It may have been symbolic but Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s tour of five Central Asian nations was no less significant for re-energising Indian diplomacy in a strategically important region, and some successes have surely been achieved this time
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has just wrapped up his Central Asia visit covering Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan. The visit was low-profile, lacked the glittering ‘rockstar’ image, and the diaspora patriotic fervour — the reason why it received very little traction. Barring the state-owned channels, mainstream media remained muted.
It may have been symbolic but Prime Minister’s five-nation tour was no less significant for re-energising Indian diplomacy in a strategically important region.
The visit did not have much economic consequences, but it took place against the backdrop of major global and regional challenges of Russia’s renewed assertion in Central Asia following its standoff with the West over the crisis in Ukraine; China’s fresh push for building connectivity infrastructure to link China with Europe via Central Asia under its Silk Road Economic Belt; prospects of Iran coming to the regional fore following its recent breakthrough with major powers; and the emerging situation in Afghanistan in the context of growing Afghanistan-Pakistan proximity to rehabilitate the Taliban.
India could not have ignored these developments. As it is there was certainly a sense of gap for India, and the PM’s meeting with Central Asian leaders probably may have imparted a new momentum to India’s ties with these countries. Modi’s visit has also to do with the importance of widening the strategic perimeter and imagination among our own people towards the region beyond Pakistan and China.
His activism is being welcomed by the Central Asians, though they know India has already missed the bus and it has a lot of catching up to do.
Central Asians had high expectations from India from the beginning. They could not be materialised due to New Delhi’s insufficient efforts when compared to focused commitment of China and others. China is already well-entrenched; its trade with the region is over $50 billion compared to India’s paltry $1.4 billion. China has won major contracts and pumping energy from the region. Many Indian analysts saw this as an important opportunity to counterbalance against China, but this could be a flawed assessment.
The visit was bound to have a strong cultural connotation because invoking the past always serves as a lubricant in diplomacy. However, India’s historical links with Central Asia haven’t yet been translated into any meaningful advantage.
Importantly, the Prime Minster touched upon the shared Islamic heritage and Sufi tradition. Kazakhstan has Yassavi Sufi tradition that had strong links to Kashmir, but one wonders whether the Wahabbi zealots have not wiped out the Yassavi in the Valley. Modi gifted a reproduction of Khamsa-i-Khusrau to Islam Karimov. Hopefully, the Uzbekistan President liked the gift. linguistic links with the Tajiks were also invoked by Modi.
Of course, there were no big ticket items to turn the spotlight on, but the PM’s strong presence created a huge excitement, perhaps no less than how Raj Kapoor, Indira Gandhi and Mithun Chakraborty had made a mark on the imagination of the region’s people.
It has been decades since any popular Indian leader visited them and they felt good about it. It was long desired; as a friend of this author put it: “We needed such a thing because Indian leaders have always appealed to everyone in Central Asia.”
Clearly, the visit entailed a strong joint socio-cultural rhetoric — references to yoga, Hindi, Sufism, IT, among others, added substance to India’s soft power. Combating terrorism, cementing defence, economic and energy ties and enhancing connectivity were recurring themes of Modi’s discussion with the leaders.
SOME SYMBOlIC AGREEMENTS
In all, 21 bilateral agreements signed with five countries were desirable but they have already been in practice for the past two decades with little or no success. The reasons are numerous and intrinsic — they are hard to triumph over.
Take the case of building connectivity to Central Asia by avoiding Pakistan. The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) has been discussed since 2000. Connecting through Chabahar Port is another option, but accessing Central Asia via the Indian Ocean has not proved viable and hasn’t worked so far.
This time, the PM promoted the idea of ignoring Afghanistan as well for seeking connectivity to Central Asia directly through Iran. He told the Tajik President: “We will improve our surface connectivity, as well as our digital and air connectivity. We will reach you through Iran and connect directly in future thereafter.” Many wonder whether his visit was linked to India’s growing disenchantment with Afghanistan’s increasing closeness with Pakistan.
A flurry of agreements on defence and security related items are largely symbolic and they have been there for quite some time, though without much significance. Take the case of Ayni airbase in Tajikistan that India acquired post-Kargil and IC-814 hijacking. India refurbished Ayni after spending $70 million in 2007, but the base is still not operable by India. The status of Ayni and even the PM’s visit to the airbase finds no mention in the official statements. His visit to the newly-built military hospital at Farkhor was widely tweeted though. However, Modi mentioned defence cooperation as a strong ‘pillar’ of strategic partnership with Tajikistan.
Defence co-operation with Kyrgyzstan, including holding of annual joint military exercises, is also not new. This has been going on for a few years with little benefits to India. Kyrgyzstan has far more closer military ties with China. DRDO’s setting up a Mountain Bio-Medical Research Centre in Kyrgyzstan mountains is meaningless when the Himalayas offer far greater high-altitude conditions for research.
