Agenda

Eurasian security at stake

Nalin Kumar Mohapatra

The NATO-Russia Council Summit demonstrates the ‘misunderstanding’ about each other still exists and is accentuating a hostile strategic climate in and around Eurasia

The deadlock between Russia and NATO in the NATO-Russia Council Summit in Brussels has once again exposed the perpetual fissures and this may jeopardise both Eurasian security and global peace.

The Cold War-era global conflict which veered around NATO-Warsaw antipathy to each other is once again resurfacing even after the collapse of the Soviet Union 28 years back. This is happening despite the fact that there is no more a Warsaw bloc. The mutual hostility between NATO and Russia (as a lead member of the former Warsaw pact in the form of inheritor of the former Soviet Union) was fully reflected in the latest NATO-Russia Council meeting which took place in Brussels on January 25, 2019.

The mutual antipathy towards each other has also reflected in the tone and tenor of the Brussels Summit. As reported in the Russian press, lack of unanimity in the Council meeting came to fore when the Russian delegates stated that the United States is keen to accelerate its infamous “Star War programme”. 

The Russian delegates urged that it will “accelerate arms race” at a global scale putting the security of “Global Commons” at nadir.  Another contentious issue which got much attention in the NATO-Russia Summit meeting was on the issue of Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces also known as (INF).  The Brussels meeting as expected from many quarters failed to evolve a consensus on the future of nuclear arsenals. The failure of the coordination council of both the adversaries is also generating a lot of hypothetical questions relevant to international security. These are:

a) Is NATO going to tame an assertive Russia in near future?

b) Whether NATO will continue its policy of “encirclement” of Russia?

The antagonism between NATO-Russia which has its roots in the Cold War period took a new turn in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and emergence of the Russian Federation as its successor. To an utter surprise, the new leadership under Boris Yeltsin guided by the pro-Atlancists forces tried to mend fences with the erstwhile foe and got engaged with the NATO bloc.

In fact the admission of Russia into the NATO’s outreach Programme of Partnership for Peace (PFP) along with some other former Soviet Union (FSU) States like Azerbaijan, Moldova and Uzbekistan showed inclination of FSU States to mend fences with their Cold War adversary.

Soon the “honeymoon” between these two fell to a low level and Moscow tried to give a new impetus to its external policy in the form of distancing itself from the Western bandwagon. The stand-off between these two reached to a new low when the latter reignited the “soft tinderbox” of Eastern Europe.

The subsequent NATO onslaught on Kosovo alarmed the strategic thinkers of Russia that the United States may use NATO to orchestrate a Cold War type crisis to checkmate Russia. Subsequent change of leadership in Russia which saw emergence of Vladimir Putin as the new President has had a profound impact on policy towards the West. Unlike his predecessor’s inconsistent policy as some analysts put it towards the West (especially in the Yeltsin’s first term), Putin, in his foreign policy orientation gave a new teething.

The 9/11 incident, however, brought the two into a common platform to fight against radicalist and terrorist forces in Afghanistan. This resulted in the creation of this institutional forum NATO-Russia Council in 2002. The Council was created as stated in the NATO website for “building bridges with Russia”.

The short-lived “bonhomie” between these two soon faded into oblivion (Russia-NATO) when West started showing its real intention in the FSU States. Directly or indirectly it propped up the so-called “Colour Revolution” in some of the FSU States like Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. By propping up its own regimes in three above-mentioned strategically important States reflected the true intention of the United States to bring this space into its orbit. In this venture it used NATO’s military might to frighten Russia. Along with this move their real intention was also to get a firm foothold in the natural resources like energy.

Nervousness on the part of Russian leadership to the question of NATO’s expansion in the Russian periphery strongly reflected in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2008. The Concept paper published in the Russian Foreign Ministry website mid.ru highlights that “bringing the NATO military infrastructure closer to the Russian borders on the whole... violates the principle of equal security.”

Giving a strong rebuttal to the NATO’s expansionist policy in its sphere of influence, as reflected in the Foreign Policy Concept paper, Russia took firm measures which resulted in Russia-Georgia war in 2008 and this contributed to South Ossetia’s declaration of independence. This gave a sever jolt to NATO’s expansionist policy. Another major flashpoint which contributed to the further deterioration of relations between NATO and Russia was over NATO initiated project, Northern Distribution Network (NDN), to deliver humanitarian aid to Afghanistan.

By bringing some of the Russian allies like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, in the NDN fold along with beefing up of the NATO-Ukrainian council, NATO tried to get an upper hand in the Eurasian geopolitics.

However in the post-2014 era the hide and seek game between these two strategic competitors took an ugly turn when Russia annexed Crimea. Calling it as an act of “aggression” by Moscow, NATO tried to frighten the former by stationing its troops across its bases in Eastern Europe, Central Europe and Baltic states. The deployment of missiles by NATO in the periphery of Russia propelled analysts to predict the return of “Cold War syndrome” in the global geopolitics. NATO’s apprehension of Russia’s action was clearly manifested in the   Warsaw Summit of NATO which took place in 2016. The Summit meeting as quoted in the NATO website stated, “Russia’s aggressive actions are a source of regional instability.”

Using “regional instability” (discussed above) as a precursor, NATO is strategising its policy towards the post-Soviet space. NATO member States despite their own internal rift are quite vociferous in demanding stricter action against Russia as evident from recent speech of President of Ukraine. In spite of internal rift (by the European  member states and the United States in NATO over generating fund)  which threatened the very existence of this military bloc, this Western body — as reported in the London-based newspaper Telegraph dated January 27, 2019 — is “mulling to spend around $100 billion” for member states” security. This demonstrates NATO’s preparedness to indulge in perpetual hostility with Russia. NATO’s intention of taking on Russia militarily can be evident from the fact that it is conducting a series of military exercises in the periphery of Russia to demonstrate its war preparedness.

Another contentious issue which got attention in the NATO-Russia Council Summit was the reduction of INF. It may be recalled here that the Council for Foreign Relations (CFR) study titled “The Ailing INF Treaty: What to Know” published on January 28, 2019 states that Russia is enjoying an “tactical advantage” over the United States in the possession of INF warheads.

The data of CFR study said, “Moscow has around 6,850 warheads and Washington has only 6,550” of the same. The failure of Brussels Summit resulted in both the United States (being part of NATO) and Russia deciding to withdraw from the INF treaty as stated by policy makers from both the countries. However this may   trigger a new kind of “security dilemma” in global politics.

The NATO-Russia Council Summit demonstrated that the “misperception” of both the sides is still there and accentuating a hostile strategic climate in and around Eurasia as evident from recent moves in Ukraine.

Similarly for a “sustainable peace” both NATO and Russia should take steps that might reduce mutual hostility.

(The author teaches in the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi)