When approaching bitter contemporary disputes, it is occasionally more comforting to fall back on an anecdotal approach. A personalised account doesn’t necessarily explain things with clinical detachment but it does inform us that almost every issue has historical parallels.
In December 1971, I completed the last of my school-leaving examinations shortly before the Pakistani forces surrendered to the Indian Army in Dhaka. The war generated huge excitement in Calcutta (as it was then known) and there were people who expected bombs to be dropped on the city. The progress of the Indian Army was closely monitored and the talk on the streets was about places such as Jessore, Khulna, Barisal, Mymensingh, et al — places that filled an older generation with wistful nostalgia. Each day, troop trains from the border would bring scores of wounded soldiers to Sealdah station. The lady volunteers who helped would often bring back incredible stories of fortitude and bravery.
As a teenager with lots of time on my hands, I often wandered around the city quite aimlessly, killing time before meeting friends at the cinema. On one of these visits to Esplanade, I noticed some excitement around a makeshift booth that was blaring patriotic songs. It turned out to be a blood donation camp organised by the local Jana Sangh. They were registering the names of people willing to offer blood at the Army station. On an impulse I volunteered, went to the Army camp in Ballygunge and gave some blood. It was my own little contribution to the war effort.
That, however, is not the main point of my blood gift to the Indian Army. In today’s context what I would find interesting is that the blood donation was facilitated by the Jana Sangh, a party that was a bit player in the city. I am sure that there were other camps organised by the local Congress which was to milk India’s famous victory in the war to win itself a massive mandate — marked by overkill — in 1972. But what is significant is that political differences didn’t prevent a grand coming together for a national effort.
It was a repeat of the national effort that was witnessed in both 1962 — when India was humiliated — and 1965. One year, there was even a RSS contingent in the Republic Day parade. And most people didn’t think that was out of order.
The only group that didn’t quite live up to the national mood was a section of the Communists, the section that broke away from the CPI in 1964 to establish the CPI(M). The pro-China stance of the CPI(M) during the 1962 war has been recorded but less know is its cussedness during the 1971 conflict. I recall many parts of Calcutta covered in wall writings of the CPI(M) proclaiming: “Indira-Yahya ek hai.” There is a place for legitimate criticism of a Government but the CPI(M) crossed all bounds in 1971, and paid a heavy political price for it.
There are moments in the life of a nation when it is necessary to be completely united and keep reservations aside. The Narendra Modi Government played by the book in briefing senior Congress leaders the day on which the news of the surgical strikes was announced. The Congress president in turn reciprocated the gesture by announcing her party’s endorsement of it. Unfortunately, the Congress vice-president had his own take on the matter and he made it public with his inflammatory “khoon ki dalali” speech last week.
It is entirely possible that this outburst reveals more about Rahul Gandhi than it does of India’s principal Opposition. However, the unseemly competitiveness among Congress notables to defend their heir apparent suggests that when it comes to dynastic interests, even national interest is relegated to a secondary place. I believe that there is enough political space available for the Congress to query the future course of Indo-Pakistan relations and even pour cold water on reckless war talk. However, to debunk an audacious anti-terrorism initiative of the Government using unfamiliar filmi dialogue is beyond the pale.
Actually there is a deeper malaise. The Congress has always believed it has a monopoly over power. The occasions it has lost power, it has behaved with astonishing cussedness, even on matters of national security. In 1998, the Congress couldn’t get itself to fully endorse the Pokhran-II blasts; in 1999, it was forever carping in its attitude to the military operations in Kargil; and its role during the Kandahar hijack of 1999-2000 was unhelpful and played a role in facilitating the Government’s line of least resistance. Behind these missteps is the belief that only the Congress has the right to steer the national destiny.
This approach may have had some validity at a time when the Congress had a monopoly over political power and the Opposition seemed a fractious, rag-tag bunch. However, those days are long gone. Today, the arrogance of the Congress is reminiscent of the exaggerated self-image of the post-Aurangzeb Mughal kings. The trappings of grandeur still accompany the Gandhis but these are based on delusions. The reality is steady decline, a process that will go on without interruption if the likes of Rahul Gandhi display their modest appreciation of Indian realities.