Since the Taliban’s resurgence in 2021, South Asia has faced profound geopolitical shifts, revealing Taliban fractures and amplifying extremist threats
Since the Taliban’s resurgence in Afghanistan in 2021, South Asia has experienced profound shifts in its regional dynamics. What initially appeared to be a strategic victory for Pakistan has instead revealed deep fractures within the Taliban, the emergence of internal resistance movements, and a growing threat from extremist factions. These developments have forced Pakistan’s intelligence services, particularly the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), to recalibrate their strategy.
Historically, the ISI concentrated its support on the Southern Wing of the Taliban (SWIN), a Pashtun-led faction. However, recent changes indicate a pivot toward engaging the Afghan-Wing Intelligence Network (AWIN), which collaborates with non-Pashtun factions, most notably the National Resistance Front (NRF). This faction, led by Ahmad Massoud, has gained significant traction in northern Afghanistan, challenging the Taliban’s hold.This strategic shift by the ISI has implications far beyond Afghanistan’s borders, influencing neighbouring countries such as India, Tajikistan, and Bangladesh. Pakistan’s growing support for the NRF, coupled with the recent visit of the ISI chief to Bangladesh, highlights a broader regional strategy aimed at reshaping South Asia’s security dynamics and diplomatic alignments.
ISI’s Strategic Shift: From SWIN to AWIN
For decades, Pakistan’s policy in Afghanistan has revolved around supporting the Southern Wing of the Taliban (SWIN), a predominantly Pashtun-centric faction. This alignment was rooted in Pakistan’s desire to maintain influence in Afghanistan while countering India’s regional presence. Leaders like Mullah Omar and Hibatullah Akhundzada embodied the Taliban’s Pashtun-dominated leadership, aligning closely with Pakistan’s ideological and strategic objectives. However, the Taliban’s return to power in 2021 has not unfolded as Pakistan had hoped. Instead of consolidating power and stabilising Afghanistan, the Taliban has struggled to govern effectively. Its failure to establish an inclusive government and address the growing threat posed by ISIS-K (Islamic State Khorasan), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and other extremist groups has led to widespread instability. Furthermore, resistance movements like the NRF, composed of Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, have challenged Taliban rule in northern Afghanistan, particularly in the provinces of Panjshir, Badakhshan, and Takhar.
In response to these developments, Pakistan has shifted its focus from SWIN to AWIN, which prioritises engagement with non-Pashtun factions such as the NRF. By supporting AWIN, Pakistan is acknowledging that a fragmented Afghanistan, divided along ethnic lines, could better serve its strategic interests than a centralised Taliban-led government. This approach also enables Pakistan to counter India’s influence in Afghanistan, as India has historically allied with non-Pashtun factions, providing them with military, economic, and diplomatic support.
The NRF and Non-Pashtun Resistance: Pakistan’s New Allies The National Resistance Front (NRF), led by Ahmad Massoud, has emerged as the primary opposition to the Taliban. Ahmad Massoud, the son of the legendary Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud, has rallied Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras under the NRF banner. These ethnic groups have long been marginalised under the Taliban’s Pashtun-dominated rule. The NRF’s guerrilla warfare tactics have posed a significant challenge to the Taliban, particularly in northern Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s engagement with the NRF through AWIN presents several advantages. First, it weakens the Taliban’s hold on power, which serves Pakistan’s goal of maintaining leverage in Afghanistan. Second, it ensures that Afghanistan remains politically fragmented, preventing any single faction from dominating the region. This fragmentation allows Pakistan to exert influence over multiple stakeholders, including the NRF, which could align with Pakistan’s interests more closely than the Taliban has. However, this strategy is fraught with risks. The NRF has historically been aligned with India, which has supported non-Pashtun groups in Afghanistan as a counterbalance to Pakistan’s influence. If India perceives Pakistan’s engagement with the NRF as a threat to its interests, it could escalate tensions in the region.
Bangladesh: The ISI Chief’s Visit and Its Implications: Another significant development in this evolving regional strategy is the recent visit of the ISI chief to Bangladesh. This visit underscores Pakistan’s intent to strengthen ties with Bangladesh at a time when South Asia’s geopolitical landscape is in flux. While Bangladesh has traditionally maintained a policy of non-interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, the growing instability in the region has implications for its own security. Pakistan’s outreach to Bangladesh serves multiple purposes.
First, it seeks to counterbalance India’s influence in the region. Bangladesh, with its strategic location in South Asia and its growing economic importance, is a key player in regional geopolitics. Strengthening ties with Dhaka could provide Pakistan with a valuable ally in its broader regional strategy.
Second, Pakistan is likely seeking cooperation with Bangladesh on counterterrorism efforts. The rise of extremist groups like ISIS-K and the TTP in Afghanistan poses a threat not only to Pakistan but also to neighboring countries, including Bangladesh. The ISI’s interest in intelligence-sharing and counterterrorism collaboration reflects a recognition of these shared security concerns.
Finally, the visit signals Pakistan’s broader strategic aims in South Asia. By engaging with Bangladesh, Pakistan may be seeking to secure a favorable diplomatic position in anticipation of further instability in Afghanistan. Bangladesh’s strategic location near the Bay of Bengal and its potential role in regional security frameworks make it an important partner for Pakistan’s evolving strategy.
India’s Strategic Calculus: India, as a dominant power in South Asia, has a vested interest in Afghanistan’s stability. Historically, India has supported non-Pashtun groups like the Northern Alliance and the NRF, providing them with military and economic aid. India’s objectives in Afghanistan are twofold: countering Pakistan’s influence and preventing the region from becoming a haven for terrorism. The ISI’s shift toward supporting the NRF complicates India’s strategic calculations. On the one hand, this development aligns with India’s historical support for non-Pashtun factions.
On the other hand, Pakistan’s involvement in the NRF could undermine India’s influence over the group and create new challenges for its regional strategy. To navigate this complex landscape, India will need to carefully balance its engagement with Afghan resistance movements while avoiding actions that could escalate tensions with Pakistan.
Tajikistan’s involvement in Afghanistan’s evolving dynamics is significant due to its strong ethnic, cultural, and linguistic ties with Afghanistan’s Tajik population. Tajikistan has consistently opposed Taliban rule, citing concerns over the marginalisation of Tajiks and the destabilising effects of Taliban policies on its borders. As a result, Tajikistan has become a key supporter of the NRF, providing it with logistical and political backing.
Pakistan’s engagement with the NRF through AWIN creates an opportunity for cooperation with Tajikistan. Both countries share an interest in countering the Taliban and preventing Afghanistan from becoming a breeding ground for extremist groups. However, Tajikistan must balance this cooperation with its relationships with other regional powers, including Russia and China, which have their own stakes in Afghanistan’s stability.
The evolving situation in Afghanistan is reshaping the strategic landscape of South Asia. Pakistan’s shift from supporting SWIN to engaging with AWIN and the NRF reflects a broader recalibration of its regional strategy. This approach aims to weaken the Taliban, counter India’s influence, and maintain Pakistan’s leverage in Afghanistan’s fractured political environment. For countries like India, Tajikistan, and Bangladesh, these changes present both opportunities and challenges. Each nation must navigate the complexities of Afghanistan’s internal politics, the shifting allegiances of various factions, and the broader geopolitical competition between Pakistan and India.
(The writer is a leading authority on geopolitics and counter terrorism, views are personal)
