India must strengthen Afghanistan militarily
During the course of his three-day visit to India that ended on Thursday, Afghan President Hamid Karzai handed New Delhi a veritable wish-list of military equipment. India must consider it favourably. The list is short and not particularly ambitious, but it has enormous potential to further strengthen New Delhi-Kabul ties. Apart from some bridge-laying equipment and a few trucks, it includes hand-me-down A2.A18 105 mm howitzers, which are tried and tested guns that India is now phasing out. Mr Karzai also wants assistance to get his fleet of An.32 medium-lift aircraft back in the air. While none of these is a military game-changer, together they can give the Afghan National Security Forces the teeth it so desperately needs.
The ANSF, which includes the military and the police, is essentially a rag-tag bunch that neither has the training nor the equipment needed to protect the interests of a country as vulnerable and war-ravaged as Afghanistan. India is already doing its bit to remedy the situation by training Afghan security personnel. But that is far from enough. The ANSF needs weapons and Mr Karzai is asking India to help out with that. More specifically, the Afghan President is looking to New Delhi to deliver on the promise it made back in October 2012, when the two signed the Strategic Partnership Agreement that says in no uncertain terms that India will assist in the “training, equipping and capacity building programmes” for the ANSF. Mr Karzai's demand for military assistance is the first test of that agreement.
With less than a year to go for the withdrawal of American troops and a general election around the corner, the transition process in Afghanistan is underway. Having already invested in that country's post-war reconstruction process, India must go the full length now if it wishes to emerge as an influential Afghan partner post-2014. The way things are at the moment, there is a definite possibility that either the Taliban will take back Kabul or that the country will collapse into a lawless mess or both. And, the only thing that stands between Talibani anarchy and a somewhat democratic Afghanistan is the ANSF.
Yet, New Delhi has been reluctant to buttress the Forces. One of the reasons is its worry that the security forces may fall apart given the deep ethnic faultlines these agencies are forever battling. The second concern is that there is great uncertainty about the Government that will come to power after the general election. Having already served two terms, Mr Karzai, who is a friend of India, is not even in the running. A new pro-Pakistan administration is as much of a possibility as any. Finally, and most importantly, India is apprehensive about how Pakistan will respond to New Delhi offering direct military aid to Afghanistan. Islamabad has already expressed its displeasure and New Delhi fears that supplying arms to Kabul would cause irretrievable damage to the India-Pakistan peace dialogue. Such fears need to be summarily dismissed because the dialogue has already run into rough weather for other reasons. On the other hand, there is much strategic depth to be gained from assisting Afghanistan. India must remember that five years ago, when it refused to supply Sri lanka with lethal aid, Colombo turned to Pakistan and China.