New Delhi played down the encroachment as a ‘local’ incident, having misread the Chinese intention. There was an intelligence and surveillance lapse. The responsibility for the border is with the Home Ministry, not the Army
The unprecedented Chinese incursion into the Depsang plateau in ladakh should be a wake-up call for the Government. Judging by the record of appeasement of China — a choice triggered by the two-front contingency — and the slipshod manner in which the adverse situation was allowed to continue for three weeks in full public gaze reflects the passivity of the establishment which will encourage the new Chinese leadership to push India around on any future settlement of the border dispute. China’s first Blue Book released on May 10 sees the UPA Government in ‘serious crisis’.
What else could be expected when Ministers described the intrusion, the most serious since the 1986 face-off at Wangdung, as a ‘local incident’; an ‘acne’; and as one lying in no-man’s landIJ A former foreign office mandarin has candidly described Minister for External Affairs Salman Khurshid as someone suffering from verbal diarrhoea, when, after his recent visit to China, he said he would like to live in Beijing. In his meetings with Chinese leaders, Mr Khurshid merely flagged the incursion because he did not want to apportion blame when clearly it was the most serious violation ever of the perceived line of Actual Control in ladakh. Mr Khurshid’s illustrious predecessor took the abundant precaution of never speaking off the cuff — he was always equipped with a written statement. It is another matter that at the United Nations he read out a part of the Portuguese Foreign Minister’s speech.
Mr Khurshid has stated that we need to do an internal analysis of how the intrusion was handled. Why did the Chinese stage the incursion in the first place, despite a multitude of agreements and protocols on maintenance of peace and tranquility on the border — 1993 and 1996 CBMs; 2005 Political Parameters and Guiding Principles; and the 2012 Joint Border MechanismIJ No one has deciphered Chinese motives in making the well-planned 19km deep 21-day-long intrusion in an area where they had never ventured before. The reasons being given vary from the zeal of local commanders to taking a leaf out of the new leadership’s ‘assertive deterrence’ in protecting its core interests of sovereignty and territorial integrity, to a show of strength for testing Indian response in an area of huge geo-strategic significance where they seek concessions.
Attributed to the intrusion are other impulses: Believe it or not, nudging India for an early border settlement, heralding China’s White Paper on defence released on April 16; and securing Indian acquiescence of yet one more protocol — the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement.
The timing was equally baffling. Four weeks before Mr Khurshid’s visit to China and seven weeks before the new Premier li Keqiang’s first visit outside China, to India. Both sides wanted the visits, India more than China. Beijing’s brinkmanship led to furious Indian efforts to get the crisis defused. So why did the Chinese PlA relent and what did they take backIJ According to the Government, nothing. There was no deal, it was an unconditional withdrawal. This is hard
to believe.
Mr Khurshid has gone public saying one tin-shed at Chumar was dismantled. Chumar, incidentally, is 400km south east of Depsang, on the Himachal border. The Chinese reportedly had made three demands: Freeze infrastructure development; cease patrolling; and deactivate Daulat Beg Oldi, Fukche and Nyoma air fields as these violate the 1993 and 1996 protocols.
Analysing the Indian response, it is clear that New Delhi played down the intrusion as a local incident, obviously misreading Chinese motivation and intention. It was an intelligence and surveillance lapse — that the intrusion actually occurred on April 10, and in no way could the Indo-Tibetan Border Police have been face to face within six hours. The responsibility for the border is with the Union Ministry of Home Affairs and not the Army. This anomaly has to be corrected till the border is settled. That the Cabinet Committee on Security met after 17 days shows the incursion was not a local affair. The most glaring defect was the uncoordinated response and the suppression of critical information that led to avoidable speculation in the media and in Parliament.
In contrast, the Chinese response was firm, measured and in one voice — that, as Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying consistently held, the lAC had not been crossed, consultations were ongoing and “China is ready to join hands with Indian side to seek a mutually acceptable and fair solution to the border question at an early date”. After the BRICS summit in Durban on March 27, where President Xi Jingping had a bilateral meeting with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the PlA Daily noted that while in the case of maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas, China’s core interests did not permit compromise, its dispute with India calls for a ‘mutually acceptable solution’. Further, the daily underlined seeking a solution as soon as possible which is a departure from the hardline formulation of ‘dispute being complex and legacy of history that required patience’. If this interpretation is accurate and not double-speak, it is a new ballgame for China’s quest of seeking a new relationship with India.
Chinese Foreign Ministry’s Qin Gang, in New Delhi to finalise Mr li’s visit next week, claimed that the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles on the boundary question have been settled. This is factually incorrect. With these mixed signals on the border dispute and China’s excitement over yet another protocol on Border Defence Cooperation which, according to Chinese media, seeks to separate the boundary issue from overall bilateral ties, India will have to tread with caution because of inherent contradictions in what is stated and implied. That said, how can Mr Khurshid claim that his meeting with Premier li was ‘outstanding’, without even daring to ask him about the motivation for the ladakh intrusion IJ
Still, another intrusion is round the corner, unless we are prepared and ready to do a Wangdung or a tit-for-tat. The Chinese appreciate strength and there is plenty of unused muscle waiting to test Beijing’s response. Mr Khurshid says the 16th Round of Special Representatives dialogue will take place in a few months. This has proved a fruitless exercise. Isn’t it time to tell Premier li that progress in bilateral relations cannot be delinked from the boundary questionIJ
For one, let us resume the exchange of maps delineating each other’s perceived lAC in tandem with finding a political solution as soon as possible. For raising national morale, the Government must decisively correct the public perception that India kowtows to China.