Combating terrorism, especially the threat of Islamic State (ISIS), gained prominence with the PM describing it as a “threat without borders”. But the facts suggest that despite being located in the proximity of the main source of terrorism, Central Asia has not become the hotbed of terrorism. There are no records of the Taliban and Al Qaeda having set their footings in the region.
Central Asian concerns here should be taken with a pinch of salt as they tended to heighten terror threats as a ploy to tighten domestic control and gain external legitimacy. The threat from ISIS is a new tool to garner global support. The West has raised eyebrows over crackdowns and curbing of rights of even children in the name of countering ISIS threat.
Modi made renewed efforts to boost economic and trade ties, but the scope for big achievements is little. These were tried again and again. Central Asia is certainly endowed with energy and mineral resources that can meet India’s needs for decades. However, doing business in the region has never been easy.
Nothing substantive featured with Kyrgyzstan except reinforcing of each other’s commitment to work together once the Indian and Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) Free Trade Agreement comes into effect. Inking an MoU for co-operation between the Indian and Kyrgyz Election Commissions is significant, though the Kyrgyz have been looking to Western countries for democratic experience.
A significant achievement in Uzbekistan is the discussion on ways to implement the contract for supply of 2,000 metric tonnes of uranium, signed in 2014. It seems Uzbekistan has put the least number of pre-conditions for supplying atomic fuel to India. However, it needs to be seen how it gets implemented finally.
energy stakes in region
PM Modi’s visit to Central Asia and Russia has critically changed the way for India finally securing the much-awaited energy stakes in the region. Three pathbreaking developments deserve attention. Firstly, Nursultan Nazarbayev’s daring decision to sign a major contract for a renewed long-term supply of 5,000 metric tonnes (MT) uranium to India for the next five years is the most significant takeaway of the PM’s visit. This is, in fact, proving more promising than the achievements on hydrocarbons.
Secondly, India’s ONGC-Videsh ltd (OVl) finally made its first breakthrough when Modi launched the drilling operations for oil exploration in Satpayev block on July 7.
Thirdly, the Ufa Summit and PM’s following visit to Turkmenistan may also have possibly shown the way for the TAPI pipeline to see the light of day. In Ashgabat, the Prime Minister called the TAPI project a “key pillar” and pushed for is realisation “quickly”. He said: “TAPI could transform regional economic cooperation and bring prosperity along the route... I convey our interest in long-term investment in the energy sector in Turkmenistan.”
India obviously cannot ignore Kazakhstan’s oil reserves of 30 billion barrels, gas reserves of 85 trillion cubic feet (Tcf). To add to this are Uzbekistan’s 65 Tcf and Turkmenistan’s 265 Tcf gas reserves.
These offer alluring possibilities. However, the OVl’s pursuits have been anything but simple as the Kazakh authorities repeatedly cold-shouldered its bidding process. To be sure, India also pursued its interests based on certain wrong assumptions, thinking it would get preference on cultural goodwill as well as on strategic tag vis-à-vis China. In fact, Nazarbayev dragged his feet many times despite commitments made to India. Surely, he may have used India in his delicate balancing game of engaging various suitors into his energy competition. New Delhi’s mistake has been that it never tried to take Russia on board for getting energy deals.
The drilling operation in Satpayev is good success but one has to wait to see whether the OVl is still left with any stamina for pursuing further oil exploration in Kazakh fields. Interestingly, the OVl has probably refused to accept Kazakhstan’s recent offer of 25 per cent stake in Abai field abandoned by Norway’s Statoil. But Modi was hopeful of more opportunities. He told the media: “I am pleased that President Nazarbayev responded positively to my request to consider additional mature blocks for Indian investments.”
russiaN lINK CRUCIAl
Make no mistake, Russia is and will remain an important factor for India’s ability to do business in Central Asia. Central Asian states, including Kazakhstan, are still integrated with Russia. They do not have complete maneuvering space to conduct foreign relations without having concord with Russia.
At present, Russia favours India as a countervailing measure against China’s monopoly on Kazakhstan’s uranium exports. As long as India’s fuel imports remain modest and ties do not get deeper, a major hurdle is unlikely. But given the growing Russia-China convergence, India’s nuclear ties will be conditioned by future change in geopolitical climate just as geopolitics decisively undermines importing hydrocarbons from Central Asia.
India’s discounting of Russia prematurely was a mistake. In fact, such a policy line has not only delayed India’s success but also made diplomacy in Central Asia a more arduous exercise. India’s energy requirements in Central Asia suggest a continuing positive relationship with Russia.
Central Asians undeniably consider India to be a reliable, trustworthy and a predictable partner, but at the same time they do not consider India to be a good performer. Many have argued that New Delhi’s indecisiveness always prompted Nazarbayev against energy deals with India.
