The Balkans might perhaps land themselves in a situation of total political backsliding, harming the long-term interests of the EU and North America
Armed with its foreign aid diplomacy, China has elbowed its way into the European geopolitical chessboard via Eastern Europe. In 2012 it launched its 16 + 1 cooperation framework, including all the Western Balkan states (excluding Kosovo) and nine other Central and Eastern European (CEE). Later next year, Greece joined in to make the initiative “17 + 1”, thereby promoting what many strategic experts call”multilateral bilateralism”. Within the framework of BRI, Chinese economic cooperation with these 17 countries fulfils their mutual investment needs and strategic interests.
In the context of the Western Balkan states, Beijing from 2005 to 2019 has invested approximately $14.6 billion (sans Albania), particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia in different projects, and more than 80 percent of these investments constitute loans with conditions as ‘pre-agreements’ on firms, workers, tax cuts. This has led to a situation of asymmetric interdependence that Beijing can essentially use as an essential bargaining tool vis-à-vis EU and the US.
Even during the Covid-19 lockdown, China successfully created a “health silk road” in the Balkans when in March 2020 European Commission decided to block essential pandemic goods. Both Russia and China used the opportune moment when they supplied them with the medical and surveillance equipment for COVID 19. Although later the EU coughed up $9 million, given the trajectories of the pandemic, the help was a little late, and China’s proactive health diplomacy was appreciated amongst the Balkan countries.
Closely associated with Chinese strategic inroads in the Western Balkans is EU membership. Of the six countries in the Western Balkans, official candidates for accession are Montenegro, Serbia, the Republic of North Macedonia and Albania, and potential member countries are Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Although the official note from various EU platforms is a positive one, i.e., considering them for membership owing to their geographical and cultural affinity with the community, yet, there is hesitation on the part of EU, especially France, to finance the projects that do not sound ‘lucrative’ and are ‘unaffordable’ apart from the fractious political nature of their societies. Beijing has taken initiatives that are probably ‘non-profitable’, such as the BRI-funded railway between Belgrade and Budapest. Chinese loans thus seem to be an attractive option for they can strategically communicate to EU to focus less on the political and the economic reforms for its membership apart from inviting more rigorous investment plans. Dorde Radulovic, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro, apparently called the “heart of Europe”, recently stated on the insufficient funding of EU and the US that it has “left an empty geopolitical space here in the Western Balkans,China jumped in”.
Beijing’s economic presence in the region is governed by debt trap conditions similar to South Asian and African countries. Projects are implemented by state-owned companies with Chinese workers employed, thereby increasing the geopolitical influence of Beijing. Imagining induced cultural changes through increased interactions to set the narratives of geopolitical changes perhaps would not be wrong if one looks at the previous case studies of small countries like Nepal and Myanmar falling into the trap of China. The vicious circle of being denied membership because of less political and financial credibility resulting in Beijing’s lucrativeness should be avoided to weaken its strategic outreach and the risks associated with it. If not so, the Balkans might perhaps land themselves in a situation of total political backsliding harming the long-term interests of the EU and North America.
Second, the strategic interests of China in the Western Balkans and other states can be understood in terms of the NATO membership of Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia and Serbia’s refusal to join the organisation for the reason of military neutrality. Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the other hand, are eager to join NATO owing to the Russian influence on the Serb community and consequently fear the collapse of the existing power-sharing agreement. China, too, has made efforts to deepen its ties with the country, making it a fourth political actor after EU, NATO and Russia seeking influence. For example, Beijing has recently decided to finance coal plants in the country despite President Xi Jinping’s pledge to reduce the projects sanctioned for the usage of coal. The smart cities project and 5G communication networks have further increased China’s influence. Such and other ‘no strings attached' measures that seem affordable to the economically disadvantaged countries only enhance China’s stakes in the regions across the world.
Further, just as the tensions between the US and Russia on Ukraine reach the brim, the locational importance of the Balkans should not be missed by the strategic experts. Nevertheless, the larger aim of China is to construct a ‘Land-Sea’ route to connect the port of Piraeus (Greece) to act as a hub for EU-China trade. As envisioned by Xi, it is the Mediterranean’s largest container transit port and serves as the southern gate of Central and Eastern Europe.
The third aspect that China capitalises on is an ideological one. Beijing has carefully increased its presence through the ideological similarities that it shares with some of the Balkan and Central European countries. These similarities in the near future will play an essential determining role in making crucial decisions such as voting in favour of China or possibly even military bases at an appropriate time. For instance, there is China-CEEC Political Parties’ Dialogue and the China-CEEC Young Political Leaders’ Forum; active participation in the World Political Parties’ Dialogue to strengthen its linkages with the world communist countries,and finally, party to party cooperation with Montenegrin Democratic Party of Socialists and Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) apart from Yugoslavia. Further, although not recognised by Beijing, Kosovo maintains informal relationships and adheres to its ‘One China’ policy concerning Taiwan. The result is the creation of sharp divisions within the European community.
The democratic summit hosted by the US has further divided Europe. With countries like Serbia, Albania, North Macedonia invited and Belarus, Hungary, and Bosnia and Herzegovina not invited, it has sharpened the divisions within Europe. China might fill the ‘political vacuum’ and extract advantages that perhaps could be detrimental to the interests of Europe and the US.
Europe has lately awakened to the Chinese threat, and in September 2021, EU adopted a new China policy that emphasised the Xinjiang human rights violations and the disinformation apart from “fostering strategic autonomy and defending European interests and values”. The European Commission has recently aimed to evolve its role to that of a “geopolitical commission” that aims to strengthen the trade rules making it fully comply with the existing international law for trade. Launching the “Global Gateway” strategy worth Euro 300 billion focussing on digital, transport and energy projects apart from strengthening democratic partnerships has increasingly been seen as a response to China’s debt trap practices.
Finally, from a different perspective, the role of the Western Balkans should be pondered over. The Balkans strategically would expect favours such as EU waiving off its debt owning to the Chinese strategic inroads and might expect a reciprocal move as a counter-response from China. Alternatively, the countries might expect EU to pay off the Chinese debt in place of military favours. In either case, the transfer of the European wealth to the Chinese banks thus seems to be inevitable.
(The writer is an Assistant Professor at Central University of Punjab, Bathinda. The views expressed are personal.)
