Recalibration of diplomatic priorities due to coalition compulsions is on the cards
India has voted and the verdict is out. It has brought back the era of coalition governments, the pressures of alliance partners weighing in on key policy matters, back to India’s polity after a decade. The era of robust, single-source decisions is most likely over and may not return for a decade. The voter’s verdict will have long-reaching impact on India’s foreign policy and diplomatic trajectory for a long time to come.
The relations with the US which were nurtured by the Modi Government in the past decade and which have reached a certain stable platform, are unlikely to be disturbed. The technology partnership added to the existing trade partnership, has bipartisan support in Washington. This means in the eventuality of Trump returning to in the US, towards the year’s end, it won’t be a spoiler in India US bilateral relationship. India and the US have in the past, shown enough maturity in discussing sensitive issues, such as the alleged hit plan on India-designated terrorist G S Pannun, behind closed doors.
Most US businesses operating in India may be relieved, with a coalition verdict, as it could, take away many concerns ( expressed by their US-based colleagues behind closed doors) regarding the overreach by a PM, with a brute majority. They may be relieved to find several pockets of influence, with more alliance partners coming in the Government, weighing on crucial policy decisions. The US and global capital would feel safe in India as a market, as long as it is business as usual, no surprise protectionist regulations and there is a growth market. In a coalition government, with several checks and balances, thescope for unilateral decisions, is less likely. Also, as many experts mentioned to this author, the US would be happy to have a peaceful democratic ally in Asia, to counter an aggressive China in the Indo-Pacific. Joint exercises, with Indian defence forces, sharing of crucial intelligence of strategic importance ( even though India is not part of the five eyes network ), sharing and empowering India on semiconductors, close co-creation of standards and regulations on critical and emerging technologies such as AI are not likely to be impacted. India and the US on plurilateral platforms such as QUAD, the I2U2 and on wider UN etc would not be impacted. However, pompous, state visits and hosting each other’s leaders on a grand scale (reference Trump in 2019 and Indian PM state visit to the US in 2023) could move to more sober, away from the camera, diplomatic conversations. Despite an occasional criticism of India, by mainly US think tanks and policy experts, primarily on human rights, polarising speeches, freedom of speech and religion in India etc, there is bipartisan support for India and deep relations between the two nations and it is not likely to change.
If the India-US civil nuclear deal proved to be the cause of a weak coalition government ( due to the withdrawal of support by a crucial ally from the UPA government 1.0 ), there exist no such threats to the bilateral relationship currently. Even with a coalition Indian government at the centre. Washinton and New Delhi have successfully managed to educate their senior lawmakers/politicians/think tanks/experts on either side of the aisle, regarding the strategic importance of the relationship. President Biden, even though faces occasional criticism from his party colleagues or pressure groups, regarding being a bit too lenient approach towards India on several issues, he understands the relevance of this relationship in the current context. There is likely to be a new Indian ambassador to the US (the former ambassador post-retirement unsuccessfully contested elections in 2024) in the next few months. The Indian ambassador to the US does most of the heavy lifting on building consensus across the aisle on several mutual bilateral issues. The choice of the next ambassador would be a space to watch out for.
(The writer is a policy analyst; views are personal)
