Scores of Bangladeshis are out on the streets for over a month now demanding death sentences for the alleged war criminals of 1971. So what does the Shahbag movement hold for Bangladesh — and IndiaIJ
All watched in awe as an ocean of colours filled Dhaka’s Shahbag square. The Shahbag movement and the corresponding developments once again tell the story of two Bangladesh that co-exist. Bangladesh, the nation with two distinct mosaics: One a society comprising a vast majority of vibrant, egalitarian and secular individuals. The other small, albeit effective, section that opposes those very notions, of the rule of law and democracy, which time and again Bangladeshis have fought for and tried to nourish. Few days ago the grand rally of March 4, in the Capital’s Jatrabari, marked the month-long movement of peaceful protest to demand death sentences for the alleged war criminals of 1971 and ban the Jama’at-e-Islami. This spontaneous, impromptu crusade was triggered by the audacious victory sign by Jama’at-e-Islami leader Abdul Quader Mollah, when he stepped out of the court after receiving a life sentence verdict by the ‘International Criminal Tribunal’ court established by the Awami league-led coalition Government for the trial of the liberation War crimes.
This image was powerful enough to compel Bangladeshis from all walks of life to pour into the Capital’s Shahbag crossing and peacefully protest against the perceived lenient judgement for the horrible acts of violence and terror that the anti-liberation forces had unleashed during the Independence War of 1971. The long wait of 42 years for the trial of the collaborators had taken a toll on each and every family that had a tale of sacrifice and sorrow to nurse. The protesters, sans political affiliation and religious identity, gathered, simply strung together by an irresistible desire to set the past record straight. The Government inaction of the past four decades had kept the wounds of history wide open. The apparent leniency shown to a war criminal was no longer acceptable to the citizens of Bangladesh. Their demand for justice through the banning of the Jama’at, however, was peaceful. Their demand for capital punishment for the war criminals was manifested through a riot of posters, banners, poetry, music and street plays. What began as an initiative by bloggers and online activists soon captured the imaginations of the Bangladeshi youth and thousands joined to show support for a cause that encapsulated both their history and culture. The fearless march did not remain confined to the Capital but soon spread to other parts of the country, including Chittagong, Sylhet, Barisal, Mymensingh, Khulna, Rajbari, Rajshahi, Rangpur, Sunamganj, Noakhali and Narsingdi districts.
Clearly the demand for justice knitted the youth into a kindred space. In stark contrast to these culturally-resonating Bangladeshis, on the opposite flank stands the smaller but resourceful section seeking resolution through perpetuation of violence. This group, identifiable with the Islamists, had to combat the surprise mobilisation that was attempting to take the wind out of their sails. Thus has followed the expected backlash which has claimed several people from all walks of life including political activists and law enforcers. Religious intolerance once again came to the forefront, with communal rage spilling onto the streets. They have attacked Bangladeshi minorities, both Hindus and Buddhists, spreading a spectre of fear and hatred in several districts of Bangladesh. The clashes that began when religious groups clashed with the police over online posts by bloggers at the forefront of the Shahbag protests have menacingly spread too. The false propaganda of their successes has not deterred the crowds but it certainly exposes the motives of the radical religious elements within the Bangladeshi polity. Consequently the slogan of “Jaatidhormo jaar, jaar, Bangladesh shobaar” (Religion is personal, Bangladesh belongs to everyone) reverberating amongst the gathered mass is as much real as the extremist slogan heard few years ago — “Aamra hobo Taliban, Bangladesh hobe Afghanistan” (We shall become Taliban and Bangladesh will become Afghanistan).
Undoubtedly the liberation War touches a strong emotive chord with the people and their sacrifices continue to dominate the Bangladeshi political discourse. Given the lack of any initiative to bring to books the perpetrators of war crimes, the passage of time has not healed the pain of loss that haunts millions of Bangladeshis. The subsequent entrenchment of the religious political parties in the political system has thus never been fully accepted by a vast majority of Bangladeshis. Although the Jama’at has been able to garner at best four per cent popular votes, the perception of this political party as collaborators persists. Thus, the trial and conviction for war crimes touched a nerve that was open for several decades. The Suhrawardy Udyan, the location of Mujibur Rahman’s clarion call for struggle to ensure freedom from West Pakistan, inspired grand celebration despite another call of hartal by the Opposition.
The war crime trial was an electoral promise of Awami league leader Sheikh Hasina. Thus the Government’s announcement of the formation of a three-member tribunal, seven-member investigation agency and 12-member prosecution team to hold the trial under the International Criminal Tribunal (ICT) Act 1973, on March 25, 2010, was much awaited. The ICT was to investigate and bring to trial not only those suspected of siding with the anti-liberation forces, but also those having committed atrocities and criminal acts against their fellow citizens. The War Crimes Fact-Finding Committee had examined the evidences and finalised its report in 2008 and handed a list of 1,600 names to the International Criminal Tribunal. Nine Jama’at leaders and two members of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party were going to be tried by this tribunal. In January, former Jama’at leader Abul Kalam Azad was found guilty in absentia of eight charges of crimes against humanity and was sentenced to death. In its second verdict the tribunal sentenced Abdul Quader Mollah, also known as the butcher of Mirpur, guilty of being involved in the killing of more than 300 people, to life imprisonment. Delwar Hossain Sayeedi (vice-president of Jama’at) was found guilty on February 28 of genocide, rape and religious persecution. He was given the death penalty. Indeed, the Government — cognisant of the growing strength of the protesters — enacted legislation to amend a law, making it possible to appeal the sentence. The fate of the Jama’at awaits a more decisive conclusion with the settling of a four-year-old petition filed over legality of the party’s registration.
