Asia-Pacific rim countries' quadrilateral alliance has a long way to go
While reassuring our Chinese interlocuters of our genuine desire for a continued and deepening mutually beneficial relationship that brings prosperity and stability to Asia, India is doing well to keep the incipient US-Japan-Australia-India quadrilateral coalition in play. It is in the national interest that we do. But easy assumptions about how this foursome, democratic countries all, will emerge as the premier strategic alliance in this part of the world keeping Asia “free and open” with ASEAN too weaned away, in the fullness of time, from its dependence on China, should not only be avoided but are misleading. Which is not to say an effort to contain Beijing's expansionist aims and day-to-day bullying of its neighbours, especially in the South China Sea and on its Himalayan borders, must not be made, nor that the quadrilateral alliance taking shape is not an excellent way of beginning that process. No, the point to be kept in mind is that while all the above is a consummation devoutly to be wished, Messrs Donald Trump, Shinzo Abe, Malcolm Turnbull and Narendra Modi have a lot of work on hand — to reshape the contours of their countries' respective bilateral relationships with China, and between themselves, before an effective strategic alliance that can check Beijing's ambitions to dominate the Asian and world stage comes to fruition.
Trade is the biggest stick China wields, of course, and not always behind its back. The US-China imbalance is skewed heavily in the latter's favour and adding to the power of Beijing over the US is the fact that China is also the largest foreign holder of US debt — it owns more than $1.24 trillion in bills, notes, and bonds or about 10 per cent of the publicly held American debt. Australia too has over the past two decades aligned its economy in a calibrated way with the ASEAN-China trade and commerce eco-system, culminating in the signing of a historic free trade agreement with its largest trading partner, China, in December 2015. As for the Japan-China economic engagement, experts have pointed out that both together account for more than a fifth of global output and contrary to widely held perceptions, the economic partnership is one of the biggest in the world. The bilateral trade relationship is the third-largest in the world, with a $340 billion trade relationship in 2014-15. China is Japan's largest trading partner, accounting for one-fifth of its trade, and Japan is China's second-largest. Japan is the largest investor in China, with a stock of direct investment at more than $100 billion in the previous fiscal. Even India's much lower intensity economic engagement with China has resulted in our trade deficit with our eastern neighbour rising to $51.1 billion in 2016-17 and looking like it will cross $61 billion for the year, up from $19.26 billion in 2009-10. In a line, Communist China is an economic leviathan and an absolutist state, a deadly combination when it comes pursuing and achieving strategic goals.
But that doesn't mean all is lost as far as wanting China to emerge as a prosperous, responsible, world power that allows democracy to flourish within its borders — which is what we mean by ‘containing China'. What it does mean is that if all four countries truly understand the potentially disastrous consequences of an untrammeled rise of the Middle Kingdom in its present shape and form, they will have to work on the triad of economic compatibilities, shared security concerns and civilizational values that put a premium on individual liberty between themselves while simultaneously engaging with China.