It is true that human curiosity has been responsible for fueling innovation across disciplines and fields. However, it would be naive to downplay the role of capitalism, competition and exigent situations; whether man-made, like war or otherwise, like an epidemic in pushing humankind above and beyond its limits. Consequently, contemporary technological innovation is granted traction in large part by capitalism or since it is viewed as integral to geopolitical strategy. While soft power and diplomacy have cemented their status in international relations, hard power and military might still remain the most primal and oftentimes the primary source in deciding cross border strategy for states.

With the coming of the World War, aerial technology for military use gained unprecedented momentum. Previously, it had been used solely for civilian and transport purposes. In the first World War, the aircrafts used were ordinary machines that had been retrofitted with mounted guns and their use was limited mostly to aircraft to aircraft dogfighting. The Germans possessed bombers, which long proved to be a thorn in the side of the British, who had no countermeasures or bombers of their own and therefore remained inferior to the Germans. However, World War II proved to be a completely novel war, which was decided by a combination of brute force, strategic improvisation and rapid and inspired innovation. Many would assume that it was the nuclear bomb that decided the outcome of the war but, notably, the Third Reich had fallen even before the first of the two bombs did.

In the buildup to World War II, the Allied powers realised that the key to victory lay not in the ground forces or the navy, but in strategic bombing, which meant securing aerial superiority. Consequently, the second war saw real, tangible and truly relevant advancement in, as well as utilisation of, military aviation. To provide some intriguing context, the development of the Norden Bomb Sight was almost as heavily guarded a secret as the Manhattan Project, with a budget amounting to 2/3rd of the total expense of the latter. However, the bomb sight failed to deliver on its promises and the American military high-command decided to shift to strategic bombing and combat box formations. Consequently, for their bombing tactic and new formation to succeed they had to spend immense amounts of money in developing the leading bomber of the war, the B-29 Superfortress. The development of the Superfortress far outweighed the budget of the Manhattan Project but proved to be instrumental in shifting the tide of the war. Without the strategic and unrelenting bombing by the Allied forces, the historic storming of the beaches of Normandy would have remained at best a pipe dream and at worst an absolutely demoralising failure. Moreover, the need for continually improving upon aircraft technology of the Allies was due to the fact that the Germans possessed arguably the best anti-aircraft artillery in their 88mm Flak. While the British and the Americans heavily relied on strategic bombing, the German Luftwaffe failed to appreciate its potential. The uncomplicated yet effective strategy translated marvelously into practice as the Axis powers were deprived of reinforcements and essential supplies. It also reaffirmed the theory that ground forces can only be mobilised once occupation is guaranteed i.e. for the purposes of clearing.

Markedly, the largest war in modern history is testament to the significance of having supremacy in aerial military technology. Therefore, it is important to bring out radical transformation in the Indian Air Force, IAF, as far as innovation and procurement is concerned.

While the importance of possessing future-proof military aviation technology cannot be stressed enough, the current Indian situation remains alarming. Presently, the sanctioned strength of the Indian Air Force is 42 squadrons with only 31 being operational with 18 fighter jets on average in each squadron. It is imperative that India begins to either manufacture indigenous and capable aircrafts or switch to western technology. Historically, India has relied on Russia to be its major supplier for fighter jets with the Sukhoi Su-30MKI dominating in terms of numbers. Russia has been generous enough to transfer technology too for its aircrafts, however, Indian metallurgy has proved impotent in even producing quality spare parts. Furthermore, the S-400 defence missiles to be delivered by Russia lack interoperability with western technology that India possesses, which impedes efficient integration of defence systems. Russia has also become unreliable as a supplier since it is preoccupied with fighting its own battles and cannot afford to divert resources no matter how deep and ancient the Indo-Russian ties run.

Additionally, the recent procurement of the 4.5th generation Rafales has bolstered the fire power of the IAF. Although the LCA Tejas is also a 4.5th generation aircraft, it cannot be claimed to be entirely native as the most important component of the machine, the engine, is manufactured by the American corporation General Electric. The AMCA, Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft, being developed by HAL is meant to be a 5th generation vehicle, however rollout is only expected by 2030, whereas in contrast China, Russia, America and even Turkey already possess 5th generation fighters. This goes to highlight the issue that by the time India is able to produce its own 5th generation fighter, it would probably be obsolete technology. The Chinese Chengdu J-20 is considered especially lethal and impressive in its stealth capabilities. China also recently went on to place a squadron of J-20s just 150km off the border of Sikkim, which is extremely problematic as even detecting these fighters, were they to be deployed, would prove a gargantuan task in itself. The relevant Indian authorities in-charge are also prone to making borderline insubstantial claims that impact the dissemination of information about the status of national security. Recently, they claimed that India could easily detect if the J-20s were on the move, while analytical experts around the globe have categorically stated that such a statement is a gross overestimation of the limits of radar technology.

All in all, the current environment requires that procurement and innovation of military aviation technology command the respect it demands and deserves. Perhaps bureaucratic and administrative adaptability is also necessary. The two arms of procurement and innovation could be placed with a Minister of State, who would report exclusively to the PMO just as the Atomic Energy Commission and ISRO function directly under the Premier. This administrative transition would also eradicate the need to await approval from multiple different departments and ministries, which, in turn, would further reduce delays. The amount of red tape that each project would bypass if it were under the direct supervision of the PMO would greatly reduce costs and also ensure that the technologies being acquired are competitive and not archaic. 

The writer is a Lawyer by profession. Views expressed are personal.