The principle of ‘equal and mutual security' will not work with the Chinese, since the bottomline of the 1993, 1996, and 2013 agreements is 'mutual consultations'. Beijing will not entertain the Indians if it does not suit its purpose
In a welcome development, Union Minister for Environment, Forests and Climate Change Prakash Javadekar has said that a policy to fast-track environment clearances for border roads and defence projects within 100km of the military-held line of Control with China will be announced soon. While this is expected to facilitate construction of long-delayed infrastructure needed for movement of forces and assets, including the positioning of the new mountain strike Corps (about 90,000 troops) on the 3,488km line of Actual Control to match the Chinese preparedness, the devil, as always, lies in the details. Here are three major challenges that India, hoping to deter the Chinese from its regular and oft border intrusions, will have to contend with:
Will the Border Roads Organisation — responsible for construction of operational and tactical roads on the lAC — in its present form, be able to deliverIJ Raised in May 1960, with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru as the Chairman of the BRO board, it was meant to be an inter-ministerial organisation. Being under the watchful eyes of an assertive Prime Minister, the BRO was mandated to deliver projects on time, cutting across bureaucratic malaise. Today, the BRO, responsible for operations spread across India, Bhutan and Myanmar is under the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, with the Army (as the user in case of hostilities) having little control over its activities.
Consequently, agreed projects between the BRO and the Army’s Military Operations Directorate have not fructified. For example, under the long Term Perspective Plan-I, 36 operationally-critical roads were to be completed by 2012. Similarly, under the lTPP-2, 40 lateral roads, which would enable inter-valley connectivity to allow switching of forces, are to be completed by 2022. Specific to Arunachal Pradesh, (where the mountain strike Corps is to operate), the main highway was to be a two-lane road and all bridges were to be upgraded to permanent Class 40 specifications in order to support movement of heavier artillery such as Pinaka and Smerch.
During a visit to Tawang (Arunachal Pradesh) in August 2011, after a gap of 33 years when I was posted in the sector as a young Army officer, I found to my horror that, while forces had increased substantively, the state of the roads was as abysmal as ever. The general officer commanding confirmed that he has little powers to persuade the BRO to deliver. However, to be fair to the BRO, I found that they were woefully short of funds and equipment, and many of their personnel were old and unfit to work in high altitude conditions. Considering that the Army has adopted the extreme forward posture with extensive regular patrolling, the BRO, in its present avatar, will not come up to expectations.
The next issue concerns the terrain on both sides. The terrain on the Chinese side has gradual gradient as compared to the Indian side which suffers from what the Army calls ‘friction of terrain’ owing to ‘young mountains’. This leads to frequent landslides and can cause havoc during rains. As a drill, troops travelling on the main road to Tawang carry packed rations lest they are stranded. Thus, a monsoon campaign in Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims as its territory, would benefit their troops. Senior Army officers who I spoke with agreed that a solution has to be found to ensure that mountains remain firm to ensure minimal landslides. This is beyond BRO mandate and competence.
Taking advantage of the terrain, the Chinese side has proper gravel roads right till the lAC. The comparison is stark and disturbing. The Chinese have deliberately avoided ‘black top’ (concrete) roads as gravel roads allow better water drainage during monsoons, and it puts pressure on the Indian side to not make ‘black top’ roads on its side. This is not all. The Chinese appear under no pressure to maintain round-the-clock forward vigil. They are content with using a plethora of tactically-networked surveillance means which are monitored regularly. This puts tremendous psychological pressure on our troops.
The flat barren Tibet terrain at the altitude of 16,000 feet suggests Chinese reliance on Rapid Reaction Forces, which are always acclimated. In comparison, Indian troops need a rigorous three-stage acclimatisation (six days for stage one at 10,000 feet; and four days each at 12,000 feet and 15,000 feet) before they can be inducted into battles. During this period, the troops are forced to live in tents under extreme winter conditions. A pilot project for fabricated reinforced plastic huts, where troops can live during acclimatisation was started in 2009, but, for various reasons, it is moving slowly. The need, therefore, is to have adequate permanent defences for additional forces which will be inducted before hostilities. Moreover, the troops of the new strike Corps will require permanent defences (as good if not better than what exits on the loC facing Pakistan), and of course, familiarisation with their operational tasking followed by adequate training.
This brings us to the third challenge, which is the severest of all. Following an appeasement policy, successive Indian Prime Ministers have weakened defence preparedness on the lAC. Under the 1993 Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement, India gave away its right to decide its preparedness. According to Article 2 of the agreement: “The two sides agree to reduce their military forces along the line of Actual Control in conformity with the requirements of the principle of mutual and equal security to ceilings to be mutually agreed. The extent, depth, timing and nature of reduction of military forces along the lAC shall be determined through mutual consultations between the two countries.”
Similarly, under the 1996 agreement, “Major categories of armaments to be subjected to ceilings include: Combat tanks, infantry combat vehicles, guns with 75mm or bigger calibre, mortars with 120mm or bigger calibre, surface to surface missiles, surface to air missiles and any other weapons system mutually agreed upon.” Moreover, the 2013 Border Defence Cooperation Agreement has reiterated the commitments made earlier in the 1993 and 1996 agreements. The point to note is that the Chinese have gone to lengths to make a legal case against India’s war preparedness.
It could be argued that the principle of equal and mutual security will give due importance “to parameters such the nature of terrain, road communications and time taken to induct/de-induct troops and armaments”, as is mentioned in Article 3 of the 1996 agreement. This will not work in India’s favour because the operative bottom-line of the 1993, 1996, and 2013 agreements is ‘mutual consultations’. Why will the Chinese understand India’s perspective, however legitimate and fair, if it does not suit themIJ By building up its forces during a situation of imminent hostilities, India will surely fall into Chinese trap, as according to their war doctrine, they never attack first, but always fight in self-defence.
More to the point, given the existing troops and armament ceilings on the lAC, where will the new strike Corps live and do its trainingIJ After some thinking, a top Army officer at Army Headquarters told me, “Troops need not live close to their operational areas; and similar terrain as the lAC can be found elsewhere for training purposes”. Will this be realistic, is what the political and Army leadership should ponder over.
(The writer is a former Indian Army officer and now Editor, FORCE, a newsmagazine on national security)