We don’t value our military history, don’t research on the wars we have fought and discourage learning lessons from previous conflicts, says Dipankar Banerjee
General Ved Malik (Ved to his friends and colleagues) has had an outstanding record in the Indian Army. His three years at the head of the Army, of which two were as Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, were the longest for an Army officer in recent years. After retirement he has often commanded the air-waves, with his strategic comments and analysis.
Fortuitously, during the last 15 years of his military career — between 1987 and 2002 — Ved played an active role in all of India’s conflicts. These he narrates in clear, unambiguous terms in his book, India’s Military Conflicts. This makes it much more than an autobiography; it’s indeed a textbook of strategic lessons. It is one of few books in India that dispassionately looks at the lessons learned and which we have failed to implement.
Alas, even after 65 years of Independence, the number of citizens seriously interested in military affairs in India remains minuscule. Is it the absence of a ‘military culture’, the lack of ‘strategic thought’ or the inheritance of a recent colonial heritage that outsourced strategic policies to WhitehallIJ As a consequence we do not value our own military history, do not research on the wars we have fought and actively discourage learning lessons from previous conflicts.
Consider Operation Cactus, a rescue operation in the Maldives in November 1988. With remarkable swiftness, India’s top national security hierarchy met at the Military Operations Room. led by Rajiv Gandhi, it promptly took all the strategic decisions jointly and in less than 24 hours ended a terrorist attack on a country in the middle of the Indian Ocean. Ved accompanied the mission and returned home successfully even before his wife was aware of his whereabouts. Group Captain Bewoor landed his big Il-76 transport aircraft on a speck of an island with no runway lights on a pitch-black night. We did not care to analyse why we succeeded in spite of enormous odds. Shift to Mumbai 20 years later. An elite battle-ready National Security Guard unit could not be moved for 12 hours within a short distance within the country. The world looked on at Indian ineptitude and reached its own conclusions. And, nobody was held responsible for this debacle!
Next was Operation Pawan in Sri lanka from 1987-90. An Indian Peacekeeping Force of four divisions was deployed in northern Sri lanka to protect Tamils facing a possible massacre. Instead, it ended up fighting a guerrilla war precisely against those who it came to protect. Till today nobody is clear of the objectives of this operation, or the analysis behind its planning. Ved is rightly scathing in his comments. As was the distinguished diplomat Mani Dixit many years ago, whom he quotes often. Yet, Operation Pawan lasted two-and-a-half years and ended in a controversial withdrawal, putting to rest any expectation of a future Pax Indica in South Asia. Of course, the possibility of learning any lessons from this debacle was nipped in the bud, when even an official study of this operation was disallowed. But Ved had a ringside view and his comments here are both trenchant and relevant, though perhaps a bit too brief.
The crème de la crème of the book is the 1999 Kargil War. Ved has dealt with this remarkable victory of the Indian military in an earlier book. Here he provides a glimpse of higher decision-making and Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s calm and assured leadership. The complexities of war in a nuclear backdrop are not sufficiently understood yet in India and will merit much stringent examination. Even more important will be educating the citizens of India of the implications of such conflicts, so that strategies can evolve free of public pressure.
There are many other issues covered in the book. Defence diplomacy is prominent among these. In a country that prefers to work in silos, the military is allowed no role to jointly promote national objectives through coercive and cooperative diplomacy. Yet, in Bhutan, Nepal, the Maldives and numerous other places where tried, these have enjoyed remarkable success. Indian armed forces’ achievements around the world under UN auspices and under international commissions are seldom exploited. Ved provides some lucid examples of his personal engagements in Myanmar, Nepal, China, etc. Also, there is an excellent description of an important UN operation under Indian leadership in Sierra leone. Wish the author had drawn some cogent lessons.
There are many other useful insights on strategic issues. Among these are nuclear strategic planning, and higher defence management and procurement issues. Each would require separate and comprehensive analysis. It is likely that the book will receive attention among military professionals. Indeed, it should be read. There are far too many nuggets to be ignored by our growing, though small, strategic community. But, alas, it will not receive much attention from the civil bureaucracy or the Ministry of Defence. The political leadership will probably not be bothered by it.
But, times have changed dramatically for India. The country is no more a small actor in the world. New Delhi is increasingly a ‘third pole’, a global balancer, in an era of rising powers. From now on, even more than before, decisions will have to be autonomous and must be carefully balanced. Strategic choices for an emerging India must be long-term and purposeful, with complete professionalism and total accountability.
The writer, a retired Major-General, is an eminent defence expert