The Indian Army should end its prolonged involvement in counter-insurgency operations within Kashmir. It must hand over responsibility to the paramilitary forces after providing the requisite training and move to the loC to build conventional deterrence
November 26 was the 10th anniversary of the ceasefire on the line of Control, a good time to do stock-taking on how well it has held and how the two sides have fared.
A unilateral ceasefire on the loC was declared by the Pakistani military ruler, General Pervez Musharraf, on November 24, 2003. Caught in a bind to follow suit by demonstrating its goodwill towards the people of Jammu & Kashmir and to reinforce its peace credentials, India not only readily accepted it, but also extended it to include Siachen. Thus, the artillery and small arms fire stopped on the loC and Siachen on November 26, 2003, that Eid day a decade ago.
The calm on the loC was, however, shattered by the massive earthquake with the epicentre in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir in 2005; the natural calamity rendered the loC irrelevant as defences crumpled with many soldiers getting buried alive under the rubble. The Pakistani side suffered heavy losses. Once the initial shock of what had befallen was over, tasks on the Pakistani side were clearly defined. The lashkar-e-Tayyeba focussed on providing succour to local inhabitants while the Pakistani Army concentrated on rebuilding its defences, better and stronger than what had existed previously. On the other hand, the Indian Army, on whose side the damage was less, did minimal to improve its defences. It focussed instead on assisting border villages with reconstruction of houses and schools, in the strategy of winning the hearts and mind of the people.
The Indian Army also utilised the ceasefire to fence the entire loC. Taking a cue from the Border Security Force guarding the 198km International Border in Jammu (called Working Boundary by Pakistan), the Indian Army erected a fence on the remaining 556 km of the loC. The fence or the Anti-Infiltration Obstacle System was completed on July 1, 2004. Given the nature of the loC which arbitrarily cuts across villages and divides streams, rivers and mountains, the run of the AIOS varies from place to place from being right on the military-held line to up to three kilometre inside.
The AIOS meant to check infiltration presents a dilemma: It is simply not cost-effective in the higher reaches in winter months where the snow is 20 feet to 25 feet and the loC gets washed away. The annual cost of repairing the entire AIOS on the loC is upwards of Rs 150 crore for materials alone. As only a small window of summer months is available for repairing the AIOS, one Army pioneer battalion (900 men) with ponies and mules to lug materials is employed every year in addition to other support services to ensure that work is finished in time. This task obviously is at the cost of annual stocking effort of forward posts in high-altitude which, too, have the same summer window for work. For these reasons, in 2011-2012, 15 Corps in Srinagar did a successful pilot project of replacing the fence with permanently buried wooden shrapnel (called punjis in jungle warfare) as the AIOS to deter infiltration. The recommendation was sent to the northern command (responsible for Jammu & Kashmir), but nothing much happened as the Army Commander was due for retirement.
Considering that the present Army Commander, lt Gen Sanjiv Chachra, has called the fence a game-changer, it will be status quo. The argument that the fence is cost-effective and prevents infiltration, will continue to be made. While attributing benefits to the fence as AIOS, the Indian Army is unwilling to concede its biggest drawback: It has instilled the Maginot mentality. Any worthwhile military commander the world over will attest that a fortification induces a false sense of security and stifles the offensive spirit and offensive action. With the silence of artillery guns and fencing on the loC, the Indian Army’s mindset has transformed from an offensive to a defensive one, focussed on fighting terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir by counter-insurgency operations without an end-state.
Pakistan, it appears has gained more than it had hoped for. Today, the Indian Army is tamed in Jammu & Kashmir. It believes that fighting insurgency is what it is paid for, and it should continue doing so brushing aside the negative consequences. The Pakistan Army, therefore, has derived four advantages from the ceasefire and the fence: One, despite large numbers in Jammu & Kashmir, a defensively-oriented Indian Army does not pose an immediate threat across the loC. Hence, the Pakistan Army can unabashedly continue with its proxy war in the border State. Two, it retains the goodwill of the people of Kashmir by continuing with the ceasefire sham. It is accepted that use of small arms constitutes ceasefire violations and not the end of the ceasefire.
The latter will happen when the two sides employ artillery guns, something that both sides did freely and regularly before November 26, 2003. Three, while the whole of Indian Army is involved in fighting insurgency in Jammu & Kashmir on the Pakistani side, only the Inter-Services Intelligence is involved in ensuring regular infiltration across the loC. The Pakistan General Headquarters with its Director General Military Operations is free to plan conventional war contingencies for Jammu & Kashmir. And four, the ceasefire has encouraged China to send its forces into PoK, making North Kashmir militarily vulnerable for India with the possibility of a two-front confrontation with Pakistan and China.
Unfortunately, instead of waking-up to the realities, the Indian Army continues to make the case for prolonged involvement in counter-insurgency operations in Jammu & Kashmir. When General Kayani took office in November 2007 and ceasefire violations had commenced, the Indian Army had said that after the crucial State Assembly election of 2008, it would review its involvement in counter-insurgency operations. This did not happen. Today, the Indian Army is yet again busy making the case of its involvement in counter-insurgency operations in Jammu & Kashmir. Its argument is that post-2014, when the US and Nato troops leave Afghanistan, the terrorists engaged with the US and Nato forces, will be freed. They will then be shifted by the ISI to Kashmir.
A counter argument is that things will not be so clear-cut in Afghanistan and it would be a few years before a semblance of stability comes to Afghanistan. The Indian Army should hand over counter-insurgency operations within Kashmir to paramilitary forces after providing the requisite training. It must move to the loC to build conventional deterrence.
(The writer is editor of FORCE, a newsmagazine on national security)