Can the BJP initiate a paradigm shift in the nation’s approach towards terrorismIJ An indepth analysis of the problems and prospective solutions needs to be undertaken to avert catastrophic consequences
A delegation from the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) met the Union Home Minister on March 21 demanding greater protection for senior party leaders engaged in the election campaign. They were apparently concerned about recent media reports, quoting intelligence sources that terrorist groups like the Indian Mujahideen (IM) might attempt to kidnap the BJP leaders in their bid to free their incarcerated leaders, including Yasin Bhatkal. Two days later, the Delhi Police announced the arrest of Bhatkal’s accomplice and the IM commander, Waqas, (and later Tehsin Akhtar), and claimed to have foiled a major conspiracy to target the BJP’s Prime Ministerial candidate, Narendra Modi, and trigger bomb blasts in the country.
Though the timing of these events could be coincidental, the BJP’s efforts to draw attention to this threat at the height of electioneering cannot be overlooked as this is a time when the top leaderships of all political hues will be vulnerable to terror plots as they uninhibitedly mingle with the masses.
As a matter of fact, the general elections and the prospect of political changes bring forth many larger questions on the issue of terrorism. Of all, the nation will be attuned to the imperative of a new political discourse on terrorism and a probable ideational shift in which this pivotal challenge to its security and integrity is addressed. The significant puzzle, though, could be: Is the BJP, as the party with the strongest chance to form a Government, prepared to spearhead a paradigm shift in the way this issue will be debated and tackledIJ As the party prepares to release its manifesto, the nation will be keen to know whether the BJP leadership has considered the need to revisit the national narrative on terrorism, and to restructure existing approaches to counter-terrorism. The party’s 2009 manifesto had general references on means to combat terror, but without any specific dogmatic framework to deal with this challenge and its attendant socio-political underpinnings.
Similarly, this time around, the party will be confronted by a more ominous question: How will the South Asian terror colossus — embedded across the border and with pervasive tentacles across India — respond (or retune strategies) to a return of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) to powerIJ Will it resurge with greater force by exploiting our many fault-lines or instead be deterred and subsumed by the fear of a leader with the known resolve to uproot such forcesIJ A decade of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) regime saw the omnipresent influx of this colossus, and its subsequent reversion, but not before inflicting major costs on the nation.
The emerging threat environment
Given that the terror tentacles are deeply entrenched within the country, there are reasons to believe that the reversal or current lull might be temporary. Besides the fact that the BJP’s top leadership is known to be among foremost targets of various terrorist groups active in the subcontinent, there are reasons to assume that these groups and their foreign perpetrators might seek to render the party’s return to power as casus belli to mobilise new forces, and launch a fresh campaign across the country.
Since the 26/11 fidayeen strikes in Mumbai, the country has witnessed only a handful of terror attacks, largely of lesser magnitude, even as the security agencies achieved major breakthroughs in solving many terror-related cases and consistently busting terror modules of groups like the IM, besides arresting top masterminds. While these achievements could be credited for the diminution in the terror spectrum, there is also a prevalent perception that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), allegedly the proprietor extraordinaire of South Asian terrorism, is remaining subdued after the disgrace of the Abbottabad operation, which led to the killing of Osama bin laden by US forces.
Yet, no one harbours any fallacies on this condition enduring for long. Rather, all recent reports continue to validate the role of the ISI in terror operations against India and its complicity in providing wherewithal to the so-called home-grown groups operating in India. The lashkar-e-Taiba (leT) has for long been suspected of anchoring this role and mission for the ISI. Since the 26/11 attack, the leT is believed to have shifted its operations through the “sleeper cells” and terror modules of groups like the IM and Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HuJI), and elements operating out of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). Moreover, the incoming Government will have to prepare for the after-effects of the US military drawdown in Afghanistan — an opportunity eagerly awaited by the Taliban affiliates in Pakistan to wreak havoc in the hinterland.
