With the announcement of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the days of short wars, which served no political or military purpose anyway, are over. The Indian military should prepare for a long war to defend Siachen and north Kashmir
Speaking at the recent tri-Service seminar on the 1965 war between India and Pakistan, the Army Chief, General Dalbir Singh, assessed that a future war (with Pakistan) will be short (four to six weeks), an assessment shared by all Services chiefs. Pakistan Army Chief, General Raheel Sharif, responded by saying that whether a short or long war, India will suffer unbearable damages.
The huge gap in the appreciation of war by the two sides — India assessing a short war while Pakistan preparing for both short and long war — should not be dismissed as rhetoric especially when in Pakistan, the Army Chief decides matters of war and peace with India.
If the Pakistan Army is preparing for a long war and India is not, General Headquarters, Rawalpindi may have chosen difficult military objective(s) for war which the Indian military may not be able to defend. Considering that Pakistan and not India is likely to start the next war, the Indian leadership should not take General Sharif lightly.
From 1990 until 2004, the way for the Pakistan Army to change the status quo in Kashmir was to continue with its proxy war. Pakistan reasoned that territorial gains were only possible by supporting the insurgency in Kashmir, as India may find it increasingly difficult to tame people who did not want to remain with it.
During this period, India had reasons to cross the military line as no insurgency that enjoys a sanctuary can be defeated without hitting the sanctuary. While Pakistan would have certainly retaliated in case of a hot pursuit by the Indian Army inside Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, by itself the Pakistan Army was not expected to up the ante for war.
Things changed from 2004, when India by fencing the line of Control indicated its decisive intention to fight terrorism within its own territory. The Indian Army showed unlimited resilience by taking innumerable casualties doing counter-terrorism operations, while paying the additional cost of being unprepared for conventional war. Even serious triggers for war like the December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament and the Mumbai mayhem of November 26, 2008, sponsored by the Pakistan Army were not enough reasons for India to go to war.
Not much has changed with the coming of the Modi Government except high decibels of political bashing and increasing small arms firing which do not alter the loC. The status quo on loC which is fine for India is not acceptable to Pakistan. This is good reason for Pakistan to do much more than earlier serious provocations in Delhi and Mumbai — a long war with decisive military results. This thinking gets added impetus from the Indian Army’s outdated assessment of a short war.
The short war concept flows from the Indian Army’s 2004 Cold Start or pro-active doctrine, where, small, self-contained, mobile offensive formations are expected to cross the border within 48 to 72 hours of war mobilisation orders. By shallow penetrations (five to 10 km) all along the border, the Indian Army hopes to expose the Pakistan Army’s offensive (strike) forces to battles to save capture of, hyperbolically speaking, even an inch of land by India. Even as this will prevent Pakistan Army’s offensive forces to deploy in a coherent form, the Indian Army’s strike corps (minus small mobile forces already across the border) which by the second or third week of war will arrive from the hinterland, will either destroy Pakistan’s offensive forces or seek to threaten depth areas.
By this time, the international pressure to end the war will become unbearable for both sides and India, without crossing Pakistan’s nuclear red lines, will have achieved its war aim of attrition of Pakistan Army’s offensive forces.
The problem with the Indian war narrative is that it is frozen in time. To neutralise the Cold Start, the Pakistan Army has moved 20 per cent of its reserves or offensive forces forward to reinforce the holding defensive formations. More to the point, Pakistan’s nuclear forces in-charge for 15 years, lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai spelt out the new ‘full spectrum deterrence’ doctrine at the US Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on March 23.
According to him, there was a gap at the tactical levels (which could allow shallow penetrations by India’s Cold Start), which has been plugged by the new doctrine that covers all war levels — strategic (by nuclear weapons), operational (by conventional capabilities) and now tactical (by the 60 km range Nasr ballistic missile). Needless to add, Pakistan, unlike India, has integrated conventional and nuclear weapons plans so that the transition from operational to strategic war level, if required, is smooth and confusion-free.
By disclosing the doctrine, General Kidwai was talking about non-contact war at the border, a crucial point missed by the Indian military thinkers. The Nasr ballistic missiles, armed with conventional warheads will in large numbers be used to stop Indian mobile offensives from shallow penetrations. Meanwhile, the Pakistan Army will use its strike corps where it assesses India’s operational vulnerabilities, which are aplenty.
Unlike previous wars, the next war, in the Pakistani scheme will employ a plethora of ballistic and cruise missile with conventional warheads bringing about two major doctrinal changes. One, there will be less dependence on air support on the forward line of troops, both in defensive and offensive operations. And two, the depth battle will be fought with ballistic and cruise missiles. The Pakistan Army could surprise India with large numbers of these missiles with good accuracy (with seekers procured from China). Given that televised wars are a norm, accuracy of missiles will be critical as the side doing collateral damages will not look good.
Having blunted India’s Cold Start short war, the Pakistan Army will seek to change the status quo on Kashmir by new means and objectives. One such objective, where China will be willing to provide military support, will be more depth to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (crucial for President Xi Jinping’s One Belt, One Road dream plan) which runs through Gilgit-Baltistan (north ladakh) and when finished by 2017, is expected to bring prosperity to POK.
Viewed in perspective, China does not recognise its border with India in ladakh since December 2010, the People’s liberation Army has been doing advanced joint exercises (building interoperability) with the Pakistan Army and Air Force since 2011 (latest Shaheen-4 exercise between the two Air Forces in underway), and the Pakistan Army has made numerous unsuccessful attempts to wrest Siachen from India.
At present, the Pakistan Army, with operational support from the PlA, scores in three conventional war areas over India: Operational sustenance, superiority at the operational level of war, and ballistic and cruise missiles — all being critical for a long war.
For these reasons, former Foreign Minister Yaswant Sinha’s argument that India should not talk with Pakistan till all terrorist activities cease as “there is a huge space between no-dialogue and no-war (with Pakistan), and India should situate itself in that space. The only thing that India must ensure is that we are not vulnerable to terrorist attacks from Pakistan,” does not hold good.
India not talking Kashmir with Pakistan is not a good idea. The Indian military not preparing for a long war to defend Siachen and north Kashmir is worse. With the arrival of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, short wars, which serve no political and military purpose, are over.
(The writer is editor FORCE newsmagazine and can be reached at pravin@forceindia.net)