As we recount the sacrifice of our armed forces on Vijay Diwas, some of the lessons learnt during the Kargil War still remain unaddressed for which we paid the price at Galwan
The nation commemorates Kargil Vijay Diwas every year on July 26 to recount the sacrifice and martyrdom of our armed forces that brought laurels to the nation by defeating a deceitful and untrustworthy neighbour of ours during the Kargil War of 1999. It is celebrated to honour the sacrifices of our brave soldiers, who laid down their lives on the lofty heights of Kargil on the frontlines to secure an unparalleled victory in the annals of military history. The war, fought mainly in the uncompromising climate of the upper Himalayas, saw the raw courage of Indian soldiers assaulting uphill, unmindful of enemy fire and dislodging them after a tough hand-to-hand fight. They regained our lost territory which the enemy forces had occupied surreptitiously, throwing to wind the unsigned convention between the two armies of maintaining status quo in the traditional gaps along the Line of Control (LoC). But for the raw courage and audacious bravery of our soldiers and young officers, history would have been different as the unscrupulous enemy had succeeded in taking us by surprise. Sadly enough, what happened in Kargil is being replicated, albeit on a much larger scale, across the trans- Himalayan region in Eastern Ladakh along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
We were surprised then and we have been surprised now. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR ) remain our major weakness. Since the war was limited and the LoC was much smaller in length, though there were shortages, the crunch was not felt. The amassing of Bofors guns and ammunition played a crucial role in enabling infantry assaults. The Indian Air Force (IAF), too, played a major role though it was not equipped to fight at those heights with the restriction of not crossing the LoC. India also successfully called the nuclear bluff of Pakistan. A determined political leadership made a critical difference. The higher military leadership and higher direction of war left many questions to be answered which were subsequently addressed by the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) but unfortunately no heads rolled. Our true homage to the martyrs would be to say with certainty and authority that their sacrifices would not go waste and a Kargil-like situation will not be repeated.
While we can say with confidence that Kargil 2.0 will not happen again but while achieving that capability, did we ignore our other neighbour? While we considered Pakistan as a threat, we continued to treat China as a challenge. Our political leadership was convinced about averting a conflict with China through political and diplomatic outreach. Despite the alarm raised by the Army and other services, the political hierarchy was overconfident of their capability to handle China. Like Pakistan, China, too, proved to be treacherous and lulled our leadership into being friendly because it needed the Indian market to become an economic superpower. China all the while wanted to be the sole power in Asia but our leadership failed to read the Chinese mind correctly as it did with Pakistan at the time of Kargil. While AB Vajpayee had taken a bus ride to Lahore in search of peace, its scheming Army Chief Pervez Musharraf was planning the Kargil incursions.
Like any developing nation with a large segment of the population below the poverty line, we also face the dilemma of butter versus barrel of the gun. Every Government had to tread a very cautious path while allocating resources for defence forces. Even during Kargil, General Malik, the then chief, had said that “my Army will fight with whatever we have.” Immediately after Kargil, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and other surveillance equipment were added to the inventory. However, post-Kargil, because of the Bofors scandal, all major defence contracts were put on hold. As a result, the country’s armed forces began to suffer not only obsolescence but shortages in spares, affecting the battle-readiness of equipment.
However, the trend was reversed post-2014 and big ticket purchases were made for enhancing the combat efficiency of the forces. Delegation and enhancement of financial powers was also done to enable the armed forces to meet their immediate and critical needs. Today, our armed forces are well-equipped with latest platforms, smart munitions, UAVs, missiles and so on. We have definitely made a qualitative jump but numerically we are still short of fighting a sustained two-front war. Also criticality still exists in our Air Defence and the infantry weapon systems. The Navy and IAF also have critical gaps which need to be filled. Depending on the quality of security we need, a percentage of the GDP (not below 3.5) has to be earmarked for the defence budget.
Unlike 1999, when we had just become a nuclear power, today we boast of our triad capability with ICBM capability. However, in view of the looming threat, we must review our policy of “No First Use.” India has always believed in honouring various treaties and agreements but both our neighbours have shown scant respect for them while threatening us on the LoC/LAC. In the case of Kargil, the plan was made as early as during the Zia regime. We should have known about it. Thereafter, Pakistan began a proxy war against us. Just prior to Kargil War, it began regular shelling of the national highway, linking Kashmir and Ladakh. Our responses were mainly defensive and ad-hoc. Pro-active and punitive responses were absent due to the fear of an escalation. Pakistan took advantage of it, ignored the understanding about “traditional gaps” and presented us a fait accompli in the form of Kargil incursions.
It is the same with China. Despite salami-slicing, we continued to appease it. Even after Doklam, we failed to wake up. The net result is the multi-point, well- planned incursions in eastern Ladakh with a definite aim of holding out and not vacating. Our planners would have known that our claim of Aksai Chin and Gilgit Baltistan will definitely raise hackles in China because both are very critical to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s pet project of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, our planners, including the military, failed to take any preventive and precautionary measures to thwart the Chinese threat. Once again we are reacting. Worried about escalation, we did not even exercise the option of quid pro quo. Now it may be too late though the LAC is quite vast and the enemy has many vulnerabilities. The possibility of collusion between China and Pakistan cannot be ruled out completely, though Islamabad does not have the capability to launch such an offensive for the time being. Where we were holding the entire frontage with a brigade then, now we have a full infantry division with well-sited and hardened defences along the entire length of the LoC. Similarly, compared to 1962, our defences in eastern Ladakh are very strongly held with adequate reserves and a well-developed road and track network. The Kargil experience has shown us that a ratio of 1:9 or 1:12 is needed in these heights to launch offensive operations.
ISR was a weakness then and remains so even today. Though a lot of structural changes have taken place like the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), Defence Image Processing and Analysis Centre (DIPAC), yet the optimal has not been achieved. The problem does not lie in the assets but in timely processing and dissemination. The permanent office of the National Security Advisor (NSA) is meant to look into this vital aspect of national security management but the desired level of integration has not taken place. We also need to enhance the capability of operational and tactical intelligence. In such a terrain, with unpredictable and harsh weather, a multi-mode, multi-layered, all- weather, 24x7 surveillance grid is needed. We also need to develop capability to monitor the movement of Chinese troops and formations to the plateau or towards the LAC from the Xinjiang Military District. Mountains do impose certain restrictions but we need to invest more in the required means. Lack of jointness was a major lesson from Kargil. Here I would like to quote the first-hand experience of the then Colonel General Staff of 8 Mountain Division, which was moved from the Valley to dislodge the intruders. “Ever since the infamous huff between the then Army and IAF chiefs in the initial stages of the operations, the Army and Air Force never operated in unison. In the first week of June, the IAF recommenced Operation Safed Sagar as we were in Operation Vijay. Two standalone operations in a small mountainous area, where the IAF had never operated earlier. We were never consulted on targets and never apprised of strike missions. Occasionally we would hear aircraft north-east of Zozila and see some puffs around some features. Though, the stories of bombs/rockets hitting our own troops are exaggerated, it is a fact that sometimes the munitions would land a few ridges away where our troops were deployed. Fortunately we never had a friendly fire casualty. Equally and importantly we never saw any target destroyed.
“When we were planning an attack on Tiger Hill, in order to maintain surprise, the artillery was tasked to fire on distributed targets but the IAF kept hitting Tiger Hill without consulting us. Infuriated, Hq 15 Corps was informed, which also confirmed that they had no knowledge of air plans.” This should give adequate idea of the absence of jointness during the last war we fought. It would be unfair to say that there has been no change. Lot of changes for the good have taken place. Joint planning is quite obvious in the current stand-off. Even the idea of theatre commands is gaining currency. Post-Kargil, two joint commands were raised as Strategic Forces Command and Andaman & Nicobar Command. Lately, a Special Forces joint command has also been raised.
Another recommendation of the KRC was regarding border management. One force per border has been implemented. But the question of command and control still remains an issue. Particularly, along the LAC with China where the Indo-Tibet Border Police (ITBP) has been deployed. There is a divided responsibility between the Army and the ITBP, which has proved highly ineffective in the current stand-off. Incursions happened under the watch of the ITBP and the Army had to come in when the crisis developed. A poor arrangement, particularly when we are faced with a cunning enemy on the other side. The ITBP should be placed under the command of the Army following the LoC model.
Needless to say the situation then and now is quite different. But some of the lessons learnt during the Kargil War still remain unaddressed for which we paid the price at Galwan.
(The author is a Jammu-based veteran and security and strategic analyst.)
