No politico-strategic assessment of China’s growth story appears to interest Indian research institutions. Not even a secondary one, based on a stock-taking of the excellent literature on the Chinese economy, available in Western academia
Despite the obvious importance of understanding its northern neighbour, both as one that looms large on India’s politico-strategic horizon (including in its troubled neighbourhood) as well as a rising power globally that makes no secret now of its ambitions to rival the USA, the national endeavour to do so is woefully weak. The number of units in the country geared to study China can be counted on one’s finger tips. The quantum of resources devoted, and exertions are also miniscule.
More importantly, there appears to be no inter se coordination or consultation between these institutions as regards the foci of their respective activities and endeavours — something that would appear to make eminent sense in a resource scarce nation. What is required is an apportioning of thrust areas between different research centres, in other words, in accordance with the professional strengths and comparative advantage of each, with a view to generating “coherent synergy” between their strivings.
And the scope of their endeavours does not even cover the tangible realm of the “known unknowns” (economic and military strengths and weaknesses, internal social and political vulnerabilities and so on), not to speak of the nebulous category of “unknown unknowns” (such as insights into thinking patterns, mental make-up, strategic culture and statecraft which are abstract and require a higher order probing). A few basic examples of the kind of tasks that are not undertaken, and the kind of questions that remain unanswered — even unaddressed — in the national discourse on China, should suffice to illustrate the point.
Omission 1
Thus no unit in India (outside Government, which is, for obvious reasons, left out of the purview of this critique) has in all these years of repeated ups and downs in the nation’s not-so-salutary interaction with its propaganda-prone peer considered it necessary to monitor and mine the Chinese media for information available in it (free, and without access barriers). Its coverage of India, in particular, which can be a veritable goldmine of insights into Chinese pre-occupations, prejudices and political anxieties in the hands of a discerning reader capable of deconstructing the “filters” through which the Chinese Communist Party-state views and projects India.
The media is, after all, the channel through which the Chinese leadership has to communicate with its citizenry, so the considerations and calculations underlying their projection of India (as indeed of any country or subject) to their domestic audiences cannot but come out in the process — they are, in fact, embedded in the media projections and have only to be laid bare with a discerning eye.
This gap shows up most starkly during high-level visits, such as that of the Chinese President in September last. How the visit was projected to Chinese audiences — which aspects of the many statements he made in India were played down, or not intimated at all to Chinese audiences (especially on sensitive issues like the border, Tibet, Pakistan, etc); how the host’s remarks on those questions, and reception of his guest generally, were featured and so on — would have been quite revealing of the Chinese approach towards India. It would have lent depth to the Indian assessment of the (impact of the) visit. But the country chooses to deprive itself of such a rich and easy source of nuancing readings on a matter of vital national interest.
Omission 2
likewise, study of the Chinese economy — its performance, problems, potential and prospects — at the present juncture, as that country negotiates new twists and turns in the course of changing the growth model it followed hitherto (from “extensive” to “intensive” growth and one less reliant on export markets in the industrialised world and investment within) should be of interest in India from several standpoints.
There is, first, the economic angle per se — to be able to gauge the extent of surpluses at the disposal of China for deployment externally (militarily or otherwise); the base on which the edifice of power of other kinds is built. The economic component, in other words, of what in Chinese strategic discourse is conceptualised as “Comprehensive National Power”. (Military, technology and capacity for strategic mobilisation of material and human resources being the others — Chinese thinking underestimates, or conceals may be in its public discourse, the role of intangible factors such as societal resilience and entrepreneurial energies, which have a critical bearing on socio-political stability.)
Chinese economic performance is of interest from a political angle as well. The chances of the Chinese political system being able to continue to command citizen allegiance and enjoy socio-political stability in the years to come will depend largely on the degree of success the leadership is able to achieve on the economic front. The Report of the outgoing General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Hu Jintao, presented to the 18th Congress held in November 2012 — the most important document discussed at this five yearly apex gathering of the Party — dwelt at some length on questions economic. It was also replete with references to (economic and other) challenges, including some stated quite starkly (such as corruption and licentious/wanton, conduct of Party members), suggesting an overall strategic scenario of that nation’s polity having reached a kind of an impasse, ideologically, with the leadership increasingly left with little choice but to predicate the legitimacy of monopoly CCP rule on continued delivery of economic successes.
