The brutal terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir — claiming the lives of 26 innocent tourists — has not only shocked the nation but reignited a serious conversation about India’s ongoing relations with Pakistan, especially in the context of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). The gruesome nature of the attack has prompted a broader reassessment of strategic, diplomatic, and humanitarian ties between the two countries. One major outcome of this reassessment is a renewed scrutiny of the IWT — an agreement that has endured since 1960, but now appears increasingly outdated given Pakistan’s repeated provocations.
In a significant development for the first time since the Treaty’s inception, Pakistan has expressed a willingness to revisit its terms. This shift comes amid India’s stern measures following the attack, including the bold decision to consider suspending elements of the Treaty. It is a move that has been debated in the past but never seriously acted upon — until now.
The Indus Waters Treaty, brokered by the World Bank in 1960 after nine years of negotiations, governs the distribution of water from six rivers in the Indus basin. It allocates exclusive use of the eastern rivers — Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi — to India, while granting Pakistan control over the western rivers — Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab. India, under the Treaty, is allowed to generate hydroelectric power on the western rivers through “run-of-the-river” projects, but is prohibited from altering the flow through large-scale storage or irrigation.
At the heart of the Treaty lies a spirit of cooperation, goodwill, and mutual trust. The preamble clearly states both countries’ intent to achieve the most equitable and satisfactory utilisation of river waters through a cooperative framework. Unfortunately, while India has largely honored this commitment, Pakistan has repeatedly violated the underlying principles by abetting terrorism and interfering in India’s internal affairs. The recent Pahalgam massacre — unprecedented in its direct targeting of tourists — underscores a serious breach not only of bilateral trust but also of the moral framework that underpins the Treaty.
India’s response was swift. Recognising the attack as a violation of the basic tenets of peace and diplomacy, the Government of India announced a reassessment of the IWT, signaling that continued goodwill cannot be taken for granted. Unlike in previous instances where debate on the Treaty was limited to academic and diplomatic circles, this time the Government took proactive steps, sending a clear message to Islamabad and the international community.
Pakistan’s sudden openness to renegotiation reflects a quiet but clear acknowledgment of its vulnerability. Much of the country depends heavily on the western rivers, especially Jhelum and Chenab, for agriculture and daily consumption. Any change in India’s approach to water flow — whether through infrastructure expansion or short-term flow adjustments — could have significant consequences for Pakistan’s water security. This looming reality may have prompted Islamabad to reconsider its rigid stance. It is also worth noting that the IWT includes provisions for revision. Changes can be made, but only through a newly ratified treaty agreed upon by both nations. Given the evolving geopolitical and ecological realities, and especially in light of persistent hostilities, India is well within its rights to propose modifications. The infrastructure required to implement such changes, like increased storage and diversion capacity, would demand long-term planning, but the very possibility is enough to concern Pakistan’s leadership.
The Treaty also includes mechanisms for resolving disagreements. These range from bilateral discussions through the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC), to more structured dispute resolution methods involving a Neutral Expert or even an ad hoc Court of Arbitration. Disagreements have arisen in recent years over India’s construction of two hydroelectric power plants — Kishenganga (330 MW) and Ratle (850 MW) — in Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan has claimed that aspects of these projects violate Treaty provisions, particularly in terms of design parameters. However, these are “run-of-the-river” projects, and India maintains that they fall within its rights under the IWT. The World Bank is not funding either project, and technical design disputes have remained unresolved despite multiple rounds of talks. India’s recent steps to enhance the reservoir capacity of these hydroelectric projects — through desilting and other improvements — are within the permissible framework but carry potential for temporary control over water flow.
Even short-term restrictions, such as temporarily closing dam gates, could have significant repercussions downstream, further highlighting Pakistan’s dependence on Indian goodwill.
The Pahalgam attack has exposed the fragility of any agreement rooted in one-sided responsibility. India has abided by the IWT even during the most challenging times, while Pakistan has continued to harbor and support terrorism. The attack has given India the moral and strategic justification to question whether the current form of the Treaty serves its national interest. Pakistan’s expressed willingness to engage in renegotiations could mark a turning point — either toward genuine cooperation or further tension. The burden now lies on both sides to either reforge a partnership based on mutual respect or prepare for a prolonged period of uncertainty.
(The writer is a political and national affairs analyst. Views are personal)