The beginning of a New Year invariably prompts a flood of speculation that is grounded in personal or collective expectations. The advent of 2017 is certain to be no different, despite the fact its advent will not be marked by dire prophecies of the end of the world, the start of a devastating World War III or even calamitous civil strife that will lead to the return of the plague or some such thing. It also happens that what strikes many people as the overriding concern on December 31, 2016 will at best appear either episodic or a significant footnote on December 31, 2017. It is my hunch that the demonetisation saga will be one such phenomenon, despite its impact being more profound and far-reaching than anyone has so far anticipated.
However, the real concern (or should I say anticipation) about 2017 centres on the forthcoming administration of President-elect Donald Trump in the US. Since November 8, the global fraternity of political punditry has been attempting to come to terms with the most unexpected of election results. Much of the time has been devoted to seismic management and the management of liberal emotional trauma. This, alas, was because to large number of influential and articulate people across the globe, November 8 was not merely the culmination of an electoral battle but the end of civilisation as we know it. Too much needless energy and column inches were devoted to frivolous games such as the “Not my President” campaign and the silly accusation that Trump was really a monstrous Kremlin plot.
The disoriented reaction to Trump’s victory, however, did bring out a phenomenon that has been obvious to most people, apart from those who live in echo chambers of the media and academia. The debate is not whether liberalism is in crisis. Everybody’s belief goes through ups and downs and convulsions. It is therefore perfectly understandable that the self-belief of a lot of people have been battered by events. The larger question that, however, warrants some attention is whether or not the body of beliefs — more like dogma — that was based on entitlement and an attitude of condescension verging on loathing of common decencies, can actually survive the backlash.
This is a question that has been thrust into the public agenda by Brexit, the convulsions over unchecked immigration in Europe and the Trump ascendancy that was a popular reaction to America’s own existential dilemmas triggered by a sense of decline.
India too has witnessed its own liberal angst that came to the surface after Narendra Modi’s victory in May 2014. Here, the fundamental changes have been two-fold. First, an entrenched elite is witnessing a political dispossession that, quite understandably, it has not taken kindly to. At the same time, there has been no automatic emergence of an alternative set of people ready to fill the vacuum. The transition to the new has been hesitant and sometimes clumsy. It is this process that will require monitoring in 2017. Secondly, after a long period of experimenting with liberal cosmopolitanism —whose outcome was not all regressive — India is attempting to once again blend modernity with a sense of cultural rootedness. It is quite noticeable, for example, that the diffidence that surrounded the entire usage of the term ‘Hindu’ has been reversed. This has not been an untroubled process. There have been excesses that have accompanied the recovery of socio-cultural self-esteem. However, overall, the real challenge before the nation is to channel this ongoing recovery of self in positive and constructive directions. The coming year promises to be interesting in that respect.
Globally speaking, 2017 will be momentous in determining whether the slow but definite rise of China as a hegemonic power, rivalling the power and influence of the US (and, for that matter, the erstwhile Soviet Union) can be either checked or even reversed.
This has a huge bearing on India because it has a direct impact on our existence in Asia, not to mention our troubled relations with neighbouring Pakistan.
India may be troubled by the military and economic rise of China but it lacks the capacity (and, occasionally, even the temperament) to take anything more than very limited remedial measures. Consequently, India has reasons to be hopeful that it will enjoy some extra elbow room in its dealings with China, as a consequence of the US reviewing its policy of craven appeasement. But on this count, India can’t be certain. Trump’s foreign policy is not bound in any discernible doctrinal certitudes; it seems to be based on a business principle of chasing a possible half-chance. How this will translate into actual diplomacy is unknown and only the very brave will risk speculation.
Yet, for India, Trump’s robust no-nonsense attitude to fighting the menace of global Islamist terrorism holds out promise. In the past, India’s own anti-terrorism strategies have suffered on account of the squeamishness of both American and European governments that were excessively preoccupied with the ‘roots of terrorism’ and the adherence to the human rights of extremists. If Trump’s message to Israel after the Security Council resolution to hold its nerve is any indication, India must redouble its efforts to reach out into the hearts and minds of the new administration. However, while the Trump administration is a potential ally, there can be no getting away from the fact that ultimately India must stand on its own feet and develop its own capacities.
Modi has often committed himself to making India great again. The coming year should be another step in that journey.