India's nuclear-armed submarine fleet will have regional and global implications, which could affect its campaign for NSG membership, write FRANK O'DONNEll and YOGESH JOSHI
India's campaign for membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the 48-member grouping of states which sets much of the rules of global nuclear commerce, has been a key aim of its foreign policy since winning an exemption in 2008 from trade restrictions that the group imposes on states that have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. At its most recent meeting, in Buenos Aires in June 2014, the group considered and again rejected India's credentials for membership. India has sought to convince the group of its record as a responsible, restrained nuclear weapons state, pointing to policies such as ‘no-first-use’ and a voluntary testing moratorium, and its nuclear export control record. As a gesture of goodwill and to underline its desire that India be integrated into the global nuclear order, the Modi Government has ratified an Additional Protocol in June, expanding the aegis of International Atomic Energy Agency’s verification of its civilian nuclear programme.
While these measures should help assuage NSG concerns, New Delhi should not overlook the changes that its emerging Arihant-class nuclear-armed submarine fleet will bring to its nuclear programme, the region, and the global campaign to reduce nuclear weapon and fissile material stockpiles.
The Arihant fleet will likely be fuelled by highly-enriched uranium. Arresting the growth of HEU production and use has been a major concern of the Nuclear Security Summit process, of which India is a committed member. As India prepares to deploy a fleet of nuclear submarines, its demand for uranium enrichment will increase further. A way for India to address this issue that also supports its aspirations to manage the global nuclear order would be to lead in developing a naval HEU verification mechanism under the auspices of the IAEA.
The International Panel on Fissile Materials has proposed a plan for such a mechanism, within which a state's naval HEU stocks would be placed under IAEA safeguards. The IAEA would verify the volume of fissile material removed from the safeguarded facility and compare it with that used in naval nuclear reactors using radiation spectrometry. This would demonstrate India's leadership in developing an international mechanism to render more difficult the practice of diverting HEU ostensibly produced for naval nuclear propulsion to warhead development. This initiative would also help ward off potential international criticism regarding rising Indian HEU production.
The development of new weapons for the submarine fleet reopens questions about the credibility of the 1998 nuclear tests. At a conference in August 2009, K Santhanam, project director of the 1998 tests, publicly declared that the thermonuclear device was a ‘fizzle', or had not performed according to expectations. The reliability of India's nuclear weapons’ new testing rounds remains a topic of discussion in Indian strategic circles. However, New Delhi must balance its technical requirements against the likely international repercussions of conducting a new round of tests. Any such tests would give Islamabad a reason and political cover to follow suit. Such developments would have grave consequences for India's nuclear and conventional security, as well as its international reputation.
The likely regional implications of the Arihant fleet underline the importance for India of protecting its image as a responsible, restrained nuclear weapons state. Pakistani officials have signalled their intention to develop a fleet of ballistic-missile submarines in response to the Arihant. Pakistan's Navy chief, acknowledging the emergence of the Arihant fleet in February 2012, affirmed that Pakistan was “taking necessary measures to restore the strategic balance”. However, there is a gap between these intentions and Pakistan's current technical capabilities. This gap may create a window for China to assist Pakistan's nuclear programme through a new round of proliferation.
By demonstrating leadership on the above issues, India would improve its standing among NSG states and within the global non-proliferation regime, which it could leverage to raise the political costs for Beijing and Islamabad of developing Pakistani ballistic-missile submarines. By anticipating these likely implications of the Arihant fleet and building these policy measures into its nuclear diplomacy, India can continue to advance its twin aims of full acceptance into the global nuclear order while fielding a credible minimum deterrent.
(Frank O'Donnell is a doctoral candidate at King's College london. Yogesh Joshi is a doctoral candidate at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi)