The ultra-Naxal threat remains and is likely to have exacerbated due to the reverse migration of workers from the cities to the villages
The medical, humanitarian and economic impact of the pandemic has diverted attention from other problems in the country. The threat of extremism in the Red Corridor, however, remains and is likely to have exacerbated due to the reverse migration of workers from the cities to the villages. This may cause a serious loss in the gains made over the years by the Government in countering Left Wing Extremism (LWE). The Red Corridor, comprising the States of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Bihar, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and eastern Uttar Pradesh, is the region that experiences Naxalite-Maoist insurgency as it suffers from illiteracy, poverty and overpopulation. The system has failed to protect industrial and agricultural workers and led to their disillusionment. This may have driven them towards extremism. Left-wing extremists and Maoist groups are aware of the potential these masses possess and will exploit the negative sentiment and loss of livelihood. There are a few immediate concerns that merit attention. Community policing, which has been an effective method to monitor early signs of extremism and radicalisation, has been reduced drastically or has been diverted to enforcing the lockdown in most areas. The vacuum is an invitation to vigilante groups and motivated supporters of LWE for creating antipathy. Strict measures by the security forces against demonstrations will be misrepresented to discredit the Government’s strategy of guarding its citizens.
The discrimination against these poor workers and the cruelty they have been subjected to in urban India and even in their villages is disconcerting. Social cohesion and painstakingly-built trust in Government-run development programmes in tribal and LWE-prone areas by community-based activities is thus seriously threatened. With schools closed and recreational and cultural activities suspended, the youth are confined to their homes and are spending more time online. Their frustration, combined with possible increase in indoctrination and targetted social posts, makes them vulnerable to radicalisation.
The contagion and the reverse migration have caused loss of jobs and disruption in education. The marginalised have become more so. In the absence of religious, cultural and community gatherings — which foster a sense of social cohesion and strengthen community resilience — the very indicators of radicalisation, which are likely to get screened in these pivotal activities, are going unchecked. Community confidence in local authorities is dwindling as local health facilities collapse, thus providing an avenue for extremist ideology. In fact, building of local capacities and bridging the confidence gap between locals and the authorities had been one of the most successful initiatives of the Government earlier. This was achieved by building trust and identifying indigenous actors who were able to spot those heading towards LWE and steer them away. Many of the existing and time-tested activities to counter LWE, such as employment schemes, education, vocational training and inter-personal interactions, are currently not taking place. Similarly, NGOs and charitable organisations have had to cut back on contributions and operations as they undergo financial pressure not only due to loss of donations and subscriptions but also due to the need to protect their staff from the virus. This kind of withdrawal of donor support has a mitigating effect on the trust of rural societies.
Since its inception in 2006, the LWE division of the Ministry of Home Affairs has implemented security-related schemes aimed at capacity-building in the affected States. The stated approach of the Government is to deal with LWE in a holistic manner in the areas of security, development and ensuring the rights and entitlements of local communities, improving local governance and public perception management. Ninety districts in 11 States were up for special attention regarding planning, implementation and monitoring of such interventions before the pandemic struck.
Now, all Government plans and any new interventions will have to focus on short, medium and long-term implications for implementation, together with keeping track of emergence of new, ominous green shoots of LWE. In the short-term, projects should aim for more agile scheduling and use the power of online and social media options by adjusting to the “new normal.” Many of the returnees are capable of taking up positions with the local authorities by virtue of their experience in jobs held by them in cities. Inputs from the local implementing partner should be used to plan, train and put technology to use.
For the medium and long-term, it must be noted that piecemeal plans of States and short-term funding will lead to competition between players and the various affected States for meagre funds and will cause further disgruntlement, thereby adding fuel to the extremist propaganda. An immediate comprehensive assessment of local needs and priorities of communities, followed by channeling resources in a coherent and sustainable plan, is imperative.
The current pandemic has the potential to knock terrorism off the top of the threat chart and precipitate heavy investment in countering violent extremism. In the meagre and dwindling resource basket, these investments will have to be counterbalanced against the defence and anti-terror capability-building programmes already in place. While this kind of rebalancing is fraught with serious security implications, the Government has to bite the bullet to stop the Red Corridor from erupting in discontent.
(The writer is an Army veteran)