responsibility to his deputy Nehchal Sandhu, it is unclear how much authority he has to bring various senior stakeholders to the table. Similarly, given the DRDO’s track record of boasting — its Director-General VK Saraswat believes that having modest anti-ballistic missile capability is enough for anti-satellite deterrence — it is imperative that the DRDO’s activities are monitored and regularly audited.
In short, with the Prime Minister taking little interest in military matters, he needs to give powers — even political — to his NSA to assist him in transforming into a strategist. Only then will the Prime Minister and a single point military commander together be able to generate the necessary synergy to meet the complex national security challenges facing the nation.
(The writer is Editor, FORCE, a magazine on defence affairs)