Even though Pakistan is reportedly increasing its nuclear arsenal, there is no need for India to engage in an arms race. Instead, India should invest in improving the technological quality and survivability of its nuclear weapons
A report on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons by the Stimson Center and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace titled ‘Pakistan as a normal nuclear State’ says that Pakistan is on the verge of becoming the third largest nuclear weapon power of the world. Currently, with about 300 warheads, France holds this position.
The report states that Pakistan’s highly enriched uranium production makes it possible to develop approximately 14 to 27 nuclear weapons per year, while India can develop only two to five nuclear weapons per year.
While on one hand, India has only one plutonium reactor (the Dhurva reactor) which is capable of producing 12 to 25 kilograms of plutonium per year, Pakistan has developed four plutonium reactors which can help produce 25 to 50 plutonium per year.
This shows the substantive difference in the capabilities of the two South Asian nuclear rivals. It brings us to the question: Is this is an alarming situation for IndiaIJ Should India engage in a nuclear arms race to beat PakistanIJ
The answer is a big ‘no’. India’s engagement in a nuclear mad race will not result into any strategic, political or international benefit because of its own policies which are reflected in its nuclear doctrine.
The nuclear doctrine of India lays stress on the ‘no-first-use’ and ‘credible minimum deterrence’. These two policies are the foundation stone for India’s nuclear doctrine and it removes the need for India to engaged in a nuclear arms race. There is no need for India to have an unlimited number of nuclear arsenals when it is not going to strike first.
Events like the 1999 Kargil conflict, the attack on Parliament in 2001 and the 2008 Mumbai attack clearly indicate that India is a tolerant state which will stick to its policy of ‘no-first-use’ even in case of a crisis.
The ‘no-first-use’ policy necessitates the presence of enough retaliatory capability rather than engaging a country in the number race of nuclear weapons. Also, the concept of credible minimum deterrence falls under the concept of ‘minimum deterrence’, which means that a country only needs that much number of nuclear weapons which is needed to deter the adversary.
For example, if India can deter Pakistan with two nuclear weapons, there is no need to have 10 more nuclear weapons in the stockpile.
Therefore, engaging in a nuclear arms race will not strengthen India’s position and will fall against its nuclear policy and doctrine. The twin concepts of no-first-use policy and credible minimum deterrence necessitate India to have technological developments in its nuclear and conventional arsenals so as to deter an adversary.
So, the question is: How should we deal with the present crisis in the coming 10 yearsIJ Instead of spending our precious Budget on building more nuclear weapons, India should invest in increasing technological quality and survivability of its nuclear weapons.
Reason being, India has to maintain the ‘second strike option’ because a nuclear weapon has the capacity to launch a successful second strike capability only after suffering a nuclear attack.
This calls for an increasing survivability of our nuclear forces without increasing its numbers. The one step taken in this direction is India’s first nuclear-powered submarine INS Arihant.
The development of nuclear submarine is an important step in ensuring the nuclear’s second strike capability as it is difficult to locate it.
However, there are questions associated with INS Arihant, like it needs to be fitted with K-15 missile having a radius of 700 to 850, which is considered to be inadequate from the perspective of having effective nuclear deterrence. Development of INS Arihant can be regarded as a first step in ensuring survivability of nuclear weapons.
There are other steps too that needs to be taken up. Questions of command, control (in case Pakistan launches its nuclear weapon directly on command and control structures of India) and development of more secure missile silos.
India also needs to ask itself whether it will launch nuclear weapons in case of an attack by Pakistan by tactical nuclear weapons which it is developing at high speed.
The direct answer to such attack would be the launch of conventional smart nuclear weapons and the development of prompt global strike on the line of the US.
This will not only result a reduce reliance of India on nuclear weapons but will also secure India’s position with regards to present circumstances and its dealings with Pakistan.
(The writer is a PhD scholar at Jawaharlal Nehru University. She is researching nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles)