Europe’s coming electoral supercycle could reshape the continent’s political order. As Donald Trump’s political model gains influence beyond America, elections across Europe will test whether integration can survive the pressures of populism, economic rivalry and a fraying transatlantic alliance
The European Union is preparing for an electoral supercycle, and Europe may not emerge from it as the same political entity. Ben Hall of the Financial Times has identified a succession of elections capable of remaking the continent, extending well beyond the replacement of individual governments. The coming year will test whether European integration can survive declining public confidence in established parties, the growing appeal of populist politics and mounting economic pressures. Spain is scheduled to vote on 29 November 2026, followed by presidential and parliamentary contests across several member states in 2027. France, Italy, Poland, Greece, Slovakia, Estonia and Finland face national electoral tests, while Bulgaria and several German states will also vote.
The European rightward shift cannot be understood solely through the history of European politics. It is also part of the international consequences of Donald Trump’s political overhaul, which has helped normalise a style of government built around national preference, hostility towards established institutions and suspicion of international obligations. As I argued in my column last March, this is the Trump plague without a cure but with unprecedented amplification in various forms. Europe’s electoral supercycle will reveal how far this transformation has travelled and whether nationalist movements can turn domestic discontent into lasting political power. The Trump connection is not simply one of ideological imitation. His second presidency has undermined European assumptions about the reliability of the United States as a security partner, the stability of transatlantic trade and the value of international institutions. European nationalist movements may share his hostility towards immigration, climate regulation and supranational authority, but they cannot automatically accept American pressure when it threatens their own national interests. Giorgia Meloni’s relationship with Trump illustrates the tension between ideological affinity and the practical responsibilities of government.
The more consequential danger may emerge after Trump leaves office. Political movements do not disappear when their most prominent leaders depart. They leave behind institutions, precedents, expectations and constituencies that successors can inherit. If Trump’s presidency further weakens confidence in independent institutions, normalises executive confrontation with political opponents and makes international commitments appear disposable, a successor could retain those political methods without reproducing Trump’s personality. His eventual legacy remains uncertain, but the possibility that his political model could outlive him deserves attention. It concerns whether the political culture he has helped shape becomes a durable feature of Western government.
The electoral calendar gives these developments their European significance. Spain’s contest will test the conservative Popular Party and nationalist Vox against the governing socialists. France’s presidential election in April and May 2027 could bring a confrontation over immigration, public spending, the EU budget and support for Ukraine. Italy’s next parliamentary election, due by the end of 2027 unless called earlier, may ensure Meloni’s repositioning, while Poland’s parliamentary contest will shape the balance between national sovereignty and European cooperation. Elections in Greece, Slovakia, Estonia and Finland, alongside German regional contests, will add to the pressure. Centre-right parties are also more willing to cooperate with the far right, weakening the political cordon that once kept such movements away from executive power.
The economic foundations of this transformation are equally important. The EU’s goods trade deficit with China reached approximately €360 billion in 2025, equivalent to around €1 billion a day, according to figures cited in European Parliament research. The underlying problem is substantial. European manufacturers face formidable Chinese competition in electric vehicles, batteries, solar technology and other industries central to the future economy. Brussels is on a knife edge over how to protect industrial capacity without provoking a damaging trade war or making its own energy transition more expensive. Europe’s claim to strategic autonomy is difficult to sustain if it cannot remain competitive in the technologies it considers essential to its future.
The next EU budget exposes the political contradiction. The European Commission’s original proposal approached €2 trillion for 2028-34, while a subsequent negotiating proposal put forward under the Irish presidency reduced the figure to €1.62 trillion. Governments remain divided over spending, new EU revenue sources and the distribution of funds between agriculture, regional development, competitiveness and other priorities. Europe is expected to spend more on defence, support Ukraine and protect its economic interests against the United States and China, yet its governments disagree over who should pay. France wants additional European revenue, while Germany and other net contributors seek tighter control of spending. Countries dependent on cohesion funding resist cuts. The dispute exposes the difficulty of making collective commitments when national politicians are increasingly rewarded for opposing the compromises those commitments require. By the time I’m writing this column, Marine Le Pen has threatened a confrontation with Brussels over France’s EU contribution and questioned continued financing for Ukraine if she wins the 2027 presidential election. The question is whether France can reduce its fiscal pressures while preserving the public services, economic capacity and European influence it needs. If a French president attempts to withhold contributions or obstruct common financing, the confrontation could affect the EU budget, Ukraine and defence cooperation. A country central to Europe’s project of confronting Russia has become the source of a deeper crisis over the ultimate aims of that strategy. The conflict is now exposing potentially fatal fractures in the governing models and political futures of European states. Ukraine illustrates how the consequences extend beyond European politics.
Kyiv insists that halting attacks on Russian energy infrastructure must depend on Moscow ending its own strikes on Ukraine’s power system, but the dispute has deepened tensions with Washington. Trump has also called for Zelensky’s replacement and fresh elections, although martial law, imposed after Russia’s full-scale invasion, prevents a wartime vote under Ukraine’s current legal framework. The confrontation risks dividing Western allies over military assistance, sanctions and the terms of peace. For Europe, weakening transatlantic unity could give Moscow greater room to manoeuvre, while economic pressures and domestic political divisions threaten the continent’s capacity to sustain a common security strategy.
However, Europe’s approaching elections will not automatically dismantle the Union. Nationalist parties may discover the practical limits of their promises once in government, while coalitions may preserve cooperation despite ideological differences. The more plausible danger is gradual erosion. Common policies become harder to negotiate, budgets turn into instruments of domestic political warfare, support for Ukraine becomes conditional, and governments treat European obligations as optional whenever compliance threatens their electoral position. The Union may retain its treaties and institutions while losing the political capacity to act collectively.
European leaders have their own records of economic mismanagement, political complacency and broken promises, and nationalist movements draw much of their support from domestic failures. But Trump’s significance is that his presidency has accelerated a wider argument about whether national power should be constrained by international commitments, whether political opponents should be treated as legitimate participants and whether institutions deserve respect when they obstruct the governing party. Those questions will survive his presidency. Europe’s electoral supercycle will show whether Trumpism remains an American disruption or becomes a more permanent feature of Western politics. The contest is not simply over who will govern Europe, but what its governments will still be capable of doing together.
Europe’s approaching elections will not automatically dismantle the Union. Nationalist parties may discover the practical limits of their promises once in government, while coalitions may preserve cooperation despite ideological differences. The more plausible danger is gradual erosion
The writer is a Colombo-based columnist; Views presented are personal.