Author: Johnson Odakkal
As Indian warships engage partners across the Indo-Pacific, Europe and beyond, naval exercises are becoming an increasingly consequential instrument of India’s foreign policy
The year 2026 began with perhaps the biggest maritime convergence in the Indian Ocean in recent years, with the Indian Navy hosting the International Fleet Review, MILAN 2026 and the IONS Conclave of Chiefs, among other associated events, at Visakhapatnam in February. Those events set the tone for the engagements that followed.
The diplomatic significance of the Indian Navy extends well beyond port calls, flag visits and ceremonial welcomes. Its greater contribution lies at sea, where warships operate alongside foreign navies, practise complex manoeuvres and build the professional relationships that underpin maritime cooperation. The concentration of engagements between September and November 2026 illustrates how naval diplomacy has evolved into a practical instrument of foreign policy.
From Malaysia and Sri Lanka to the Philippines and France, and from the Mediterranean and the Atlantic to the Pacific, this expansive canvas of bilateral and multilateral exercises has strengthened India’s maritime relationships. With MALABAR 2026 under way off Japan from 5 to 12 November, this is proving to be a particularly consequential period for Indian naval diplomacy.
The recent sequence included SAMUDRA LAKSAMANA with Malaysia, SLINEX with Sri Lanka, the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) maritime security activity in the Philippines, the second ASEAN-India Maritime Exercise (AIME-2026), VARUNA with France and INDRA with Russia. Together, these engagements demonstrate the breadth of India’s maritime outreach. The 13th edition of SLINEX, held off Visakhapatnam in September, featured an expanded range of serials: coordinated maritime manoeuvres, air operations, night replenishment at sea, Special Forces drills and visit, board, search and seizure operations. Such activities require common procedures, effective communications and close coordination, and they improve preparedness for maritime surveillance, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and other contingencies. AIME-2026 similarly promoted operational synchronisation between India and ASEAN maritime forces, with drills spanning humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, boarding operations, underway replenishment and cross-deck helicopter operations. The participation of INS Sahyadri, a stealth frigate, and INS Kulish, a missile corvette, demonstrated India’s ability to contribute different warship capabilities to multinational engagements. Partners gained familiarity with Indian operational practices, while India strengthened interoperability and its understanding of regional maritime priorities. The diplomatic message is consequently more substantial than a declaration of friendship: it demonstrates that relationships can deliver practical outcomes.
Indian naval engagements this season spanned the Pacific, the immediate neighbourhood, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Sustaining deployments across these theatres demands logistical support, operational planning, personnel management and readiness. Two ships tell the story best.
Sailing west, INS Trishul joined the French Navy at Toulon for the 24th edition of VARUNA, called at Valencia, and went on to exercise KONKAN with the Royal Navy’s HMS Sutherland off Plymouth before calling at Lisbon. A single deployment thus carried the Indian flag from the Mediterranean into the Atlantic and linked two of India’s most important European partnerships. The longevity of these exercises, with VARUNA now in its 24th edition, offers partners a credible basis for long-term cooperation rather than occasional ceremonial contact.
Sailing east, INS Sahyadri traced an even longer arc. After the ADMM-Plus activity and AIME-2026 at Subic Bay, she sailed to Vladivostok for INDRA, conducting the sea phase in the Sea of Japan with the Russian Navy’s Aldar Tsydenzhapov. INDRA, which began in 2003, reinforced a defence relationship in which maritime cooperation has long been a pillar. Sahyadri then proceeded to Busan for the second edition of the India-Republic of Korea Navy bilateral exercise, strengthening engagement with Northeast Asia, and is now off Japan for MALABAR alongside the navies of the United States, Japan and Australia. Within a few weeks, one Indian frigate has worked with ASEAN partners, Russia, the Republic of Korea and the Quad.
The exercise calendar extended this reach further. IBSAMAR, involving India, Brazil and South Africa and held this year at Simon’s Town with INS Tarkash, connected partners across the Indian and Atlantic Oceans. SIMBEX with the Republic of Singapore Navy, held off Visakhapatnam in October, marked its 33rd edition and continued one of India’s longest-standing bilateral naval exercise relationships, which began in 1994.
