India

Railways’ EMU manufacture fiasco: Two railway tender cancellations, one troubling pattern

SUDHANSHU MANI

In June 2026, Integral Coach Factory (ICF), Chennai of Indian Railways (IR), invited bids for design, manufacture, supply, testing and commissioning of 200 MEMU rakes of 20-car, each to be manufactured at the proposed Rail Manufacturing Unit in Kazipet, Telangana. Earlier, in September 2025, Mumbai Railway Vikas Corporation (MRVC) had invited bids for 238 air-conditioned suburban train rakes. Both procurements, worth tens of thousands of crores, had generated great interest among Indian and global rolling-stock manufacturers.

In August 2026, IR announced that the MRVC tender had been cancelled and that the trains would instead be manufactured at Integral Coach Factory and other rail factories. Subsequently, the Kazipet tender was also scrapped.

The stated reason for cancelling the MRVC tender was to accelerate delivery: the first rake is targeted for 2027 and all 238 by 2030, rather than around 2030 for the first and 2034 for the complete fleet. The Kazipet cancellation, meanwhile, marks another abrupt shift in approach  with the cancellation notice stating that the proposed 200 MEMU rakes will of 16 cars each, built to existing proven specifications at the Rail Manufacturing Unit in Kazipet under SC Railway’s administrative control.

The MRVC decision is particularly curious. Mumbai’s suburban railway is the city’s lifeline, and its modernisation has been part of a World Bank-supported programme for more than two decades. Mumbai Urban Transport Project-3(MUTP-3), which is a multi-modal transport project formulated by the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA) and Indian Railways to upgrade the rail and road infrastructure in the Mumbai Metropolitan Region, MUTP-3 was approved in 2016, with rolling-stock procurement included in the wider programme. Cancelling a major global tender after years of planning risks stalling crucial capacity upgrades for the saturated network. Relying on domestic manufacturing units avoids immediate external vendor lock-ins, but it places intense pressure on local factories to deliver complex, next-generation electronics on time.

In 2018, ICF had floated a tender for AC suburban trains for MRVC, but it was cancelled following objections from a public sector undertaking, although the said undertaking was not itself a train builder and was still developing a reliable propulsion system. The matter went into cold storage for nearly five years and a global tender followed only in 2023. Even this tender was as later withdrawn. Subsequently, MRVC reissued the tender for 238 AC rakes on 6 September 2025. That, too, has now been scrapped.

The Rs 19,293-crore programme falls under MUTP-3 and MUTP-3A. Its procurement model sought competition on manufacturing, technology and long-term maintenance. Reports that prospective bidders used delaying tactics or sought eligibility conditions tailored to their interests remain unverified. In any case, such pressures should be managed through transparent conditions and firm administration. They cannot, by themselves, justify abandoning a strategy developed over years. After decades of planning, Mumbai is still waiting for large-scale fleet modernisation. IR has once again demonstrated its remarkable ability to take the longest possible route.

This is not an argument against ICF or other railway factories. ICF has demonstrated that it can design and build sophisticated trainsets. The Vande Bharat experience showed what a determined Railway organisation can achieve when empowered to take responsibility for the complete product.

The structural issue plaguing IR is flawed, cyclical decision-making. The ministry routinely spends years, sometimes decades, developing complex procurement strategies, only to watch them collapse under the weight of its own bureaucratic dysfunction. Yet, this time these multi-billion-rupee global tenders were abruptly scrapped and the subsequent shift to an internal fallback plan has been deceptively repackaged as a pragmatic, self-reliant breakthrough. What was actually a decade of paralysis and missed opportunities is suddenly framed as a four-year fast-track saving. In reality, no amount of creative public relations arithmetic can recover those lost years of commuter agony, stalled modernization, and economic inertia.

More worrying is the message to global train builders, who may no longer regard India as an attractive market despite massive railway investment. Indigenous manufacturing must be supported without driving global manufacturers away. A healthy ecosystem needs strong domestic capability as well as credible international participation.

The same indecision has repeatedly affected rolling-stock modernisation. The aluminium-bodied Train 20 concept, conceived by ICF as a collaborative project with an international technology partner, was abandoned in 2018. Later, the proposed procurement of 100 Vande Bharat-equivalent aluminiumtrainsets also went through the familiar cycle of tendering, pricing concerns and cancellation. The result is that IR remains far from the global standard in deploying aluminium trains.

The irony is that IR no longer suffers primarily from lack of money. Government investment has risen enormously. What remains scarce is a commensurate improvement in the quality and speed of decision-making.

The new AC locals are expected to offer better air-conditioning, cushioned seating, passenger information systems and higher acceleration. Their proposed 130 kmph capability could help, but on a congested suburban system speed alone will not transform journey times. Signalling, terminal capacity, station dwell time and the ability to run trains at close headways matter at least as much. Infrastructure investment under MUTP-2, MUTP-3 and MUTP-3A includes additional lines, yard remodelling, platform extensions and new corridors. Trains and infrastructure must arrive together. Otherwise, faster trains will merely become faster occupants of a constrained system.

Rail is cleaner and more energy-efficient than road and air transport for mass movement. India needs fast travel for those who can afford it, dignified travel for those who cannot, and a reliable rail alternative for freight now carried by road. Yet rail’s share of national transport has been falling despite enormous investment.

The MRVC and Kazipet episodes are therefore not merely tender stories. They are a warning. Railways needs fewer announcements, fewer afterthoughts and fewer reversals, and more clear-eyed decisions taken at the right level and at the right time.

That must begin at the top. In any organisation, decision-making culture flows downwards. If leadership prizes hype over honest assessment, the system learns to rationalise rather than decide. Mumbai’s commuters and country’s other intercity travellers do not need another explanation. They deserve better. They need modern trains.

The writer is retd GM/Indian Railways and Independent Consultant Leader of Vande Bharat project; Views presented are personal.