The Russia-Ukraine war is changing the very foundations of the global order. As the debris settle, we will see a more militarised Europe & a more multipolar world with repercussions for India's interests as well, writes Dr. Swasti Rao
Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine is likely to be a hinge point in contemporary history. It has shown that brute power politics and the threat of war can very well be unleashed in the most developed, democratic and industrialised parts of the world.
The concomitant background of the rather overdone ‘conflicting sphere of influence’ debate does not explain the unfolding ground situation. The key lies in deconstructing West’s support to Ukraine followed by the real question — is it enough? The short answer is — No. NATO and the West know that they are pumping Ukraine with weapons and ammunitions to fight a losing battle. The analysis also needs to delve into the impact this crisis on the security imperatives within Europe which is witnessing an uncontrolled surge of refugees alongside foreign policy shifts in industrial giants like Germany and the officially neutral countries like Sweden and Finland.
Deconstructing West’s support to Ukraine
Limits to West’s support: The weapons that the West is helping Ukraine with may broadly be classified into three types — Stinger missiles, Javelin Missiles and the ATGMS. The problem is that Ukraine doesn’t have a potent air force system. The West is merely helping Ukraine spread out a tactical air defence with the Javelin and Stinger missiles (more than 200 stingers were given to Ukraine on Monday alone). In absence of a potent air force, these missiles enable a spreading out of tactical air defence as they can be operated by less training by an array of non-military personnel like the voluntary fighters and militias. Hence, they are effective for a country like Ukraine where brave people have picked up arms and thousands are signing up to defend their country against the aggressor. Having said that, they are no match for the Russian advanced air assault system with their barrage of S-400s, sophisticated Ballistic and Cruise missiles that Russia hasn’t activated till now. When they do (and signs have started to emerge), Ukraine’s tactical air defence posturing would crumble.
Regardless of US’s $350 mn and EU’s $500mn promised for support, Ukraine cannot be given advanced fighter planes right now because it simply doesn’t have the required background infrastructure to deploy them. Unless the NATO sends their troops on the ground, or they let the air defence be launched from NATO’s territories with adequate infrastructure like the hangars and the fuel, there is no way Ukraine can be saved with javelins and stingers. The only expected outcome has been buying time for themselves by putting up unreal bravery and resistance to Russia and perhaps delaying the ground offensive.
The third type of weaponry that the West is giving Ukraine (or have promised to give as the battle intensifies) are the ATGMs (Anti-Tank Guided Missiles) which can prove to be extremely effective against the Russian tanks and bunkers but require specialised and skilled manoeuvring. While Ukrainian army has had a few joint military drills with NATO and there may be some trained military personnel within the army to operate the ATGMs, their number is not satisfactory. Again the unnerving realisation — the West knows it.
Western Military Industrial Complex: The other aspect that reeks of West’s calculated strategising is that these ammunitions come with a shelf life which if not used in time, need to be junked. The same applies to Javelins and Stingers. The self-perpetuating logic of the military industrial complex cannot be overlooked in the West’s supply of these weapons to Ukraine to supposedly ‘liberate’ Ukraine from the evil occupation by Russians. The Ukrainian crisis may just be helping the West to utilise their close to expiry missiles to the maximum optical and moral advantage. The clarity on these matters will emerge slowly but steadily.
The sad part of the story is that the West knew all the above mentioned factors all along. If they really wanted to bolster Ukrainian defence against the mighty Russian army, the steps should have been taken right from the immediate aftermath of the Crimean annexation in 2014. Eight years would have been a decent time to modernise Ukraine militarily. Perhaps then the steady incremental advance in military capabilities of Ukraine may have worked in 2022. The Ukrainian demand for joining the NATO is nothing new. It has merely given a perfect alibi to the Russians to invade them. Ukraine has been expressing this desire openly (unlike its other neighbour Moldova that, for its own survival, has only expressed the desire to join the EU but not the NATO.) West’s ‘unified and unflinching’ support to Ukraine does seem like a well-orchestrated bluff.
Analysis of the Russian Ground Offensive: The next question is how far can Ukraine pull off its heroic resistance? So far the way Russians have manoeuvered, it appears they have not faced either any real terrain-friction or any force-friction from the Ukrainians. The standalone pictures of ambushed Russian tanks circulating in social media serve as great morale boosters but are misleading for understanding the ground situation. The purpose is to pitch favourable optics for propaganda which have little significance in real operations. It needs to be remembered that Russians have not yet started a real ground offensive. To illustrate how war strategy works, the US ground offensive in the Iraq war in 1991 was initiated after six weeks of air offensive establishing their complete superiority in the air. Compare that with the ten days of the Special Military Operation in Ukraine. Despite readiness, what has been done so far qualifies more as strikes, manoeuvres and probing and not the savage ground war itself. The latter may or may not happen depending upon how far the Ukrainians are prepared to fight or resist a losing battle.
