By mounting cross-loC strikes, the Government has shifted the onus of response to itself in the event of a fidayeen attack, which can occur to disabuse the impression that the operation has deterred Pakistan
Monday’s fidayeen attack is the second in eight months at Pampore and the fourth terrorist strike in 13 days since the punitive retribution. Three weeks on, the dust over Uri and after has not settled. The repercussions of surgical strikes are being assimilated on both sides of the line of Control (loC). Cross-loC tit-for-tat attacks occur months later, at a time and place of their choosing. Watch this space for the next big attack. Clearly, the episode has not yet played out in its entirety.
Some foreign and Indian experts suspect the veracity of the operation. The doubting Indians should jump into the Yamuna. The Government has done right by not releasing evidence of the raids. This takes pressure off the deep state to furnish a response. Here are some comments on the copious writings and debates of the fortnight. First, military terminology. The bold and unprecedented operation was a cross-loC, multi-target raid not surgical strikes, a term more relevant to nuclear and Air Force operations. Second, in the past, cross-loC raids were revenge, single-target covert strikes and never declared. For the first time since 1971, the sanctity of loC was breached and more importantly, announced as response to Pakistan’s ceaseless cross-border terrorism (CBT) crossing the tolerance threshold at Uri. This paradigm shift — the willingness to cross the loC — is display of political will. But the current shallow strikes have neither called Islamabad’s nuclear bluff nor raised the nuclear threshold, though during Operation Parakram, Pakistani leaders had threatened to use nuclear weapons even if one Indian soldier crossed the border.
A few questions. Has India’s objective of deterring or ending CBT been achievedIJ Certainly not. Reprisals were delivered by terrorists with immediate despatch. As Prime Minister Narendra Modi does not want war, no casualties and no escalation, the surprise raids might end up as a one-off unless the deep state intends to raise the ante. So far, its response is tactical employing its asymmetrical advantage of 200-odd terrorists inside the valley to execute the hit-and-run attacks at Baramulla, Handwara, Shopian and Pampore. Is a mass casualty attack where 19 soldiers were killed and many wounded at Uri, the new normal for revenge strikesIJ Can’t say, but unlikely. Why has Pakistan vehemently denied the incursionsIJ Denial is its hallmark. It takes away the onus of retaliation and escalation, especially when one-third of its forces are deployed in the West. In any case, the objective of internationalising Kashmir has been achieved largely due to Indian political ineptitude over the continuing unrest in the valley. The residual mission of resuming dialogue which is not shared by the deep state and its terrorist assets may fructify when the situation astride loC develops into a crisis forcing US/China intervention. The current situation has to get worse before it can get any better — for defusion and dialogue.
Has the deep state given the punitive strikes a passIJ Given that the battle of succession for the next Army chief has been joined, we should expect measured retaliation any time soon to herald one of the three awards for Gen Raheel Sharif — appointment as honorary Field Marshal; one-year extension; or his retirement on November 30. It is difficult to forecast, but a combination of the first two gifts should not be ruled out. Indian political triumphalism and media crowing about the surgical operations may hasten a military response — BAT-cum-fidayeen strikes in Jammu & Kashmir or an lashkar-e-Tayyeba/Jaish-e-Mohammed strike outside Jammu & Kashmir against a soft target like Delhi. How will India respond to another UriIJ It can repeat the cross-loC raid; escalate to striking at deeper targets in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir; or do nothing. There is also the possibility of a terrorist strike against a major city. How will Prime Minister Modi reactIJ India does not have the stamina and resources to compete with Pakistan’s infinite capacity for CBT using non-state actors. It does not help when the media eulogises non-existent capacities which favour escalation and risking war for which we have only just begun filling critical operational deficiencies. By whetting the appetite of the likes of taxi driver Dileep Chand, raising expectations of teaching Pakistan a lesson and sorely politicising the issue, Modi’s team has landed itself in a quandary: The September 29 grand response, while achieving the short-term objective of taking it off the chest, was not thought through to its end game.
The war of TRP has created myths and phantom military capabilities: Far worse, given the country Modi, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar doctrines when none exist — not even a national counter-terrorism strategy. The Modi doctrine translates into a muscular approach to Pakistan; Doval idea is spreading disaffection inside Pakistan; and Parrikar enthrals with silly witticisms that are difficult to comprehend except one, of using terrorists to take out terrorists. Further, military veterans charged with nationalism have fantasised winnable scenarios distorting ground reality by transcending from doctrines of unachievable deterrence to questionable compellence.
The most devastating consequences of the Army’s raid has been its political dissection, which has embarrassed the soldiers and made the political class a laughing stock. Posters of Army Generals among political leaders will contaminate the apolitical professional forces. BJP president Amit Shah’s threat to take the commando operation to the people is most dangerous. The Election Commission must immediately ban as per its order no 13, the use of Armed Forces for electioneering purposes.
The lull on the loC and shelving withdrawal of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status should not be read as return to normalcy. By mounting the surprise cross-loC strikes, the Government has directly shifted the onus of response to itself in the event of mass casualty fidayeen strikes which are likely to occur to disabuse the impression that the September 29 operation has deterred Pakistan. Islamabad will never surrender its psychological advantage in CBT. A more serious crisis is required before dialogue can re-start to de-escalate militarily and diplomatically. The tragedy of India-Pakistan reconciliation is that just when back-channel contacts begin to realise a breakthrough non-state actors engineer the breakdown. Even more tragically the history of bilateral dialogue shows that only when the military in Pakistan rules directly does the peace process take off though the opening is a short-lived window of opportunity. Here too, India is caught in a dilemma: To welcome another Musharraf; or engage with more lame-duck Nawaz Sharifs.
The moral of the episode: New Delhi has to strengthen military deterrence and political and diplomatic coercion against Pakistan and internal dialogue in Kashmir.
(The writer is a retired lt General of the Indian Army. He writes extensively on defence matters and anchors Defence Watch on Doordarshan)