Will the Iraqi Government be able to reoccupy the land taken over by the ISISIJ A lot will depend on the political measures that are taken by Maliki, the will of the international community, especially the US, the state of Iran-US relationship, and the stand taken by Saudi Arabia
International politics evolves in unpredictable ways. Events take policy makers by surprise. Yesterday’s allies become today’s enemies and vice versa. Nowhere is it as visible as in West Asia today. The evolving political dynamics in Syria and Iraq have forced states to reconsider their positions. The ISIl, aka ISIS, advance in Iraq has shifted international attention away from Syria into Iraq. That a new reality was brewing in north-eastern Syria escaped the considered attention of most intelligence agencies concentrated in the region. How did it all happenIJ
Syrian situation as an enabler
It is true that the direction of Western intervention in Syria until middle of last year favoured boosting of the morale of the radical Sunni forces and buffeted the Sunni-Shia divide in the entire region spanning from the Mediterranean till the borders of India. Even though, in principle, the West and some of the (Sunni majority) regional countries tried to isolate, equip and train “moderate and liberal” elements from amongst various Syrian resistance groups, the turmoil in Syria had a salutary effect on the efforts of radical Sunni groups in the region. Moreover, some of the trainees in the anti-Assad training camps in Jordan and elsewhere were sympathisers of ISIS as claimed by some reports in the media.
By the time of US withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011, the predecessors of ISIS, regarded primarily as Al Qaeda affiliates in Iraq, had already established a base in north-eastern Syria. Despite losing two of their leaders — Abu Musab al- Zarqawi in June 2006 and Abu Ayub al-Masri (Egyptian) in May 2010 — the group (ISIS) was waiting in patience for turn of the tide in its favour. In June 2014, earlier this month, it announced itself as a lethal force to reckon with in the region threatening to redraw the map of the Middle East, as some observers have noted.
Origin of ISIS and its Advances
let us trace the origin of ISIS. In 2002, Zarqawi, a rabid sectarian Sunni militant from Jordan, who had participated in Afghan Jihad, formed an organisation called Al-Tawhidwal Jihad in his country and later moved to Iraq. He pledged his loyalty to Al-Qaeda and was given the title Emir of a shadowy group called “Al-Qaeda in the land of the Two Rivers”. After his death in a US airstrike the organisation renamed itself as Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in October 2006, led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (alias Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al Badri al Samarra’i) of Iraq and Masri. ISI was targeted by joint US-Iraqi forces and Masri was killed in 2010, following which Al Baghdadi assumed undisputed leadership of the organisation.
Ever since, under his leadership, ISI further consolidated its base on north eastern Syrian cities lying along the Euphrates river-Al Raqqa, Deir-ezZur, Al Mayadin and Al Kamal. Further north east, it also established control over cities of Al- Hasakah and Al-Malikiyaah, closer to the Kurdish autonomous region along the borders in north western Iraq.
According to reports, ISIS used its presence here to strengthen its financial support base. The region along with the neighbouring Nineveh province of Iraq is home to many of Iraq’s major oil fields. It also funds its activities through extortion from humanitarian workers. ISIS also generates lots of money from its control over local business as well as the oil and gas sector. It takes full advantage of the fact that there is no effective security presence from the Syrian side, and uses the area as a strategic backyard.
In fact, if reports are to be believed, the Asad government even paid ISIS handsomely for uninterrupted supply of electricity from the region and probably allowed ISIS to operate there because of its hostile position vis-Ã -vis the US, and hoped to divert attention of the West towards Iraq. Asad may have succeeded at last in his strategy.
By the time the uprising in Syria made its mark in March 2011, and the Syrian Al- Qaeda group by the name of Jabhat al- Nusra made its presence felt in Syria,
Al-Baghdadi expressing his support for Syrian resistance called for a regional Islamic state and ISI was renamed as Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Shams, which was otherwise reported by the media as Islamic State of Iraq and levant (ISIl) or Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Intensely sectarian in its outlook, sensing escalating Sunni resentment in both Syria and Iraq, ISIS gave a call for launching a sectarian war during the same time.
Interestingly, al-Nusra maintained its distance from ISIS. Ayman Al Jawahiri, leader of Al Qaeda, reportedly disagreed with Baghdadi over his strategy of establishing a joint state of Syria and Iraq and asked ISIS to leave Syria and focus on Iraq. ISIS refused to comply with such suggestions and moved along Euphrates to capture the towns of Ramadi and Falluja south of Baghdad in early 2014. On June 11, it moved down from its bases in north eastern Syria along the Tigris river and descended on Mosul, the capital city of the Iraqi province of Nineveh. Ever since, it has threatened to control other important states along the Tigris — Baiji, Tikrit and Samarra — and engaged the Iraqi forces in pitched battles. The Iraqi army is facing a tough resistance from ISIS safeguarding the oil refinery at Baiji. To add to Maliki’s worries, al Nusra and ISIS have reportedly agreed to coordinate their activities in Iraq.
