Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is known to be aimed at India, and China’s doctrine leaves enough space for a first strike against this country. Given these circumstances, New Delhi must revisit its nuclear policy
On July 8, 1996, the International Court of Justice, commonly known as the World Court, ruled that countries possessing nuclear weapons have not just a “need” but an “obligation” to commence negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament. Nearly two decades later, thanks to the disinclination of so called “established” nuclear weapons powers — the US, UK, France and Russia — the ruling of the World Court remains an ever receding mirage. Even today, a quarter of a century after the Cold War ended, the US deploys an estimated 150-200 tactical nuclear weapons in Nato allies — Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, Germany and Turkey.
The US has, for long, held the position that it will not hesitate to use nuclear weapons for its security and to protect its Nato allies. The 1999 Nato Doctrine retained the option to use nuclear weapons against states merely possessing chemical or biological weapons, even if they had signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Nato’s new strategic concept, adopted in 2010, avers that the grouping will retain nuclear weapons as long as anybody else possesses them. While the Soviet Union had declared that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons, the Russian Federation adopted a “first strike” doctrine in 1993, which was subsequently reaffirmed.
The Bush Administration was prepared to use nuclear weapons even against non-nuclear weapons states in regional conflicts. The 2002 Nuclear Policy Review called on the Pentagon to draft contingency plans for use of nuclear weapons against Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, libya and Syria.
In contrast, the 2010 Review by the Obama Administration avers that the US will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are signatories of the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. It notes: “It is in the US interest and that of all other nations that the nearly 65-year record of nuclear non-use be extended forever”. India should move to get universal support for this reference of the getting the “record of non-use extended forever”.
China adopted a No First Use policy in 1964, stating it would “not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances”. It has reiterated this policy in 2005, 2008, 2009 and 2011. But, some Chinese statements have cast doubts on whether the NFU pledge will apply to states like India which possess nuclear weapons and have not acceded to the NPT.
The Pentagon has noted that, “there is some ambiguity on the conditions under which China’s NFU would apply”. China has offered to sign agreements on “no first use” of nuclear weapons with the other five NPT ‘recognised’ nuclear weapons states. It has signed such an agreement with Russia and had concluded a ‘non-targeting’ agreement with the Clinton Administration, immediately after India’s nuclear tests. New Delhi should seek and obtain a formal confirmation from China that its NFU pledge applies to India.
While Pakistan has not formally enunciated a nuclear doctrine, the former head of the Strategic Planning Division of its Nuclear Command Authority, lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai, told a team of physicists from Italy’s landau Network in 2002 that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were “aimed solely at India”.
Gen Kidwai added that Pakistan will use nuclear weapons if India conquers a large part of Pakistan’s territory or destroys a large part of Pakistan’s land and air forces. He also held out the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons, if India tries to “economically strangle” Pakistan, or pushes it to political destabilisation.
This elucidation, by the man who was the de facto custodian of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal for over a decade and a Prisoner Of War in India between 1971 and 1973, was a precise formulation of Pakistan’s nuclear thresholds. It now appears that Pakistan’s military wants to also keep open the option of mounting further Mumbai-style terrorist attacks, by threatening to lower its nuclear threshold by the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
India has no intention of either destroying Pakistan’s Armed Forces or conquering its territory. Pakistan cannot, however, forever assume, it will be free from an appropriate Indian response, to 26/11-style terror attacks.
The threats by Pakistan to use tactical nuclear weapons in a conflict against India arise for two reasons. First, Pakistan wants to warn India and the world that it will respond with tactical nuclear weapons if Indian forces cross the border following yet another 26/11-style attack. This is a crude resort to nuclear blackmail, to enable Pakistan to perpetuate cross border terrorism.
Second, there is a cold calculation in this thinking. The Indian Nuclear Doctrine is premised on nuclear restraint. India has pledged No First Use of nuclear weapons, while voicing a commitment to developing a “credible minimum deterrent” comprising a triad of land-based, air-launched and sea-based missiles. Realistically, India’s nuclear deterrent will be credible only after the Agni-5 Missile and the nuclear submarine, Arihant, become fully operational.
India’s Doctrine also contains provisions of a massive response should Indian territory or Indian Armed Forces anywhere be subject to attacks by nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Pakistan evidently believes, or purports to believe, that if it uses tactical nuclear weapons against concentrations of Indian Forces attacking or poised for attacking it, India will not risk a massive retaliation, as this will lead to a full-fledged nuclear conflict and mutually assured destruction. Pakistan appears to have lobbied globally seeking understanding of this rationale.
In these circumstances, we need to review how we should signal to Pakistan and the world that we have the capability and willingness to inflict escalating and devastating damage on Pakistan’s military, if it chooses to be stupid enough to resort to the use of tactical nuclear weapons against our Forces.
Gen Kidwai has clearly spelt out Pakistan’s thresholds. India really has no reason to cross these thresholds, while responding to a 26/11-type strike emanating from territory under Pakistan’s control. Thanks to liberal assistance from China, Pakistan has developed the capability to build a large arsenal of plutonium-based weapons — both strategic and tactical. This was not the case when our nuclear doctrine was formulated.
There is, however, no need to change our basic commitment to ‘No First Use’ of nuclear weapons. Uncertainties about our intentions, thresholds and policies could lead to others seeking to resort to a pre-emptive first strike, with disastrous consequences.