There is a great degree of focus on Ukrainian defence but little on Russian recalibrations during the war. Both need to be studied carefully to assess the outcome of the ongoing conflict
Even as a bizarre sense of global ineptitude has run into Russian President Vladimir Putin’s obstinacy in the ongoing attack on Ukraine, there is a settling fear that the war will continue longer than initially expected. If the Ukrainian crisis has taught the world anything, it is that any definitive pre-assessment of modern wars could be misleading, even when the two sides are asymmetrically distinctive in their supposed capabilities. Clearly, this has been on display in the Russia-Ukraine war on both sides. Whether it was the exaggerated nature of Ukrainian expectations from the West coming to its assistance against Russia, or the Russian expectation that Ukrainian defence might crumble in the face of the sheer weight of the Russian defence paraphernalia, both have depicted that modern wars require a great degree of adaptability in strategic planning, force deployment, modes of warfare, use of intelligence and above all the information war.
In modern wars, the unpredictability factor looms large. Small nations could inflict tremendous costs on relatively larger powers, which could in turn change the course of the war very quickly — often through the use of capabilities enhancing asymmetric power like drones, artificial intelligence, cyber attacks, space capabilities, use of social media and ability to put out information. All this requires a great degree of adaptability even as the war is going on, often reflecting poorly on the larger player in the conflict.
However, if nations can show strategic adaptations quickly — losing the battles to win the war — the outcome may be very different than popularly expected. This is true from both ends of the Russia-Ukraine war. As the current trends in the Russia-Ukraine war shows, Russia may well be adapting to the changing demands of the war. Both, the resolute nature of Ukrainian defence and Russian recalibrations during the war may have been underappreciated. There is a need to closely examine both, weaning them form the intense miasma of the “fog of war”.
The fog of war is not just an expression but a reality when any war breaks out. It is almost impossible to get a clear picture of what the tactics from either side are, the scale of losses in both human and material terms, and perhaps most importantly the question of which side having an upper hand in a conflict at any given point remains contested. As such, multiple and contrary narratives remains central to the fog of war. In conflicts where perceptions of power equations of states involved are asymmetrically in the favour of one, the fog of war can add as an advantage for the weaker party.
Generally, the fog of the war is more intense when relative asymmetry in power equations between warring parties is high. Just as deterrence could be central to shaping the conflict-behaviour of states, creating favourable or winnable perceptions under the overarching umbrella of the fog of war is essential to modern warfare. Increasingly, states’ acquisition of asymmetric capabilities and technologies, including by China, North Korea, Taiwan and others, depicts its importance in modern warfare. These assessments will likely put in perspective many of the developments vis-à-vis the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war.
One of the important trends coming out of Russian recalibrations changing in the first two weeks of the war is that Russia started feeling the heat of the war in terms of the fact that the scale of losses, both material and human, was much above the earlier estimate. This also fuelled suspicion that Russian advances would crumble in the face of Ukrainian defences. However, Russia seems to have stabilised its currency after an initial slide, its Central Bank chief sounds very positive, Russian oil and other energy forms continue to be imported by the world, including the US and Europe.
Russia’s recent announcement that its military campaign in Ukraine will focus in the east of Ukraine, primarily the Donbas region, may have signalled a strategic reassessment and adaptation to the changing realities on ground. While this has been widely perceived as an outcome of a failed Russian strategy to capture Kyiv, there might be some credibility in Russia’s claim of never intending to take Kyiv. Russia’s announcement of the completion of the “first phase” of its war in Ukraine shows that it could well have been a combination of “pounding the west and controlling the east” strategy. More importantly, it shows Russia’s intention to adapt to the vagaries of the war - a difficult thing for very large armies and ones that continue to rely majorly on infantry tactics. Topping this strategy is Russia’s intention to cut off Ukraine’s large maritime access to the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea. With the recent control of Mariupol in south Ukraine and its continued attacks on Odessa, Russia might well be on the path to controlling a strategic-continuum in the east and south.
The ongoing war and its final outcome have often been played in the minds of strategic analysts and pundits who have assessed it differently. While most assessments have predicted Russia’s economic and military ability to carry on its operations inside a country of the size of Ukraine as unsustainable, others have gone as far as predicting the end of Putin’s regime, including a Kremlin coup. All such assessments remain engulfed by the fog of war and its repercussions.
Despite some resentment, Putin’s ratings have soared back home, defying western predictions and expectation of a coup. The support of Putin’s oligarchical circle continues in many ways, despite the western sanctions impacting the fortunes of many of the oligarchs severely. To address the strategic deficit brought on Russia with heavy losses in Ukraine, many domestic steps have been taken by the Russian central bank, its military and the political establishment.
Has Russia stabilised strategically and economically to the extent that it is able to carry out its operations inside Ukraine for some more time? In the face of increasing losses by the Russian side they were increasing a lot of reports and assessments regarding how Russian aggression in Ukraine was about to collapse given the scale of its losses and the sustainability of the operations in Ukraine. However, direct answers to a lot of questions apropos the Russia-Ukraine war remain shrouded in the fog of war. For instance, questions regarding the death of a Ukrainian negotiator, sinking of Russian warship Moskva in the Baltic Sea, capture of Britons from Azovstal, the seeming resilience of the Russian economy especially with stabilising rouble after initial tanking, fate of the PoWs captured from both sides etc, leave more questions than answers.
There is a great degree of focus on Ukrainian defence but little on Russian recalibrations during the war. Both need to be studied carefully to assess the outcome of the ongoing conflict. Russia’s strategic adaptability has ensured that the war will continue for longer than expected. Such adaptations form an important part of great power necessities to prevent a loss of face. Although, loss of face can be a better long term and sustainable choice sometimes for great powers as has been shown by the US withdrawal from Afghanistan.
With Russia having announced a definite date to wrap up its operations and the beginning of a new phase of its war in Ukraine, the war is likely to continue for some time before ending. The fog of war may descend only when a diplomatic ceasefire brings war-kinetics to halt in eastern Europe.
(The writer is a fellow, Strategic Studies Program, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi)