This movement, which has been compared to the Tahrir Square uprising, is more about correcting the gaps in its history rather than ushering in democracy and egalitarian leaders. For a change, the Bangladeshi people and the Government are on the same page. In this apolitical movement the goal for all the actors is one: To seek a closure on history that has dragged on for too long by all accounts. Indeed, the Shahbag crusade is reminiscent of the past when the nation united in face of military rule and dictatorship. They gathered strength from within their own experiences, their own stories consciously avoiding any political leanings. Thus the only face that adorns posters and banners is that of the iconic Jahanara Imam, known as Shaheed Janani (Mother of Martyrs).
The killing of blogger Haider for his open criticism of the strident Islamists provided a further impetus to the youth to pursue their dream of Sonar Bangla.
The promise of a new Bangladesh had dissipated in the face of rampant corruption, misgovernance and partisan politics. For long no one questioned the political leadership which steered the narratives without much thought to the general masses. The commitment of liberal, pluralistic Bangladesh that was sown in 1948, leading up to the language movement of 1952, has come to the forefront once again. The process of nation-building had somewhere along the way steered a path that seemed to be in consonant with the promise of Sonar Bangla, the promise of new dawn.
Since the beginning of the trials, Jama’at-e-Islami supporters and their student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir, have held violent protests nationwide demanding the tribunal be scrapped permanently and their leaders are released immediately. The trials were deliberately portrayed as a political crusade against the Opposition. To briefly recall, religious fanaticism was always evident, albeit sporadically, in Bangladesh but its increasing appeal became evident for the first time in the controversy surrounding Taslima Nasreen. Since the first major bomb blast against a secular target in Udichi on March 6, 1999, attacks on secular leaders have increased considerably and militancy peaked during the 2001-05 phase. Most of the radical groups are committed to bringing about an Islamic revolution in Bangladesh with no forbearance for any other ideology or faith.
Significantly, the minorities have also emerged as a target for extremist violence. Since the sudden upsurge in October 2001, anti-Hindu violence has steadily increased. Unlike the previous occasions, they are not related to any specific development involving India. Initially the violence was linked to the Jatiya Sangsad elections and was seen as part of the anti-Awami violence unleashed by the BNP. Gradually, however, a small section was able to create images of a nation that belief its roots of pluralism.
As in the past, when pushed into a corner, the Islamists have fallen back on the appeal of the Indian hand. Bangladesh is, however, unlikely to fall for that guile which has often derailed bilateral relations in the past. The Indian hand has been accused of being behind the spontaneous flow of Bangladeshis on to the streets. President Pranab Mukherjee’s first international tour, post ascending to the highest office in India, amidst the charged atmosphere fell under the scanner too. While Bangladesh’s jamai babu did not reschedule this much-awaited trip to Bangladesh, Opposition leader Khaleda Zia’s cancellation of the scheduled meeting did not bode much cheer for India. The Jama’at and BNP’s call for subsequent days of hartal was a message of alliance arithmetic. With elections less than a year away, the coalition numbers will be impossible to ignore. Clearly, all the positive yarn of friendship with India spun during Khaleda Zia’s New Delhi visit were mere expression without content for a neighbour that Bangladesh would have difficulty overlooking.
But at the same time, irrespective of the lack of the Teesta water agreement and transit rights between the two neighbours, the past four years have seen a phase of considerable progress. The land Boundary Agreement, measures for free bilateral trade, and extradition treaty are significant achievements that have been relegated to the background. The one billion dollar credit line given by India will inextricably link the two neighbours through various common infrastructural projects that will not only connect the borders through water, road and rails, but also through energy grids. In the post ninth Jatiya Sangsad election period, India and Bangladesh began to work in earnest to address each other’s problems. Dhaka’s political will to address India’s security concern was evident from the outset. India found ways and means to address some of Bangladesh’s longstanding demands. Its readiness to dilute the trade barriers, its willingness to consider Bangladesh’s fears on Tipaimukh dam and border conflicts, as well as its agreeing to Bangladesh’s demand for transit to Nepal and Bhutan, reflected sheer attitudinal shift. This will be difficult to reverse. Stakeholders on both sides would rather hold onto the benefits accrued than fritter those away.
If the past experience is any measure, then Bangladeshis are unlikely to give up their movement before they have a modicum of success in what they had set out for. Their determination to set the course of their nation right is evident even in the face of present adversity. It is also possible that political leaders will stake claims to the catharsis that is taking place and that this churning will give way to new leaderships, to new choices. It is now largely dependent on the people of Bangladesh to ensure that they steer the nation’s course in the direction that they desire. It is unlikely that they will any longer put up with what is imposed upon them by manipulative leaderships, as was the case in the past. India can in such times lend its full support to the people of Bangladesh. Support that has no political motive but the peoples’ interests at best.
The writer is Director, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies, Kolkata