The Defence Research and Development Organisation has revealed its criteria for evaluating missile reliability. A new look at assessment procedures is the need of hour to improve deterrence. Tougher standards are needed to strengthen the credibility of India’s nuclear force
India’s nuclear force development is attaining new levels of technological sophistication. India has conducted three successful tests of its Agni-V nuclear ballistic missile, with a stated range of 5,500 km. As the first missile was able to reach important Chinese east coast targets such as Beijing and Shanghai, its arrival within India’s missile suite strengthens Indian nuclear deterrence against China. India is also conducting sea trials of its indigenous Arihant nuclear-armed submarine, the first in an anticipated fleet of five to six boats. Further-reaching delivery platforms, such as a 10,000 km-range Agni-VI, are presently being studied by the Defence Research and Development Organisation, the defence technology agency responsible for missile development.
The DRDO has for long, enjoyed substantial operational discretion in how it initiates, develops, evaluates and completes nuclear missile projects. The internal standards that the agency sets for judging technological reliability of its missiles, and thus readiness for operational induction into the Armed Forces, have long been unavailable to external analysts. However, a statement by Mr S Christopher, Director General of DRDO, on July 9, revealed one important standard. Mr Christopher remarked: “To declare a missile proven, we need three consecutive successful tests.” This policy has important implications for the credibility of India’s nuclear forces.
The rule of three: Requiring only three back-to-back successful flight tests for DRDO to self-verify the technological reliability of missiles raises questions regarding the thoroughness of this evaluation. Mr Christopher did not go so far as to say that the third successful consecutive test was always the terminal one, and the agency is planning a fourth test for the Agni-V in December 2015, even though it has deemed the previous three tests successful. However, Mr Christopher still noted that “In case the next test is okay, we can taper off the testing”; that not many more tests would be needed after three successes.The Agni-V could thus be judged ready for induction into military service just three years after its initial flight test in 2012, and after a total of four tests.
A general policy, in which DRDO scientists “normally look at three consecutive tests”, forms a very small sample size from which to draw definitive conclusions of technological reliability. In his assessment of American ballistic missile defence programmes, Anthony Cordesman catalogued flight test totals for American ballistic missiles. Writing in 2002, Mr Cordesman calculated that the Minuteman-I intercontinental ballistic missile had been tested 56 times, while 42 tests had been conducted for the Polaris A-1 submarine-launched ballistic missile. The lowest number of tests for any American ballistic missile in Mr Cordesman’s analysis was 19. The Trident-II D5 SlBM, currently carried by the American and British SSBN forces, had received 155 tests by February 2015.
Given this comparison, the DRDO reasoning behind its restrictive “rule of three” is unclear. The agency enjoys more political and technological flexibility today than at any stage in its history. The context of the 1990s, in which any missile test could provoke a vituperative American reaction and a threat of further international technology sanctions, has passed. Today, Indian missile tests are instead greeted by the United States with a response close to indifference. The technological discretion that the DRDO enjoys in deciding new missile projects, combined with the unprecedented and growing diversity of Indian nuclear delivery platforms and their supportive technologies, would also ostensibly support more extensive testing programmes to validate new designs.
The DRDO may be concerned about the risk to its image of test failures that may result from a longer flight test series. The Indian Armed services are perhaps the agency’s strongest intra-Government critic, but military grievances have largely focused on its poor involvement in the DRDO project design and completion, and delays in technology delivery. A three-test rule may permit the agency to claim that a missile project has been quickly completed with minimal delay. However, this incentive would raise questions regarding the credibility of its evaluation process and that of its missiles judged to be ready under this system.
Writing about the status of the earlier Agni-I and Agni-II, DRDO missile projects in 2008, a retired military officer and editor of Indian Defence Review commented that the missiles “have been tested five times, which is inadequate to generate confidence in a nuclear capable missile… The end users of these ballistic missiles are army and the air force…but (they) lack confidence in the quality of the product.” A new look at DRDO assessment procedures is needed to improve Indian deterrence.
Re-defining success: The DRDO should develop a more thorough testing system. A higher standard of design reliability should be set than the current criteria of three successful consecutive tests. The number of tests should be decided by the military, as the ultimate end users, in order to obtain their full technical confidence in the missiles. The number should certainly be at least into the double digits. The military should also decide the range of conditions for missile tests and ensure that these are substantially varied.
Better external oversight over DRDO systems would also raise confidence in its claims regarding its strategic systems among the wider strategic community. This could entail stronger parliamentary oversight regarding DRDO project status, requirements, and costs. Another suggestion, made by Verghese Koithara with regard to the Department of Atomic Energy, has been to establish a panel of retired scientists to independently audit its technical assessments. This idea could also be applied toward independently auditing DRDO technological evaluations.
Not every technological project is immediately successful, and extending missile test series past a normal slate of three tests may entail a scenario of repeated test failures that we have so far not notably seen in the Indian missile programme.
However, the failures that do occur permit the DRDO to understand the issue, resolve it and conduct new tests to validate the technical fixes. A three-test rule, by contrast, may allow such technical problems to remain hidden. Creating a higher standard for missile design validation will, therefore, strengthen the technological reliability of India’s missiles. This will enhance political and military confidence in the credibility of Indian nuclear deterrence as it moves toward greater reliance on these land-based ballistic missiles. The rule of three must be broken.
(The writer holds a PhD in defence studies from King’s College, london, and will join the British Naval College as a lecturer in September)