With a combination of a Non-Field Force review and a limited Field Force review restricted to the two military lines, the Army can cut down its size by 2,00,000 troops over three to five years. This will free up some of the financial resources necessary to improve troop quality
Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar wants to trim the flab of the Army to make it ‘smart and lean rather than big, unwieldy, and manpower-centric’. The bad news is that he has asked the Army itself to do this task. The increased defence pensions (after grant of one-rank-one-pension) and salaries (the Army is 13-lakh strong and growing) have eaten into finances for acquisitions and modernisation.
The Army is ill-suited to undertake its own manpower shedding for three reasons. One, since it does not know what is expected of it, it has taken upon itself a long list of tasks which would exhaust even the superman. From fighting sub-conventional, conventional and nuclear wars to participating in United Nations Peacekeeping, military exercises with friendly nations, being first responders in natural calamities, seeking a formalised role in disaster management, cleaning the Ganges river, flag marching to restore law and order, advising Government on combating left-wing extremism, regulating traffic in cantonments and everything imaginable where disciplined manpower could be used. Given this, the Army is overstretched and overworked; it could do with more rather than less manpower.
Two, of the three Defence services, the Army, being boots on the ground, worries most about the two military lines. In the absence of political directives about what is to be achieved in war against Pakistan and China, and a joint war-fighting doctrine about how the three Services would achieve military aims in war, the Army is, unfortunately, seeking to equip itself to fight the last wars better. Unlike the last wars, future wars will be fought in six domains — land, air, sea, space, cyber and electromagnetic — and on two battlefields, regular and irregular (terrorism). To be fair to the Army, it can prepare itself to fight on land alone, which, regretfully, will not help. On the one hand, more boots on the ground gives a false sense of security to the army leadership. On the other hand, modernisation without clarity of why and how the wars will be fought negates the purpose of war preparedness.
And three, it is illogical to ask the Army chief to voluntarily downsize his domain which will mean less promotion avenues for officers and men. Meeting me in his office in January 2010, the then Army chief, General Deepak Kapoor, said with pride that he had got two divisions (each with 12,000 soldiers) sanctioned and raised during his tenure. “The last raising was of 29 Division in 1983”, he added.
His own experience with the Army leadership would have informed Defence Minister Parikkar about its reluctance to downsize. In April 2015, Mr Parrikar told the media that, “The Government had frozen the cost of new 17 corps at Rs38,000 crore over eight years and it would consist of 35,000 soldiers.” (The raising of 17 corps with 90,000 soldiers at the cost of Rs70,000 crore was sanctioned in July 2013 without making any budgetary allocation). In less than a year, Army chief General Dalbir Singh informed the media on January 13 this year that, “We are on target to raise 17 mountain corps without changes by 2021.”
What is the way to reduce the Army’s strength: Through Non-Field Force or non-fighting forces, and Field Force or fighting forces reviews. The NFF is the easy part and comprises tweaking rather than wholesome review. According to Mr Parikkar, the Army will consider cutting down training establishment strengths since simulators have been inducted, and will reduce operators where automation has happened. To recall, then Army Chief, General VP Malik, in 1998 had announced reduction of 50,000 troops through NFF. This was never implemented as the 1999 Kargil war increased guarding responsibilities and added more troops (Rashtriya Rifles) to the Army’s strength. While a similar exercise could be done now, it will not make substantive difference to the skewed salaries/acquisitions allocations ratio.
The real answer lies in FF review. With help from the Defence Minister who is member of the Cabinet Committee on Security headed by the Prime Minister, the following should be considered.
On the line of Actual Control with China: Since the role of security forces after the 2013 Border Defence Cooperation Agreement has been downgraded from guarding to policing on the lAC, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police, as the first line of defence, should assume greater responsibility. Except for ladakh, where China says it does not have border with India, and four agreed flashpoints, namely, north Sikkim, Diphu, Bum la (Tawang), and Fish-tail in the eastern sector, the remaining lAC should be policed by the ITBP. In February 2015, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs announced raising the ITBP strength by 49 battalions; more should be done if needed.
Except for a few pockets in depth, the Army should be withdrawn from most of the lAC to return to its war role. The ITBP’s policing task will be assisted by border confidence building measures already in place. The Chinese proposal of June 2015 for a ‘code of conduct’ in response to India’s suggestion of defining the lAC, for added peace and tranquillity on the disputed border, should be considered.
Troops of two Army corps, namely, 3 and 4 Corps involved in counter-insurgency in the North-East, should also revert to its war role. Once this is done, the Army would have two tasks to perform: Maintain and upgrade its defences, and conduct tactical level exercises. Under Article IV of the 1996 bilateral agreement between India and China, division level troops (12,000) are allowed near the lAC and up to brigade-group (5,000) can do military exercises without notification to the other side. This will help in identifying gaps in defences, war stores, equipment, ammunition, missiles, storage sites, and help in coordination with the Indian Air Force. Once troops rehearse war tasks, their morale will be up. Moreover, higher headquarters of the Army and the IAF will be able to resolve their operational differences and have better coordination in crisis.
The overall results on the lAC will be astonishing. The Army will become professional, confident, and it will be able to dispense with the 17 mountain corps (90,000 troops). The finances so saved can be used for equipment for mountain warfare.
On the line of Control with Pakistan: The Army should adopt an offensive-defence posture on the loC. According to National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, the forces have three options: Defensive option, which the Army adopted in 2004 by fencing itself; Offensive option, which will be war; and the intermediate option of offensive-defence, which involves activities like aggressive patrolling, raids, use of special forces, increased firepower and so on.
The Army had adopted this stance between 1990 and 2004 when the enemy was always on tenterhooks looking out for surprises. The offensive-defence posture will have numerous advantages. It will raise the morale of one’s own troops and keep the enemy nervous; since the focus will be on providing war withal to field units, higher headquarters will seek fast-tracked and timely acquisitions from the Government; and it will deter the Pakistan Army from raising the ante.
The biggest advantages of offensive-defence posture would be professionalism and slashing of manpower. Once the Army gives up its counter-insurgency role, bulk of the 80,000 strong RR will become unnecessary.
Thus, with a combination of NFF and limited FF review restricted to the two military lines, the Army’s strength can be reduced by over 2,00,000 troops in three to five years. This is not all. Given the pro-active doctrine (Cold Start) adopted by the Army on the border with Pakistan, up to 1,00,000 troops can be reduced without compromising on war-fighting capabilities. Then, the under-10 lakh Army will have the finances to improve troops’ quality over quantity, a must for a modern Army.
(The writer is editor, FORCE news magazine)