Even though the Kazakhs realise the importance of engaging India for countervailing the Chinese, they also know well that it is only China which can fit their bill ultimately. Hopefully, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) can provide India the opportunity to work together with Russia and Central Asian republics. It could help resolve at least some problems.
hurdles aplenty for india
Despite strong intentions, India faces the financial limitation for competing with others in Central Asia. India’s investment is dismal and current engagement policy does not have vitality for spurring a desired rhythm of economic interdependency with these countries. Geography alone is not the only factor; private Indian companies with deep pockets have also not shown the necessary interest. They too tended to take shelter under the Government-patronised schemes abroad.
Some Indian companies experienced instances of business irregularities in the past. They are scared and apprehensive about uncertain legal and taxation system practiced in the former Soviet republics. Besides, language is a major barrier. Visa regimes for Indian visitors are extremely tight in these countries. All these continue to dampen enthusiasm and keep the potential investors away from venturing into Central Asia.
lack of understanding is a major handicap. India does not have the scholarship with in-depth knowledge of the region’s historical, political, linguistic, and above all, the intricate socio-tribal structures underpinnings ie the function and relationship among Kazakh Zhuz (hordes) that ultimately regulate the decision-making process.
As a result, official and diplomatic channels often used do not necessarily entail the desired results. That is why engagements so far have largely remained Government-to-Government contacts. Over a period of time, this style of approach has led to distortion in overall relations — reason why the depth of India-Central Asia ties have always remained in question.
For India, the problem has never been about sourcing energy resources but about routing them. And this has less to do with distance, but with India becoming a victim of denial strategy.
The situation is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. From India’s perspective, traversing gas pipeline through Pakistan will remain a risky proposition, especially when the revenue Pakistan will earn on transit fee from India could be redirected to sustain terrorism against India. This apart, by letting the pipeline come through Pakistan, India will consciously close its options for military strikes and thus allow its adversary into blackmailing it in perpetuity. It is equally unlikely that India will forsake Kashmir for the sake of gas supplies.
This is not to suggest that India will have no other options. It should find other innovative ways, such as joining international energy consortiums for exploration, opting for lNG purchases from the region etc. Central Asia could become another Middle East for the Indian engineers, management experts, skilled and semi-skilled workers to find employment in Kazakh oil industry. They could earn huge amounts of foreign exchange from the region’s energy service sector.
Apart from Mittal, Indian companies such as Punj lloyd, KEC International limited, TCS etc have gained a major presence in pipeline construction, electric transmission, and in the ancillary and drilling sectors of the oil and gas industry, which is rapidly grow in the Caspian region. Tengiz, Karachaganak, and Kashagan fields will open up major opportunities for Indian engineering and construction services.
larger global power game
PM Modi has seized the opportunity for asserting India’s influence in Central Asia. Some successes have been achieved this time. Surely, Central Asian reserves are not the last solution but they will certainly contribute to satisfying India’s growing energy demands. The continuous denial of access to affordable gas also means that India will continue relying on burning domestic coal that will pose a threat to the global environment.
Importantly, the Modi Government seems to have realised that India’s internal issues, including Kashmir, energy security, connectivity and above all problems with Pakistan, are linked to a bigger balance of power game. They are interlinked and hence cannot be treated in isolation.
The attempts made by the previous Governments to resolve the Kashmir issue, Indo-Pak conflict and enlarging interests in Central Asia failed to get off the ground. It is here that the Modi-led Government is trying to broaden the scope of geopolitical engagement. Modi’s meeting Vladimir Putin and Nawaz Sharif in Ufa and followed by a visit to Ashgabat cannot be without a well thought-out strategy.
Projects like the TAPI and IPI are vexed into the larger global power game. The US has so far opposed the IPI and instead backed TAPI pipeline, which was opposed by Russia. However, the geopolitical and corporate games around pipeline projects have diametrically altered following the Ukraine crisis and ensuing Russia-West stand-off.
As India’s energy demands increase in the future, vying for access to supply lines would bring India in the centre of important geopolitical and energy relationships. It will become more complex after the recent breakthrough between Iran and the Western powers.
It only underlines the point that the global and regional power balance is more sharply impacting India’s policy directions and perhaps in a more positive and realistic way.
In fact, it is not terrorism but energy factor that may have turned the tables on India and Pakistan for talks in Ufa. Global politics and the role of Russia in this are conspicuous whether one likes it or not. Russia may be attempting to nudge both India and Pakistan towards cooperation, especially in terms of working on the energy pipeline.
Even though Russia under the current scenario may be moving closer to China as a result of Western sanctions, it may be having an opportunistic aspect. Moscow will never be able to ignore India for a future contingency when Russia and China clash against each other in Central Asia. The relevance of Modi attending BRICS and SCO summits in Ufa, his visit to Central Asian states, his talks with President Putin, President Xi Jinping, and Prime Nawaz Sharif is part of this growing trend.
The writer is a former Ambassador and an expert on Central Asia