Themes of Glory
Author- Darshan Khullar
Publisher- Vij Books, Rs 850
Battle of Asal Uttar is the most crucial component of the 1965 War; it is here that Pakistan planned to turn the tables on India by launching its ambitious and potentially dangerous armoured counter offensive, writes BRIG DARSHAN KHUllAR AVSM (Retd)
India’s response during the operations in Rann of Kutch during April/May 1965 had been low key for sound tactical and strategic reasons but Pakistan took it as a sign of weakness. Pakistan felt that it had emerged with an upper hand. As a member of CENTO and Baghdad Pact, it had received the latest arms, equipment and Fighter Aircraft from USA. Its Army now enjoyed a marked qualitative and quantitative superiority in their armoured forces and a qualitative one in medium and heavy artillery, though numerically as far as infantry was concerned India had a clear edge. The Pakistanis felt that time was now opportune to wrest Kashmir from India and possibly inflict a military defeat on that country, especially when it had not yet fully reorganised itself after the debacle in 1962 against the Chinese. They had however, not taken into reckoning that in Gen JN Chaudhury, the Army Chief and lt Gen Harbaksh Singh, the Western Army Commander, India had two very cool headed and shrewd tacticians and strategists. In fact the two were perfect foil to each other and with many complementary attributes. There were quite a few other professionally competent formation commanders down to brigade level and the rank and file in the Indian Army, despite certain crucial deficiencies, particularly in radio communications, were now a motivated lot, keen to redeem themselves. The crowning feature was that India now had a very clear headed and morally upright Prime minister, Mr Shastri, his diminutive appearance belying his strong character. He was backed by a well knit Cabinet. The situation was unlike the one in 1962.
India was preparing itself for a Pak offensive possibly in collusion with China, though not realising that at that time China itself was in the midst of a very serious political turmoil and was therefore unlikely to come actively to the support of Pakistan.
In August 1965, Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar by sending a few thousand fully armed infiltrators into Kashmir. India retaliated by seizing the Hajipir Pass, the area north of Krishan Ganga and the heights around Kargil, effectively neutralising the infiltration and in fact ended up capturing key tactical features within POK. This unnerved Pakistan and it responded on September 1 with a brilliantly conceived Operation Grandslam with the aim to capture Akhnur and the Bridge over River Beas. Pakistan enjoyed in this offensive an overwhelming superiority, nearly 5 to 1 in armour, nearly 20 to 1 in artillery and 3 to 1 in infantry. By September 3 the situation had become absolutely critical and despite some good rearguard action by the small Indian force, there was an imminent danger that Akhnur Bridge would fall into Pak hands unless something was done immediately to force Pakistan to relieve the pressure in this sector. The Indian PM’s response was spontaneous. He now gave the go ahead to the Indian Army to open a new front across the Indo-Pak Border in Punjab and threaten lahore. It was a bold move but a gamble all the same. The surprise was the key factor. Pakistan had convinced itself that India will confine itself to operations within J&K.
India’s 11 Corps under lt Gen JS Dhillon was ordered to launch three simultaneous thrusts with its 15, 7 and 4 Divisions along the axes; Grand Trunk Road, Bhikiwind — Barki and Bhikiwind — Khemkaran — Kasur respectively with the aim of securing the east bank of Ichhogil canal including the bridges over it and having achieved the above to thereafter be prepared to pose a threat to lahore.
There were inherent risks in launching unrehearsed troops without prior reconnaissance, considering the marked edge Pakistan enjoyed in armour, artillery, CB and a better equipped PAF, elements that could prove decisive in warfare in the plains. Pakistan had convinced itself that India under the circumstances would not dare to launch an offensive in the plains and would confine itself to operations within J&K. Besides Pakistan had an ace up its sleeve that it would bring into play at the right time, to turn the Indian defences in Punjab and bottle up not only the whole of 11 Corps but also cut off Jammu and Kashmir from the rest of India. The Indians on the other hand had premised that this very thinking on Pakistan’s part made the latter susceptible to an Indian surprise attack into Pak Punjab. And should Indian troops manage to occupy and hold on to defences along the eastern bank of Ichhogil canal, it would lead to a battle of attrition within Pak territory itself, which Pakistan would end up losing, given India’s larger numbers in infantry and other munitions and resources.
The imperatives of the Indian offensive would have to be initiative and surprise, allowing Pakistan minimum reaction time once our troops started moving forward from peace time locations. It was planned to launch them straight into battle from their peace stations. To ensure secrecy, all movement west of River Beas was confined to hours of darkness. (It is tempting to assume that this 11 Corps offensive has since served as the prototype of the Cold Start Strategy that the Indian Army is now said to have formulated as one of the options in a future war with Pakistan).
It is in the light of the above that one must consider the Battle of Asal Uttar as the most crucial battle of the 1965 War, because it is here that Pakistan planned to turn the table on India by launching its most ambitious and potentially dangerous armoured counter offensive. The rest of the chapter is devoted to this battle that was fought by India’s 4 Mountain Division under rather difficult conditions in nearly every sense.
Excerpted from Themes of Glory by Brig Darshan Khullar, AVSM (Retd), published by Vij Books