As the operation unfolded with unprecedented swiftness and clarity, it revealed a new Indian normal: Confident, deliberate, and undeterred by nuclear posturing or global scrutiny. India harnessed the information dimension — not just to win battles, but to shape outcomes and future doctrines
Operation Sindoor demonstrated the effectiveness of credible harnessing of information for precision and decision thereby achieving impact and retaining initiative all through the operations. It was a classic manifestation of information as the primary resource to gain asymmetry over an adversary in combat even as there was relative symmetry in firepower and mobility resources on the two sides. The last few centuries have seen an evolution from attrition to manoeuvre to information warfare, with firepower, mobility and information technologies supporting the inflexion, respectively. As the range, speed and lethality of firepower and mobility resources attained their maxima, the focus shifted to harnessing information to achieve asymmetry at both tactical and strategic levels.
In the tactical battle area, all three resources operated mainly in the physical dimension with the role of information being limited to intelligence or situation reports travelling along the command chain across physical, cognitive, and decision (or metaphysical) dimensions. Information age, with its concomitant ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) and CIS (communication and information systems) technologies, and ever-evolving practices, allowed targeting of cognitive or decision dimensions directly and independently through any or all three views of information, namely, matter, medium and message. Information Dimension is the technological realm, comprising networks, where credible information is drawn from. It is the ecosystem where information resides, travels and evolves. This dimension is as keenly contested in modern warfare as the physical dimension. Info space is largely global commons and information is a neutral resource available for exploitation by any party to suit their ends. Moreover, information is non-expendable and reusable, with or without augmentation and synthesis. Its direct connection to cognitive and decision dimensions makes it as critical, if not more, as the physical dimension. In this context, it is important to examine our performance in the information dimension of Op Sindoor.
Strike on Terror
The term “Sindoor” was a masterly coinage as the operation id. It carried, not only the cultural significance of vermilion but also brought home the unprovoked, unapologetic and dastardly terrorist act by persons indoctrinated in religious fundamentalism and armed in Pakistan. It was strategic communication aimed at driving home the “jus ad bellum” to the global, interconnected infosphere and convincing them of the rightfulness of Indian strikes on May 7th. After 2016 and 2019, the friendly population expected a higher degree of punishment. India had to be prepared for not only the retaliation but also the international pushback. Punishment was served in 19 days, which is commendable by any standards.
Pakistan was surprised at the precision and boldness of the 7th May strikes. Indian declaration of the 7th May strikes as “measured, non-escalatory, proportionate and responsible” and “focused on terrorist infrastructure” took the wind out of the sails of Pakistani retaliation. It was “jus in bello” well served and presented. India had established ascendancy in physical, cognitive and decision dimensions.
Pakistan’s Muddled Response
Pakistan repeatedly proves the famous quote of the French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau that “war is too important a matter to be left to Generals.” The absence of political leadership and lack of civilian control of the military has always done them in, be it 1965, 1971 or 1999.
The trend was repeated this time too. They retaliated, without purpose, only to sue for peace two days later. The retaliation has added to the reputation of neither the Pak Army’s professionalism nor Chinese and Turkish equipment. The promotion of the Army Chief as Field Marshal is a pathetic display of intellectual bankruptcy on the part of the polity as well as the military. If there is a message to the friendly, adversary or neutral population, it is certainly not discernible. It only demonstrates the Army Chief’s disconnect with the ongoing operation and its outcome. There have been random briefings on Indian losses too, in order to shore up their forces’ morale. Whatever the facts on losses, the narrative of “a defeated Army with a promoted Chief” has very much taken root.
New Indian Normal
“Zero tolerance to terrorism” has been a long-propounded national philosophy. Op Sindoor is only the first manifestation of its credible operationalisation to a conclusive outcome, where Pakistan sought an end to conflict after initiating it.
Much has been written about Pakistan’s nuclear shield, or the lack of it, although most of the world would prefer the latter. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) with a revisionist power as Pakistan, with a proven complicity in state support to fundamentalist forces employing terrorist methodologies, are dangerous for the world.
India is most exposed to this danger, both by Geography and History. Pakistan has repeatedly tried to play the game of irrational response with its nuclear assets to considerable effect in the past. But a confident nation has decided to call out this bluff, aptly and successfully through Op Sindoor.
Hits and Misses
While combat space saw only two participants — Pakistan and India — info space saw many, with everyone having their axe to grind. The first briefing by the Foreign Secretary, ably assisted by two Woman Officers, was a masterly instance of strategic communication. India had declared an end to further strikes, which was unprecedented in the history of such conflicts undertaken by the USA or Israel against terrorism in the past. Pakistan, on the other hand, quickly moved to operational and tactical briefings.
Surprisingly, it had enough support from some international media. The debates on Indian combat losses, comparison of Chinese and French aircraft, the effectiveness of Chinese and Indian missiles and air defence (AD) systems, etc. diluted the strategic message. Reputed agencies like BBC, Reuters, and respected commentators like Christine Fair waded into needless debates on the truth about the combat superiority of platforms.
More intriguing was the continuation of such debates even after graphic details of strikes on 11 airbases were publicly shared by the DG Air Ops. Admittedly, operational briefings by the DGMOs came a little late in the day, allowing Pakistan to set the narrative for combat space, and thereby helping willing collaborators run the same narrative. The absence of authentic information on combat space from the Indian side allowed the national media to run riot, affecting their credibility. Although it is legitimate for national media to be nationalist in times of conflict, international media seems to have reacted virulently. POTUS remarks did not help India either. In my reckoning, it would have been done to save face for Pakistan, camouflaging their capitulation with Trump’s post on X.
The Prescription
Pakistan, as a revisionist power, ruled by a radicalised, self-indulgent military, has been a perennial challenge to the progress of India. With time, however, our respective country’s basic philosophies have resulted in India pulling far ahead as an economic and military power. China’s strategy of using Pakistan as a proxy to keep India hyphenated with Pakistan has suffered such diminishing returns as to force China into open confrontation since 2020. Chinese participation in Op Sindoor on Pakistan’s behalf in the information dimension was reasonably evident besides the direct support in terms of aerospace technologies. India must, therefore, prepare to deal with the strategic narrative far more effectively in future, even as it keeps improving its precision targeting and protection against the same.
Strategic communications need consistency and coherence. Tactical and strategic briefings would need far more coherence in future eventualities. The briefings could well be coordinated at NSCS, where representatives of MEA, MHA and MoD are under one roof. This would also prod NSCS to take up strategic communications as one of its charters because it is the most suitable body for this function. It is already coordinating ISR and CIS for security agencies. Adding strategic communications will address the complete information dimension.
Conclusion
Information dominance would be a key battle — winning factor in future operations. Creating impact through precision, along with gaining and retaining the initiative through correct decisions, are key to information dominance in combat space. Alongside, the information space must hold a favourable narrative too. This requires capture, storage, flow and analysis of data, continuously scaled up in scope, through enhancement in spread and speed of both capture and dissemination.
Every component of the information dimension, whether philosophy, doctrine, technology or practices, must be Indian to keep it sustainable, innovative and evolving. Operation Sindoor has not only brought home the importance of the information dimension but also the need for its enhancements and refinement to face bigger challenges in future.
(The writer is a Major General, VSM (Retired). He is a former Scientist at National Technical Research Organisation and an Information Operations specialist. The views are personal)