Bilateral exercises such as SAMUDRA LAKSAMANA, SLINEX, VARUNA, KONKAN, INDRA and SIMBEX deepen specific relationships. Multilateral engagements such as AIME, MALABAR and IBSAMAR bring multiple partners together, exposing participating forces to different operational practices and encouraging common approaches to maritime challenges.
This flexibility matters in an Indo-Pacific marked by competing interests and divergent threat perceptions. Engagement with ASEAN supports India’s Act East Policy, while MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions) provides a broader framework for maritime cooperation. India’s diplomatic value does not require every partner to share its geopolitical assessments. It rests on cooperation where interests converge: safe seas, freedom of navigation, disaster response, humanitarian assistance and maritime security. Concurrent engagements with Russia, Western partners and Global South countries also demonstrate the breadth of India’s defence diplomacy. These relationships do not imply identical strategic alignments; rather, they reflect India’s preference for multiple channels of cooperation while preserving strategic autonomy. INS Sahyadri moving from INDRA to MALABAR within a matter of weeks is perhaps the clearest illustration of that approach. A capable navy gives diplomatic commitments practical substance. It can support evacuations, deliver humanitarian assistance, respond to emergencies and contribute to maritime security. Exercises cannot guarantee success, but they develop the procedures and relationships that make coordinated responses more feasible. Professional exchanges, ship visits and interactions between crews also create personal connections that extend beyond individual deployments. This less visible diplomatic capital can sustain cooperation long after an exercise concludes. India’s ability to convene maritime cooperation is equally significant. MILAN 2026 demonstrated that the country can do more than participate in international exercises: it can bring numerous navies together around shared professional objectives. This strengthens India’s profile as a maritime security contributor and a convenor of regional dialogue.
Naval exercises communicate political intent to allies, partners and potential competitors alike, and their diplomatic significance extends well beyond the ships participating. An important distinction is that participation in an exercise does not automatically signify a military alliance or an agreement to intervene in a conflict. Exercises can strengthen relationships while preserving independent foreign policy choices.
Complex exercises such as MALABAR signal India’s willingness and ability to cooperate with partners in protecting maritime interests, freedom of navigation and the rules-based international order. By convening multiple navies, India also helps shape the regional security environment, establishing habits of cooperation and shared expectations about responsible conduct at sea. Regular naval engagement, in turn, creates additional channels through which India can pursue dialogue, negotiate maritime arrangements and respond collectively to regional crises. Above all, exercises allow India to deepen cooperation with the United States, France, Russia, Japan, Australia and other partners without entering a formal military alliance. The choice of exercise, participating countries and level of operational integration can be calibrated to India’s diplomatic objectives. That calibration is the essence of strategic autonomy at sea.
The measure of naval diplomacy is not simply the number of exercises conducted or the distance travelled. It is whether engagement builds lasting trust, improves operational coordination and encourages partners to cooperate when circumstances demand it. The Indian Navy’s 2026 exercise calendar illustrates how maritime capability becomes diplomatic opportunity. Individually, these may look like tactical training events. Collectively, they constitute a network of relationships spanning bilateral and multilateral frameworks and multiple maritime theatres. Through repeated, credible and cooperative action, the Indian Navy is helping translate India’s maritime reach into diplomatic influence, advancing the country’s ambition to shape a secure and cooperative Indo-Pacific.
From Malaysia and Sri Lanka to the Philippines and France, and from the Mediterranean and the Atlantic to the Pacific, this expansive canvas of bilateral and multilateral exercises has strengthened India’s maritime relationships. With MALABAR 2026 under way off Japan from 5 to 12 November, this is proving to be a particularly consequential period for Indian naval diplomacy
Commodore (Dr) Johnson Odakkal is a maritime scholar, strategic affairs analyst, and Indian Navy veteran. He is an Adjunct Faculty of Maritime and Strategic Studies at Naval War College, Goa; Views presented are personal.