It is perhaps fortuitous that there has been relatively little media interest in Sri lanka’s presidential election.
As opposed to every little development in Pakistan that prompts every TV anchor and foreign policy pundit to rush across the Radcliffe line or, at least, drool over Islamabad’s visa-issuing authorities in Delhi, the political happenings across the Palk Strait have been met with remarkable indifference.
Maybe this is just as well because there is a tendency in a section of Colombo to view every Indian media report as somehow indicative of official policy-a habit that often has laughable consequences.
Yet, the outcome of the January 8 presidential election is important to India. Sri lanka is a neighbouring country whose turbulent domestic politics has often impacted India, and a repetition is not in our national interest. likewise, a stable, united and prosperous Sri lanka is necessary for India’s own well-being. Recall that nearly 70 per cent of the traffic handled by the bustling Colombo port is centred on India’s exports and imports. India must neither interfere nor be seen to be interfering in Sri lanka’s democratic choice. At the same time, India has a vested interest in hoping that the island’s voters choose wisely.
The million-dollar question is: What constitutes a ‘wise’ choice from the Indian perspectiveIJ What will be the impact of President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s re-election for a record third-termIJ Alternatively, if emerging reports of the contest being closer than was initially imagined are correct, will a victory of the common Opposition candidate Maithripala Sirisena inject a new dimension into bilateral relations that, despite some tensions, have stabilised over the past five yearsIJ
Curiously, there are no credible opinion polls in Sri lanka-at least not in the public domain. The English-language media-on which a foreigner like me is disproportionately dependant for both information and trends-has published a range of ‘guesstimates’ and quasi-academic surveys that seem to suggest that lankans are inclined to prefer change over continuity. But then the editorial positions of the private-sector media are so unequivocally anti-Rajapaksa that it is sometimes difficult to separate real trends from wishful thinking.
Attempting to read between the lines for the past three weeks, I can safely conclude that the contest is tight. The race was precariously close in 2005 when Ranil Wickremsinghe was the UNP candidate and-contrary to media reports-not so close in 2010 when General Sarath Fonseka was the common opposition candidate.
The fact that the SlFP-the party Rajapaksa belongs to-has never been that strong in Colombo should not cloud our judgement. In the Sinhala Buddhist-dominated southern provinces-the counterpart of India’s Hindi heartland-Rajapaksa still retains his hold, despite Sirisena having equally formidable Sinhala Buddhist credentials. Yet, there is no doubt that a measure of anti-incumbency plus an emerging resentment against ‘family rule’ of the Rajapaksas may see an erosion of the President’s plurality.
In 2010, Rajapaksa performed rather well in the Eastern Province where Muslim voters constitute a significant majority-as they do in Colombo. The last-minute defection of the Sri lanka Muslim Congress, the principal Muslim party, to the side of Sirisena is a big setback to Rajapaksa. But the strategic weight of this setback will depend on the quantum of voter turnout in the Tamil-dominated Northern Province. If, as a consequence of the Tamil National Alliance throwing its weight behind Sirisena, the Tamil turnout matches the national average, Rajapaksa could be in difficulty.
It is clear that Rajapaksa’s prospects depend almost entirely on achieving a spectacular measure of Sinhala Buddhist consolidation all over the island. In 2010, he campaigned successfully as the victor in the devastating 30-year civil war; this time his success will depend on the extent to which ordinary Sri lankans believe they are benefiting from the peace dividend. Rajapaksa’s development record is quite impressive but this is offset by allegations of corruption and the high-handedness of some of his functionaries. He desperately needs a last-minute emotional thrust that instinctively appeals to the Sinhala-Buddhist voter and puts Sirisena on the defensive. I believe that such an issue may well be forthcoming in the last days of campaigning. As of now, both sides are waiting for each other to make a mistake.
There are media-inspired rumours that an adverse result will prompt Rajapaksa to instigate a military takeover. I don’t believe there is any real substance to this alarmism. Nor do I believe that the abolition of the Executive Presidency —promised by both sides with different degrees of sincerity —will happen in a hurry. In the Sinhala-Buddhist mind, “federalism” is a big “No-No” and any mainstream party that embraces it faces electoral annihilation in the South. Indeed, Sirisena has had to clarify that if he wins the army will not be withdrawn from its bases in the Northern Province. In the coming days his uneasy partnership with the TNA will also be subjected to questioning.
If Rajapaksa wins, the existing strategy of political management through economic development-his prescription for the entire island-will continue. From India’s perspective this will be encouraging. However, if Sirisena prevails, there will be an equal incentive to resume the process of tinkering with the Constitution and reopening issues that have no evidently satisfactory solution. Whether this will encourage Tamil politicians to demand the price for the crucial votes that ensured his victory or encourage responsible power-sharing are questions that have no easy answers. My only dread is that political churning will necessitate an Indian involvement in Sri lanka’s internal affairs. That is something to be avoided at all costs.