Peace has become elusive in Afghanistan as the Quadrilateral Coordination Group failed to prepare the ground for reconciliation. Focus is on Pakistan. In case the Taliban fail to strike a deal with the Ghani Government on Pakistani terms, Islamabad’s credibility will be at stake
There are a number of ways to understand a peace process which finally leads to agreements that are formal contracts, meant to end violent conflicts. Peace agreements during a peace process may include pre-negotiation agreements, interim agreements, framework agreements, and implementation agreements. Each has a specific purpose. However, sometimes, one agreement may overlap the other. Pre-negotiation agreements are ‘talks about talks’ as they tend to deal with issues such as who is going to negotiate with what status and what is the agenda of negotiations. At this stage, negotiations discuss the pre-conditions of talks such as the release of political prisoners, or cessation of hostilities or ceasefire during peace negotiations. But the Afghan peace process is still stuck in the primary stage and is yet to reach the level of pre-negotiation deal.
The Quadrilateral Coordination Group which includes Afghanistan, China, Pakistan and the US, has taken a much-needed initiative to pacify the conflict-ridden Afghanistan. The QCG mechanism became operational in January when it met for the first time. And just before the fourth round of QCG discussions in February, Pakistan Army chief Raheel Sharif travelled to Doha to persuade the Taliban factions and groups to return to the negotiating table. But it is not hard to believe that any substantial breakthrough in peace negotiations is as remote as ever.
The QCG is not a balanced and efficient mechanism to bring about lasting peace in Afghanistan as it effectively blocks Russia and Iran, the two most important neighbours of Afghanistan, from the discussion table. Most importantly, multiple rounds of talks among the quartet have failed to convince the Afghan Taliban to talk peace with the Government in Kabul. Although former Afghan Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami, formally allied with the Afghan Taliban, has decided to join the peace talks, it will not have a greater impact on the peace process because Hezb-e Islami’s capability of anti-Government insurgency has been increasingly declining over the years and it has virtually no or little influence over the Taliban. Why does the latest refusal by the Taliban, to join the peace negotiations, seem so much frightening today than it did a few years backIJ
There are serious concerns about the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan. Terrorists are posing several challenges to the prospects of peace and security in that volatile region. This is borne out by the recent observations of Nicholas Haysom, the special representative of the UN Secretary General for Afghanistan. Haysom has painted a very grim picture of the situation in Afghanistan where conflict has grown in intensity and scope, resulting in all Afghan governmental institutions, including security forces, being critically challenged on all fronts.
The two most disturbing features of the report are the rise in security-related incidents in 2015 as compared to 2014, and the deterioration of security in areas that have not been previously the Taliban’s stronghold. The Taliban have undoubtedly expanded their territorial reach last year, as reflected in the temporary capture of about two dozen districts in almost all parts of the country, with the temporary seize of the Provincial capital of Kunduz being the most notorious and audacious.
While the Taliban are fighting their way to the negotiating table, the Afghan National Unity Government seems to have neither any viable peaceful conflict settlement plan nor any overarching war strategy. To make matters worse, the political, economic and social angst and discontent of a large section of the Afghan people as not been properly addressed, and has been exploited by the Taliban.
Faced with a rapidly intensifying insurgency, the country may witness the dangerous prospect of being carved up into rival fiefdoms. The emergence of the Islamic State, which is trying to recruit from among the disgruntled Taliban ranks and other terrorist groups, has further diminished hopes of the country returning to a state of normalcy.
As the Taliban have again rejected the latest peace offers from the QCG, firmly insisting on their own terms and conditions, the already fragile peace process has entered the most crucial phase. Under such circumstances, it will be futile to expect the inadequately-trained Afghan security forces with support from insufficient number of US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organisation forces, to attain a military edge over their opponent. If the Taliban escalates the fight in the coming months, the country faces the prospect of sliding down a perilous path towards turmoil and mayhem. In fact, Western military support for the Ashraf Ghani regime is more of a background psychological factor than a physical one since the US has almost quit Afghanistan.
The focus of attention has now again shifted back to Pakistan’s role in contributing to the peace process. The conventional wisdom is that Pakistan has a great influence over the Taliban. Pakistan’s Taliban policy has shifted along with broader geopolitical trends, with the balance sometimes swinging towards closer alignment and at other times, at permitting greater autonomy.
Foreign Affairs Advisor Sartaj Aziz has admitted to Pakistan’s influence over the Taliban when he recently said, “We have some influence on them because their leadership is in Pakistan, and they get some medical facilities, their families are here. So we can use those levers to pressurise them to say, ‘come to the table’”.
But attitudes within Pakistan’s security elite are complex; dividing between those who support the resolution of conflict at the earliest on the ground that continuation of conflict will further worsen the security situation in Pakistan, and those who insist on first protecting Pakistan’s strategic interests, defined in straight forwardly realist terms. Thus there is a strong section within Pakistan’s military establishment that defends the notion of a tightly integrated geopolitical region on both sides of the Khyber Pass with Pakistan’s informal control over policies of Afghanistan. In constant denial about the costs and tragedies perpetrated by the India-centric ‘strategic depth’ policy, this powerful lobby argues that Pakistan’s strategic needs stretch well beyond the Durand line, and it is only pragmatic to act on those needs. Afghan political elite’s excellent relations with India has been a chronic irritant in Afghan-Pakistan relations, making Rawalpindi profoundly paranoid about collaborating in an effort that enables India to have any meaningful say in Afghan political affairs. This explains the Pakistan Army’s highly selective approach towards eliminating terrorist groups it once created and had patronised.
The Taliban can seem very powerful now but it will wrong to think of the outfit as invincible. There are many splits and fissures within it. The Afghan Taliban have been going through a turbulent leadership transition since last year with the new leader Mullah Mansoor still facing difficulties in consolidating his leadership position. Those who are challenging Mansoor’s succession to Mullah Omar are of the view that they have acquired a decisive edge against the Afghan security forces. In order to avoid internal rebellion and further dissension, Mansoor does not want to show any haste in joining the peace talks.
If a dominant section of the Taliban leadership is not prepared to strike a deal with the Ghani Government on Pakistani terms, then the very credibility of Pakistan will be at stake. Islamabad will face tremendous pressure from Washington and Beijing to take action against the recalcitrant Taliban elements that are based in Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan seems to be doubling its efforts, short of arm-twisting, to bring the Taliban leadership to the negotiation table. But the current adverse dynamic may likely continue between the Taliban and the Afghan Government.
(The writer is Assistant Professor, Department of International Affairs and Security Studies, Sardar Patel University of Police Security and Criminal Justice, Jodhpur)