Once China made the desired gains at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, it stepped back, in true Chinese style of ‘confrontation and cooperation' diplomacy. At the strategic level, it brought India's political leadership under enormous psychological pressure
Clarity on the disputed border between India and China will help us better understand the recent Depsang occupation by Chinese border guards, which ended as dramatically as it had started. This may also help us crystal-gaze into what lies ahead.
During my July 2012 trip to Beijing, when I had a week-long opportunity to meet with officers of the People’s liberation Army and visit the Army’s installations, I asked them how they defined China’s border with India. Colonel Guo Hongtao, Staff Officer of the Asian Affairs Bureau, Foreign Office, Ministry of National Defence, who had participated in special representative talks on border resolution, said: “The border question is about four lines. The first is China’s traditional claim line, which is 2,000km long. The second is the line claimed by India, the so-called McMahon line, which is longer. The third line is the line presently held by both sides (line of Actual Control). Because of these three lines we can say that India has done more transgressions than the Chinese side. The fourth line is about Sikkim.”
The Colonel implied three important things. First, China has unilaterally shrunk the disputed border by half, from 4,056km that India believes to a mere 2,000km that Beijing accepts today. The discounted portion is the entire Western sector (Jammu & Kashmir) which runs from the tri-junction of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir-Afghanistan-Xinjiang, along the K2 mountain, Shaskgam valley, Daulat Beg Oldi till Demchok. Second, the lAC, though 4,056km, is mutually accepted neither on ground nor on maps. Moreover, being a military-held line, it can be shifted at will by force. And third, the 90,000 sq km Indian State of Arunachal Pradesh (Eastern sector), called South Tibet by Beijing since 2006, belongs to China. So, on the one hand, China does not have a border with India in PoK and ladakh, on the other hand, India has occupied the Eastern sector which belongs to China.
Contrast this with China’s border-settlement formula that was offered by its Premier Zhou Enlai in 1959 and 1960 and by Deng Xiaoping in 1980. The then proposed land swap was: Karakoram (Western sector) for China, and the Himalayas (Eastern sector) for India, with Tawang tract in the Eastern sector to go to China. Thus, in 33 years from 1980 onwards, China built excellent border infrastructure, impressive military capability, and through various bilateral treaties, visits and protocols, and made a legal case to have its cake and eat it too. Forget a land-for-peace swap, China has done the unprecedented in history: laid claims on both Western and Eastern sectors legally, without firing a shot.
So why did Depsang start and end suddenlyIJ Once China made the desired gains at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, it stepped back, in Chinese style of ‘confrontation and cooperation’ diplomacy. At the strategic level, it brought India’s political leadership under enormous psychological pressure for 20 days. like Tibet is China’s ‘core concern’, where Beijing will never tolerate outside interference, the border issue is India’s ‘core concern’, where, unfortunately, a deal has been struck to buy peace. New Delhi’s appeasement at whatever level will spur China to boldly unfold its grand strategy of encircling India, both from land and sea, in the years ahead.
At the operational level, the Chinese move has made the Siachen Glacier extremely vulnerable with a two-front war situation staring India in the face. With China showing disregard for the lAC on the eastern side of the glacier, and Pakistan treating the western side as no-man’s land, the stage is set to cut off logistics supplies for 4,000 Indian soldiers on the glacier (which they have been occupying since May 1984) at the time of the enemy’s choosing. It is no coincidence that Pakistan’s interpretation of the line of Control beyond mutually-agreed map point NJ 9842 runs eastwards and joins at the Karakoram Pass, just 30km north of where Chinese troops had pitched their tents. In a broader sense, India’s claims over north ladakh stands diluted, and leh, the capital of ladakh, is militarily vulnerable.
At the tactical level, the morale of Indian forces (regular Army and Indo-Tibetan Border Police) manning the lAC would plummet. What use is holding posts round the year at heights of 18,000 feet and above, if the higher leadership lacks the determination to push intruders back, is what the soldiers would ask.
Against this backdrop, Union Minister for Defence AK Antony’s remarks made to the media that “the situation is not of our making”, sounds outlandish. To be sure, if India was politically strong-willed and militarily capable, China would not have acted so brazenly. Mr Antony, the longest serving Defence Minister, cannot absolve himself of his responsibility. It needs to be remembered that the disputed border is India’s Achilles Heel, which China will regularly exploit.
Despite having a 13-lakh standing Army, a large Air Force and Navy, and an annual defence budget of $49 billion, India has given little importance to its national security. Political will can be assessed by recalling the November 26, 2008, Pakistan-sponsored terrorist attack in Mumbai, where 164 lives were lost. India did nothing in retaliation. Moreover, the country lacks a military strategy roadmap to match the PlA, as it would require a matrix which synergises five domains of war: land, air, sea, space and cyber. Unlike China, Indian defence services, namely, the Army, the Air Force and the Navy, have neither jointly assessed the Chinese threat nor do they have a single war doctrine to match the PlA’s conventional war prowess.
In specific terms, there are at least seven Chinese military capabilities for land warfare that the Indian military (Army and Air Force) will find difficult to match without help from the Defence Minister. These are: Desired border infrastructure, preponderance of accurate conventional ballistic missiles, massive air lift capabilities, hardened special forces, unity of command exemplified by Chinese Military Area Command concept, space and anti-satellite capabilities, and offensive cyber prowess. Without these, and given the known critical deficiencies of equipment and ammunition in the Army, brave words from the Army Chief to take on the Chinese do not amount to much. The Depsang incident should be a wake-up call for India.
(The writer is a former Indian Army officer and now Editor, FORCE, a newsmagazine on national security)