The bad news is, the more heavy weaponry is deployed for ground offensive, the bigger the warhead and larger the destruction capabilities. And when that lethality is unleashed, the west will only watch Ukraine fight this battle from afar supporting them with more ‘aid’, ‘weapons’ and social media propaganda.
The complexity of Urban Warfare: It is argued how the Russians are ‘unable’ to enter Kyiv as a 40 mile long convoy of tanks, armoured vehicles and towered artillery positioned north of the city is ‘stalled’. Once again, these are statements that are carefully crafted to boost the morale of a people fighting for their very lives but offers little insight into how real wars are planned and fought by great powers. There are two reasons that are keeping the Russians waiting even if their attacks are getting intensified by the day. One is the complexity of ‘Urban Warfare’ which is easier to understand. Urban warfare is combat conducted in urban areas such as towns and cities. It is very different from combat in the open at both the operational and tactical level. Complicating factors in urban warfare include the presence of civilians and the complexity of the urban terrain. Putin is aware of this complexity. The outcome of the latest negotiations suggest so. The second is a more complex reason that hinges on Putin’s psychological fatiguing of the Ukrainians.
Then what does Putin want? Putin wants to fatigue the fighting Ukrainians and raise the cost for them to rely on the notion that West will save them. Putin wants a pro-Russian leader in Kyiv. He doesn’t want to annihilate the entire city or kill all its people. He wants them to realise that it was a mistake on their part to aspire for a military alliance with the West that could not even step in to save them.
Had mass killings been the aim, the first step would have been closing down the western borders from where people are fleeing Ukraine. Already about a million people have fled since 24 February. The fact that the second round of negotiations have reached a deal on humanitarian corridors is evidence enough that Putin does not want to kill the same people he wants to rule via a proxy.
Putin’s Objectives: Putin wants the following objectives met that are an amalgamation of his military and political aims guiding the Russian invasion.
1. He wants Ukraine divided along the River Dnieper that provides a geographical boundary between the east and the west. He has already cut off ports along the border of the Sea of Azov. Those are regions where Putin has already established Russia’s overarching dominance after annexing Crimea which headquarters the Russian black sea fleet. Starting from Odessa (Ukraine’s only major port in the Black sea), all the way to Mariupol (Ukraine’s only major port in the Sea of Azov) and Donbas ahead of it, inching up to Kherson, Dnipro and all the way up to Kharkiv. The outcome is, he is cutting off the crescent of land along the sea, all the way up to Donbas and Kharkiv. Putin could slice off eastern Ukraine and make it into an independent territory like he did in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia in 2008.
2. Regime Change: He will put a pro-Russian leader in Kyiv. Yanukovych’s name has started to surface as a potential replacement for Zelensky. Thereby, a demilitarised and divided Ukraine with a pro-Russian president will be a perfect buffer strip for Russia along with Belarus, Moldova and Georgia, against NATO’s eastern flank.
What does the West want?
The West knew all along that in case of a Russian invasion, with no NATO troops on the ground, and with a rudimentary air defence, Ukraine, despite heroic resistance, would fall in a matter of a few days. The West is chasing four objectives — 1. Putin’s isolation and condemnation which has been flowing from all quarters all over the world. 2. The cycle of western Military Industrial Complex running. 3. Fuelling an insurgency that will precipitate once Putin instates a pro-Russian Yanukovych in west Ukraine. Data and research shows that great powers fare badly in asymmetric warfare like a protracted insurgency — Vietnam, Cambodia, West Asia, Iraq, Afghanistan in 1979 and 2001. Hence, West will support and fuel the low grade insurgency against Russia that will bleed Russia and be Putin’s real defeat. 4. Hitting Russia with unprecedented sanctions to weaken the Russian war machinery in the long run.
Irony is, none of the aforementioned are going to help Ukraine today.
The far-reaching impacts of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in Europe and beyond EU’s response: Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine has met with European Union announcing €500M million in arms and other aid to the Ukrainian military. It is a first time for the EU to finance the purchase and delivery of weapons and other equipment to a country that is under attack. It reflects a change in EU policies because the EU’s treaties bar the bloc from using its normal budget to fund operations with military or defence implications. The European Union has closed its airspace to Russian airlines including the private jet of the Russian oligarchs. The US has also decided to join the EU by deciding to close its airspace to Russian aircrafts.
