General Abdul Waheed Kakar bundled Nawaz Sharif out in a midnight ‘deal', while Gen Pervez Musharraf ousted him post-Kargil without bothering to extend such courtesies. But then, Mr Sharif is not known for being very bright
Given the BJP’s 3.5-0 victory in the State Assembly elections, it is probably safe to assume that Mr Narendra Modi will become the next Prime Minister of India. It is probably safer still to assume that his de jure opposite number in Pakistan, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, will try to engage him in talks and possibly attempt some form of normalisation. It is also, however, safe to assume that Pakistan’s new Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan, General Raheel Sharif, will not let Mr Sharif do anything worthwhile. The last safe assumption here is that India will have to pick up the tab (again) for Mr Nawaz Sharif’s lack of judgement.
Trudging along the beaten path, delegation after Western delegation, visiting Delhi, have gone to great lengths to stress how they see a ‘strategic shift’ in Pakistan. We are, based on their sermons, expected to believe that Pakistan has finally broken its toxic cyclic logic of ‘Settle Kashmir or else we’ll send a few psychotic jihadis to terrorise you — and if you respond we cry ourselves hoarse about the big, bad Indian wolf that poses an existential threat to us’. So let us examine how and why Gen Sharif is expected to break this cycle.
The first is the issue of logic. This phantom strategic shift is supposed to be based on the realisation within Pakistan’s Army that it now doesn’t have to scapegoat India anymore. Since domestic terrorism has emerged as such a serious threat, jolly jihadi and not India will become the new focus. This supposedly will help the Generals retain the Army’s primacy in Pakistan’s decision-making process while redefining the Army’s role in terms of the internal threat. As a result the Generals are apparently slowly stopping their sponsorship of terrorism and cracking down on these outfits.
For a reorientation to be truly strategic, one must identify an ongoing and durable source of threat. Durability is the functional word here. India has been a durable scapegoat because of its existence since 1947. If, however, the Pakistani Army is serious and cracks down on terrorism, it will probably crush these organisations within a few years — terrorism is not a durable threat to the Pakistani state. Invariably the focus will have to shift back to India, meaning, that what we are seeing — if at all — is a tactical shift, and not a strategic one. The other option is that the Army will be half-hearted at best in its crackdown, allowing for the possibility that these outstanding specimens of the psychopath fraternity could be used at a later date against India. As we know from our own experiences of stoking the liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam terrorism in Sri lanka and creating Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale in Punjab, terrorists cannot be controlled, and invariably they will attack India. logically the idea of a shift in the Pakistani establishment’s orientation is untenable.
The facts on the ground again tell us that this strategic shift would require an identity shift — a change in the very terms that Pakistan perceives itself. To break the Kashmir-terror-security link, Pakistan has to understand that Kashmir and security are mutually exclusive — it can have one, but not both. This would mean disbanding the lashkar-e-Tayyeba, this would mean rewriting history books, this would mean changing the very nature of the political discourse in Pakistan. There are several studies to prove that, given a choice between identity and progress, most societies tend to choose identity. Consider another fact: Gen Raheel Sharif is supposed to have changed the orientation of the Pakistani Army while he was in charge of training, from an India-focus to an anti-insurgent focus. Yet, terrorism remains at an all-time high in Pakistan and Afghanistan. So either Gen Sharif is incompetent or he is a fraud.
Too much print space has been given to the non-existent ‘positive qualities’ of former Army chief Ashfaq Parvez Kayani that his successor is supposed to imbibe — prominently the fact that he did not stage a coup and ‘allowed’ Pakistan’s first civilian transition of power to proceed smoothly. Sadly, much of this is wishful thinking. Coups in Pakistan, like in any other place, are based on a cost-benefit analysis. What are the pros and what are the consIJ In Pakistani Army’s case, for the last five years at least, the cons have far outweighed the pros. The Army invariably uses civilian Governments as a dissatisfaction magnet. While being responsible for the economic doldrums Pakistan has been in, the Army requires a civilian administration to take the brickbat for it. While demanding more drone strikes in secret, it needs a civilian administration to absorb the public anger over it.
While deeply intertwined with and encouraging terror in both Afghanistan and India, the neighbouring Army needs a civilian poncey to go to Washington, DC, and face the music. While actively destabilising Afghanistan by using the funds Nato gives Pakistan, the Army need a civilian scapegoat to go around begging for more money. The fact is that Pakistan and the West have reached complete strategic divergence, and the Army needs a civilian administration to paper over this fact. Gen Kayani, therefore, avoided a coup not because of the purity of his heart or towering strength of character, but rather because it simply did not make sense — military, geopolitical, economic or otherwise.
However, come 2014 and the withdrawal from Afghanistan, the incentive-disincentive structure will change depending on the nature of the residual Nato force in Kabul. Whatever temporary congruence Pakistan and the West have will largely evaporate, and thereafter a whole new cost-benefit analysis will emerge.
One also needs to consider the historical pattern. Every time a Pakistani General has been made the COAS through bypassing seniority, a shift in Government has resulted. It started with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto promoting Zia-ul-Haq, who felt obliged to return the favour by hanging the former. Mr Nawaz Sharif himself has made this mistake twice before and forfeited his prime ministership on both occasions, owing to his poor judgement.
Gen Abdul Waheed Kakar bundled Mr Sharif out in a midnight ‘deal’, while Gen Pervez Musharraf ousted him post-Kargil without bothering to extend such courtesies. But then, Mr Nawaz Sharif is not known for being very bright. As they say, “We learn from history that we never learn from history”.