Strong India-Bhutan ties can meet challenges
Speculation and even apprehension that China will soon trample over Indian interests in Bhutan, should come to rest with the successful visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, his first trip abroad as head of the Government, to that country. The joint statement issued at the end of Mr Modi's two-day visit said, inter alia, that the two countries would “not allow each other's territory to be used for interests inimical to the other”. In other words, Thimphu will clamp down on any activity that seeks to subvert India's sovereignty or cause internal strife. The Kamtapur liberation Organisation, which seeks to cull out a new Indian State comprising six districts of West Bengal and four of Assam, will reportedly be one of the first targets of Bhutan's anti-terror campaign. The KlO and a handful of insurgent groups of the North-East have been operating out of remote areas in southern Bhutan, such as the Sarpang district which borders India's troubled Kokrajhar district of Assam. Also, this will not be the first time that Bhutan undertakes a military campaign to flush out anti-India outfits. In 2003, the Fourth King had led ‘Operation All Clear' and dismantled 14 Ulfa, 11 Bodo and five KlO camps within his country. The Indian Army, which has a base in Bhutan and trains Bhutanese troops, also played an important role in the operation.
Apart from cleansing anti-India militant groups, the joint statement is also seen to cover Chinese moves to enhance its influence in Bhutan at India’s cost. While some of these are above-the-table actions, such as assisting with infrastructure development projects, there have been other more covert moves by Beijing. Bhutan and China share a 700km long disputed border and the People's liberation Army has been using that as an excuse to intrude into Bhutanese territory. For India, this is of grave concern because it threatens the crucial ‘Chicken's Neck' corridor which connects the North-East to the rest of the country. Beijing has offered to resolve the dispute if Thimphu in turn allows it to set up a mission in the mountain nation. Bhutan, which has only recently emerged out of isolation, has diplomatic relations with more than 50 countries, including most of its immediate neighbours, except China. Understandably, Beijing is trying hard to get its foot in the door, but, given the warmth with which the Modi-led delegation was received in Bhutan, this is no reason for New Delhi to unduly fret over the matter. Even if China gets a toe-hold, it is unlikely to replace the unique status that India enjoys in Bhutan (especially also due to the strong sentiments the Bhutanese people have on the issue of Tibet).
New Delhi must not be complacent, but over-reaction can be counter-productive. It must nurture its strong relationship with Thimphu, and at no cost allow a repeat of the kind of last year’s fuel subsidy fiasco. On the eve of the second general election in Bhutan, India cut the subsidy on the item it supplies to Bhutan, which not only burdened the poor there but also fuelled rumours that this was New Delhi's way of expressing displeasure over then Prime Minister Jigme Thinley's supposed cosying up to China. The subsidy was restored after an internal ‘miscommunication’ was sorted out, but the damage had been done.