Singh-li promise more of failed mechanisms
The much-hyped talk between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Chinese counterpart li Keqiang can effectively be summed up as such: The promise of more talk. Held under the shadow of last month's tense military face-off in ladakh, following the intrusion of Chinese troops 19km into Indian territory, many had hoped that the high-profile Singh-li meetings would produce concrete measures to prevent similar flare-ups on the line of Actual Control. Instead, the two leaders spent their time “taking stock of lessons learnt” from that incident, then praised the supposed effectiveness of existing dispute resolution mechanisms, but made no concerted effort to ensure that such a blatant violation of mutually agreed upon terms is not repeated. And so it was that, while both Mr Singh and Mr li spoke of the importance of a peaceful border and asked their Special Representatives to consider additional measures towards that end, New Delhi failed to get any assurance from the Chinese leader that his troops would stick to their side of the line of Actual Control. Yet, this is something that had been agreed upon back in 1993.
Also, if there were no positive take-aways on the incursion issue, there was even lesser progress on the border dispute as a whole. In this case, both sides reiterated their previously stated positions — and that's about it. The third contentious issue was the sharing of the waters of the Brahmaputra. China is building dams on that mighty river, which India worries will adversely affect water-flow and hurt agriculture in States such as Assam. But here too there were no breakthroughs; Mr li merely assured Mr Singh that he was mindful of the concerns of lower riparian countries and a Memorandum of Understanding was signed wherein China agreed to share with India more information regarding its three hydrological stations on the Brahmaputra.
Disappointing as all of this may be, it would nevertheless be unfair to paint all of Mr li's trip in one colour. Even though negligible progress was made in subjects of conflict, there was some appreciable forward movement in areas of convergence. For instance, both parties agreed that they will not let their respective territories be used for activities against the other. This not only addresses Beijing's concerns regarding Tibetan activities in India but, more importantly, brings into focus elements in China that are brewing trouble in India's North-East. Similarly, the two sides also agreed to take a “positive view of and support each other's friendship with other countries” — a reference to China's support for Pakistan and India's increasing proximity not just to the US but also to Vietnam, for example. The two countries also decided to collaborate on development projects of common interests in third countries — such as in Afghanistan, where New Delhi and Beijing are already looking to each other to secure mutual interests. Geo-politics apart, in the field of commerce, the two agreed to address the issue of trade imbalance, which is currently skewed in China's favour, while still working to achieve the turnover target of $100 billion by 2015. Finally, the joint statement signed by Mr Singh and Mr li, broke new ground with its commitment to bilateral cooperation on civil nuclear energy.