What explains the successIJ
The success of ISIS has led many analysts to take a relook at the Iraqi situation. Undoubtedly, the Sunni minority of Iraq (about 35-40 per cent of the population), in a dominant position in Iraq until Saddam’s ouster, seems to be gravitating towards the ISIS, which explains the extraordinary pace with which the ISIS forces marched down to the margins of Baghdad, the capital city. There are credible reports of the US and some of the regional countries ignoring intelligence inputs about possible ISIS invasion of Iraq. Had these inputs been taken up seriously the march of ISIS could have been stopped.
Most explanations by the regional and western media analysts, however, attribute the spectacular military accomplishment of the ISIS to popular support among the Sunnis of the two large provinces of Anbar and Nineveh. They would allege that the current Prime Minister Nouri al- Maliki has acted in a sectarian manner all throughout his last 8 years of rule and made the Sunnis feel as if they were second class citizens of Iraq. Consequently, the emphasis on making the government apparatus duly representative has been ignored. Moreover, the Maliki government has reportedly harassed and tortured the Sunnis with its overwhelmingly Shia Iraqi police force.
It is also argued that the Iraqi security force is riven by sectarian divisions and completely demoralised. This may explain why a mere 800 strong ISIS force drove away an Iraqi contingent of 30,000, posted near Mosul with absolute ease. Media reports suggest that the Iraqi forces chose to run away rather than fight!
At the heart of the matter is, therefore, the inability of the Maliki government to ensure an inclusive and representative government which enjoys legitimacy in the eyes of all sectarian and ethnic groups in Iran. The US Secretary of State John Kerry has already visited Baghdad and impressed upon Maliki the need to form an inclusive government. There are clamours in Iraq for the replacement of Maliki by some other moderate leader.
However, like Asad in Syria, Maliki is insistent that he is not going to resign. He has called for a parliamentary meeting on July 1, 2014 to discuss the modus vivendi for formation of a new government. In April 2013 elections, Maliki’s State of the law party secured 92 out of a total of 328 seats and emerged as the largest political party. However, he has failed to strike a balance among Shia and Sunni groups, which complicates Sunni-Shia relations.
Can ISIS be stoppedIJ
Militarily speaking, Iraqi forces do have the numbers and support of external forces in their favour to turn the table against the ISIS. Media reports place the strength of the ISIS militia at about 10,000, while Iraq has about 250,000 troops to defend its security. Added to that Iran has reportedly sent weapons and 500 military officers having experience in special operations from its elite al Quds group, whose commander Qassem Suleimani, with a vast reputation for his operational abilities, is also assisting the Iraqi government in planning and execution of its war efforts.
Americans too have pledged to send 300 military advisers to help the Iraqi army in its counter-insurgency operations. A situation has thus emerged where Iranians and Americans are being forced to save the Iraqi political system that both hold critical to stability of the region. Americans have so far desisted from making any commitment for enhanced support. However, in the face of ISIS advance, they may be compelled to carry out airstrikes to stop the insurgents from taking over Baghdad.
The Kurds in Iraq’s north west, who have gained a lot from ISIS operations and have taken over the control of the oil facilities in Kirkuk, may also find reason in obliging the Americans and working with them and the Iraqi government in the emerging strategic equations in Iraq.
Maliki has also called upon the Shias to protect their holy places in Najaf and Karbala. Some ad hoc mobilisation of the Shia youth has taken place with hundreds of Iraqi Shias being offered capsule training to fight alongside the Iraqi forces. Radical Shia clerics like Moqtda Al Sadr have come out to defend Shia shrines too. Another usually apolitical Shia cleric Ali Sistani has given a call for Shias to unite to defend their holy land. While such Shia efforts may succeed in checkmating the ISIS, there is a risk of deepening the sectarian divide further by making Iraq’s defence look like a primarily Shia affair.
Desperate efforts are being made to ensure that the oil facilities do not fall under insurgents’ control. In the meanwhile, airstrikes by the Asad government near Iraq-Syria border point Al Kamal-Al Qiam has drawn rather subdued criticism from the West and hailed by the Iraqi government as a “win for both the states”. All this shows that ISIS may find it difficult to penetrate further into the Shia-majority locales while in the coming months the battle for control of strategic facilities will continue to rage on.
Future ahead
The major questions that remain to be answered are: Will the Iraqi government be able to reoccupy the land taken over by the ISISIJ How long will it take for the confrontation to endIJ Will there be a de facto division of Iraq leading to the establishment of a new Islamic state of Syria and Iraq encompassing parts of both these states for some time under
ISIS controlIJ
A lot will depend on the political measures that are taken in Baghdad by Maliki, the will of the international community and especially the US to stand by the Iraqi government, the state of Iran-US relationship, and the stand taken by Saudi Arabia among other regional Sunni majority countries to either disable or further strengthen ISIS, to ensure that the region does not turn into a sectarian inferno. The task is difficult but not impossible.
(Dr Ashok Behuria is Coordinator of South Asia Centre and a Fellow at IDSA. The views expressed here are his own)