The far-reaching impacts
Shift in Germany: The Russian onslaught has triggered a shift in the geopolitical and geo-economic calculus in Europe. Germany has shifted its position on major foreign and defence topics, ranging from arms deliveries, defence spending, sanctions and diplomacy. So far, Germany had been the key player in co-opting, often to the disapproval of other NATO allies, its transatlantic ties and its business interests alongside a massive reliance on Russia’s gas. Under the Normandy Format, it was also a keen supporter of sustaining dialogue as the best means to resolve the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Germany refused to deliver defensive weaponry to Ukraine due to its “peace policy” and restrictive stance on arms and even blocked weapons shipments from its ally Estonia to Ukraine. Changing its previous course, Germany has announced sending 1000 anti-tank weapons and 500 missiles to Ukraine.
Sweden and Finland: The public opinion in Sweden and Finland has also, for the first time since the WW-2, started swinging against their alleged neutral status in favour of joining NATO. A recent survey operated by the Novus agency revealed that 37% of Swedish citizens are in favour of the country’s entry into NATO, while only 35% take the opposite position 28% are undecided. This reflects changing attitudes with far reaching implications for the security architecture of Europe. In lockstep with Sweden, a similar survey done in Finland showed its drift towards NATO. A poll released by the Finnish Broadcasting Company showed that for the first time a majority of Finns, about 53%, supported joining the alliance, up from 19% in 2017. A full 66% would support NATO membership if neighbouring Sweden, which has also long maintained a nonaligned status, joins at the same time. This has been touted as yet another sign of the fundamental shifts in Europe’s security landscape.
Will Sanctions Work?
Russia has been preparing for the SWIFT sanctions in two ways: by setting up Russia’s System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS) as an alternative to SWIFT and by building a large $ 640 bn foreign reserve (Putin’s Insurance Policy). The problem is that a big chunk is held overseas. The strongest weapon in the West’s financial arsenal has been the cutting off a G-20 Central Bank of Russia from SWIFT system. Freezing the overseas held foreign reserves will prevent the Bank of Russia from using them for currency interventions or transfers to the Russian treasury to spend. As a result inflation will shoot up and the Ruble will tank further.
However, the EU sanctions exclude banks like VTB (Largest bank of Russia) and Bank Rossiya. Gazprom bank also has been excluded from SWIFT because they are main channels for payments of Russian oil and gas which EU countries are still buying despite the war. SWIFT is still being used for some 70% of transfers within Russia. Despite that, China and Russia setting up their own systems of payments that will be developed faster in current circumstances.
India is also exploring ways to set up a rupee payment mechanism for trade with Russia. Vital supplies of fertiliser from Russia could be disrupted as sanctions intensify, threatening India’s vast farm sector.
India’s precarious position
Calling for de-escalation and dialogue, India has for the third time abstained from UN (twice at SC and once at GA). India’s response to Ukraine is a product complex geopolitics of its disputed borders and its ambition to counter its key adversary China through its maritime strategy along with the ‘Quad’.
The weakening of the U.S.-led global order as manifested in the US withdrawal from Afghanistan has complicated India’s position and options in regional geopolitics.
We need Moscow for our huge defence supplies to the tune of 60-80%. We also need them to secure our outreach to central Asia, for the North South Maritime Corridor (that includes India, Russia , Iran and Central Asians but neither Pakistan nor China) and for retaining our relevance in the Taliban controlled Afghanistan. As far as these corners stretch, India could only bank upon Russia.
This story changes with our maritime domain. That is where we need the Quad. IOR is a crucial maritime space which lies at the heart of America’s strategy for the Indo Pacific. The US would like India to buy less defence equipment from Russia but wouldn’t offer comparable, top of the line technology like the SSN (nuclear powered sub marine), S-400, Brahmos etc. One can understand why Indian leaders are refraining from taking sides. India’s current challenge is to evacuate its thousands of students stranded in Ukraine under ‘Operation Ganga’.
The Russia-Ukraine war is changing the very foundations of the global order as we know it. As the debris settle, we will see a more militarised Europe. Globally, we are likely to encounter a more multipolar world with repercussions for India’s national interests as well.
The writer is Associate Fellow, Europe and Eurasia Center, MP-IDSA. She is MA and M.Phil Int. Politics JNU; PhD Advanced Comparative Politics, Tsukuba University, Japan