The latter is, however, a matter of perception — so far, in the three decades plus of economic reform and opening up (initiated by the late Deng Xiaoping in December 1978), the improvements in living standards of the people (which, by all accounts, have been felt by the populace palpably) have been well ahead of their expectations. That may or may not be the case in the future, with exhaustion of the relatively easy sources of growth and a consequent slowing down of the growth rate (accompanied by difficult burden-sharing choices and trade-offs), on the one hand, and a quantum leap in popular expectations (and disaffection) generated by the demonstration effect (of these very successes, to wider sections of the citizenry), fuelled by the communications and media revolutions, on the other. Hence the question mark over the future of the Chinese polity.
But no such politico-strategic assessment appears to interest Indian economic research institutions. Not even a secondary one, based on a stock-taking of the excellent literature on the Chinese economy, available in Western academia, parsed from an Indian standpoint (if delving into primary sources in the Chinese language is considered too forbidding a task).
Testing the reading that the ebbing of double digit growth of the Chinese economy due to exhaustion of the main sources of that growth hitherto (waning demand in industrialised country markets above all) is unlikely to ease in the foreseeable future, and its corollary that Chinese dependence on upcoming markets like that of India will grow concomitantly, is one that should be of obvious interest in India.
Omission 3
The military dimension of China’s power, widely but wrongly hyped ahead of reality, is the one most directly pertinent for India. It would have been in the fitness of things, and no big deal, if the country’s military sector with myriad well-funded think-tanks had made a name for itself, at least post-1962, for scholarship on the Chinese military, its relationship with the Party, influence on foreign policy-making and overall role in the Chinese political system. That, however, is far from being the case.
Though a major border incursion incident was staged by the Chinese in ladakh cheek by jowl with their President’s visit in September last, the state of understanding of China’s military in the country is not at a stage where anything definite could be concluded about the scenario underlying the incident at the Chinese end — i.e. whether it was a local PlA level initiative or done at the behest of some central authority to signal a message to India and, if so, what and whether the visiting top leader was privy to that signaling and so on. The result is prevarication, with bold options for dealing with such situations going off the table automatically, leaving the nation’s diplomacy to pick up the pieces.
Remedial Action
The main reason for this sorry state of affairs is lack of Chinese language expertise in the country. In the absence of translation facilities, source material available in Chinese (only) is not accessible to scholars and analysts, who have per force to rely on translated versions in English put out by the Chinese media. These are, almost always, not complete translations but only excerpts. Very often, they are not even exact translations of the excerpts selected but summaries giving a gist, not the exact turn of phrase. They are obviously not authentic representations of the original, the selection and summation making them vulnerable to biases. Nuance is lost in the process and in-depth interpretation of intent becomes a casualty.
This is a gap that can only be overcome in the long run, through a dedicated programme for grooming language experts in large numbers. There is need for establishment of a national Chinese language Center, with a mandate to monitor, and translate, material (writings/commentaries/books/TV footage) on pre-identified themes emanating from China and making them available to analysts on a daily basis.
The decision to teach Mandarin in secondary schools is a right step. It must be implemented with alacrity (if necessary as pilot projects in selected schools where conditions are conducive, in order not to let blocks in the larger system hold up the entire exercise). In the interregnum until that policy begins to deliver, hiring of experts on commercial terms should be resorted to. With increasing numbers of Indian students going to China for higher studies, the requisite language felicity should be available in that constituency, at least as a supplementary source.
Unfortunately, proposals in this regard seeking sponsorship of self-contained projects on these aspects, made to various authorities and think-tanks, languish unattended, without even an acknowledgement of receipt. It is time the Indian strategic establishment showed better appreciation of these concerns and attend to remedial action expeditiously.
(The The writer is a former Ambassador with a background on China, nuclear and other strategic issues. At present, he is Adjunct Faculty, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru. His perspective on India-China Relations can be seen in more detail in his writings at http://www.nias.res.in/aboutnias-people-faculty-ambassadorsaurabhkumar.php)