Killing of Abu Ismail is a strike against terrorism in Kashmir Valley. Action must be sustained
The killing of lashkar-e-Tayeeba’s (leT) top commander Abu Ismail, believed to be the mastermind of the massacre of Amarnath pilgrims, is a significant breakthrough in intelligence gathering and counter-terrorism operations in the Valley. For the first time, despite Ismail's chameleon-like ways, the security forces got wind of his intended fidayeen attack on a security camp on the outskirts of Srinagar, button-holed and eliminated him without much resistance. That too by gathering information from the terrorist bastion of south Kashmir, which has so far been intransigent to any intervention or coercion by security forces. By eliminating the Pakistan-born Ismail so quickly after his predecessor Abu Dujana, the security forces have been able to create and perpetuate a leadership vacuum in the south Kashmir division of leT and have managed to deliver a significant body blow to the jihadist movement. The operation moved cohesively and was coordinated by the intelligence units, State police and security forces. Army sources said the intelligence input for the raid was provided by the technical cell of the Jammu & Kashmir police, which had been tracking the mobile phone of Ismail's accomplice and was following his movements closely. This cell has of late been instrumental in the killing of wanted terrorists, including Bashir lashkari, Abu Dujana, Sabzar Ahmed Bhat and Burhan Wani. This shows that the impervious network of the leT in the Valley is slowly giving way. This is also significant considering the fact that for about a year, no major operation could be effected in the Shopian area because of a tightly enforced militant lockdown. But the latest killings are evidence enough that information and leads are now trickling in. While his predecessor Dujana was criticised for befriending a local Kashmiri girl, Ismail always made it a point to not come in direct contact with Kashmiris to avoid getting caught and used local terrorists instead to communicate and execute his best-laid plans. This episode proves that counter-terrorism measures have worked their way through the mantle and touched the core network.
Kashmiri jihad seems to be under severe stress with the recent spate of militant killings — 58 in south Kashmir this year. This has even led to faultlines within the separatist movement. The Hizbul Mujahideen is already waning with ageing and reluctant leadership and the leT is gasping for a new survival strategy. The presence of Zakir Rashid Bhat or Zakir Musa, who broke away from Hizbul Mujahideen to prop up an Al Qaeda affiliate and whose rant against Pakistan, Hizb and Hurriyat is finding new followers, is already altering the context of separatism with a larger idea of pan-Islamism. In fact, Hizb has officially accused him of colluding with the establishment and held him responsible for the elimination of top line Hizb leaders. Whatever the accusatory diatribes among outfits, it is clear that their proselytising ways are not quite effective at the grassroots which has lived in fear. For it is from the on-ground network of informers that this operation could be executed with such precision. There has also been no major protest or demonstrations after the attack either, indicating that the leT tempo, for now, has been compromised.