In late July 2026, Indian troops on routine patrol in Arunachal Pradesh's Upper Subansiri district, near Taksing and Asaphila, came face-to-face with Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) troops, leading to the first of many confrontations, which continued till November 2026. After the first confrontation, Chinese soldiers returned in larger numbers and pitched tents several kilometres inside Indian territory (formerly part of the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA)). These face-offs/confrontations, which included the Indian Army and Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), with the PLA in Arunachal Pradesh continued despite both armies' Corps Commander-level talks held in early September 2026.
In October 2026, these incidents were brought to public light following disclosures by ITBP Director General Shatrujeet Singh Kapur, and the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) confirmed that the face-offs occurred when PLA troops diverged and deviated from established patrolling patterns. DG Kapur also confirmed that the confrontations -primarily verbal or physical standoffs over patrolling limits- continued in late 2026. Physical standoffs often extend to grappling or fisticuffs, even since the post-1967 agreement not to fire at each other.
In August 2026, the 25th round of Special Representatives (SR) talks, co-chaired by National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing, ended with India and China reaching an eight-point consensus. What emerged was that hopes for Sino-Indian relations centre on a cautious diplomatic thaw, institutionalised border stability and renewed high-level engagement. While the very long overdue settlement of the disputed border was decided to be implemented on a newly coined term, "early and substantial harvest", routine border management, including patrolling, was expected to proceed smoothly. Even more so, considering the fact that the SR talks were very shortly followed by Xi Jinping attending the BRICS Summit in New Delhi, albeit after a period of uncertainty. While the activation of these eight points provides valuable channels to prevent an accidental kinetic clash on the ground, the real test of China's sincerity will not be the joint statements signed in Beijing, but whether the PLA ceases infrastructure build-ups and respects the historical patrolling rights of Indian troops along the LAC. Also, considering the long history of the PLA and the Chinese Communist Party signing agreements and not implementing them on the ground, for this 8 -point agreement to succeed, and for relations between the armies to remain steadily smooth, the PLA must ensure that it establishes and maintains trust/wins the confidence of the Indian Army. The faceoffs/confrontations continuing till November obviously mean that the PLA has not done anything to win the confidence of Indian personnel.
On September 6-7, 2026, Indian and Chinese armies held their first-ever Corps Commander-level meeting in the Eastern Sector, i.e., Arunachal Pradesh, expanding the military dialogue mechanism that was previously restricted to Eastern Ladakh. At the Vacha-Damai Border Personnel Meeting Point, near Kibithu and the Kibod sector in Arunachal Pradesh, the Indian delegation led by Lt Gen Girish Kalia, commanding the Indian Army's 'Spear' Corps, accompanied by a twelve-member group including representatives from the ITBP and the Ministry of External Affairs, met the Chinese delegation. Held days before Jinping's visit to New Delhi for the 18th BRICS Summit, the meeting also aimed to keep diplomatic channels open and prevent immediate escalation ahead of the summit rather than settle entrenched territorial claims.
The confrontations which Indian authorities attributed to PLA's departures and deviations from established patrolling patterns have resulted in friction points occurring at multiple areas along the frontier in Arunachal Pradesh, including Asaphila and Taksing/Limeking in the Upper Subansiri district, which have not been marked, again by the PLA. The September 6-7 talks between Lt Gen. Kalia and his Chinese counterpart focused on implementing new hotlines and two additional Border Personnel Meeting points decided upon in the SR level talks, rather than immediate troop disengagement. Post-meeting, it was confirmed that these talks did not resolve the ongoing border confrontations in Arunachal Pradesh. While no violent clashes have occurred, both sides maintain heavy troop deployments. The ITBP has also deployed specialised close-combat units known as Shaurya Commandos to handle the standoffs. Both sides continue to use existing diplomatic and military channels to prevent miscalculations.
China claims Arunachal Pradesh as "Zangnan" or South Tibet and does not recognise the 1914 McMahon Line, whereas India firmly maintains that the entire state is an integral part of its territory. Following the Corps Commander-level talks at Wacha-Damai, both sides scaled down the number of troops at key friction points like Taksing and Limeking. Meanwhile, officials and fact-checkers have flagged various viral videos circulating online claiming massive PLA incursions as misleading, recycled, or manipulated footage. There remains no doubt that the PLA's persistent transgressions are deliberate and a long-term policy regardless of signed agreements/frameworks. Any unilateral advance or camping by the PLA violates the core tenets of the 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the LAC, the 1996 Agreement, and the 2005 Guiding Principles. A look back at the post-1967 period to date, particularly the 2020 Galwan and other clashes, confirms that every agreement signed on the table has been violated by the PLA on the ground.
Also, PLA has consistently stalled the formal exchange of maps outlining each side's perception of the LAC, a process explicitly outlined in Article X of the 1996 agreement. This deliberate ambiguity allows the PLA to continuously push its boundaries under the guise of "varying perceptions."
"Salami Slicing" in various areas along the LAC is the PLA's process involving frequent incremental encroachments, infrastructure development and temporary tent setups (such as those reported 6-to-7-kilometre-deep positions near Maza) to slowly establish a new status quo over a period. These actions are an absolute mockery and total breakdown of treaty obligations, which New Delhi responds to in a measured manner, treating these incidents as operational friction rather than a permanent policy failure. Rather than declaring the agreements completely dead, New Delhi maintains that existing military and diplomatic channels-such as the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC)-remain the primary tools to manage and defuse these incidents.
Col Anil Bhat, VSM (Retd) is a strategic affairs analyst and former Defence Ministry and Indian Army spokesperson; Views presented are personal.