While these threats may continue to evolve in the coming months, the real challenge for the incoming Government will be to deal with a potential resurgence of home-grown groups. Notwithstanding the severe blow dealt out to the IM, various trends point to the possibility of other remnants of the erstwhile Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) network emerging through newer entities. This could include new off-shoots from the widely-dispersed segment of fringe groups that are breeding in various forms across the country. Most of these groups have clear fundamentalist attributes and latent seditious tendencies, but are largely masquerading as social and political groups, which will make the task tougher for an NDA Government.
Inevitably so, the need for a comprehensive policy agenda on this front will beckon the BJP as it prepares to assume power. The party’s leadership could brainstorm on the possibility of new strategy focusing on four major segments: (a) Political — introducing a new paradigm on counter-terrorism; (b) Ideational — straightening the national narrative on terrorism; (c) Structural — revamping the organisational apparatus towards greater efficiency; and (d) Strategic — preparing to conclusively confront the cross-border linkage and influx.
Scope for a new paradigm
At the core of this exercise will be the political calling of introducing a new paradigm in the way the country conceives of its capabilities to deal with the terror syndrome. The basic driver of this imperative is the huge confidence-deficit on the state’s ability to protect its citizenry from terrorism, coupled with its deficiencies in foreseeing and preparing for such eventualities. The Indian experience, for that matter, is coloured by the belief that the primary victims of terrorism are quite often the unarmed citizens, while the state’s security apparatus seems predominantly poised towards protecting the ruling gentry. This is so despite the assumption that the state is mandated to fulfill the national goal of safeguarding the lives and property of citizens.
The flaws in the existing paradigm could be attributed to the “reactive” nature of India’s security policies. This is exemplified by the behavioral patterns of the state, which swiftly moves to a “pro-active” mode for a particular period during crises, and then gradually reverses back to an earlier state of complacency. Since a sustained state of “pro-activeness” might not always be tenable for a state preoccupied with governance challenges, the key element of a new paradigm will be to instill an “affirmative” policy posture.
This implies development of eternal practices for “active situational cognition” (state of passive alert), “forecasting the evolution” of the threat matrix (conceivable and unimaginable scenarios) and creating effective “response systems”. Unique to this paradigmatic transformation will be the shift from a “counter-terror” to an “anti-terror” orientation, which will facilitate a security culture that anchors the wherewithal for early threat detection, prevention and elimination.
Straightening the narrative
The current narrative on terrorism in the country is inevitably shaped and influenced by the fissures in the Indian society, as characterised by its innate cultural and ethnic fault-lines. The narrative bares open the societal dissonance driven by identity-based constructs and ingrained cultural biases, which enhances the costs of the state to ensure uniform distribution of security in a multi-cultural and diverse nation. Nowhere is this friction as visible as in the realm of counter-terrorism, which suffers from divergent approaches among various communities towards its objectives. Hence, unlike the UPA regime, a BJP-led Government will find it challenging to address these incongruities, and to balance counter-terror objectives with social harmony.
This could easily manifest at two levels: (a) The imperativeness of promising and fulfilling an egalitarian distribution of security to a diverse socio-cultural polity; and (b) Ensuring the separation of social and cultural identities from the national narrative on terrorism. In other words, the new narrative should be underlined by an ideational initiative that institutionalises the dictum that “terrorism has no religion”, affects every segment of the Indian society and hence needs to be tackled by a national movement that involves optimal utilisation of all social, political and cultural tools and depicts a rejuvenated system of national core values.
Resolving the structural gaps
Recent breakthroughs in investigations and busting terror modules are testament to the efficacy of at least some of the structural changes initiated after 26/11. Nonetheless, there is no room for complacency, and hence the need to restructure and strengthen the security apparatus has to sustain under a new Government, while also redressing the many shortcomings. The idea of a National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) as a single-point agency to control and coordinate all counter-terror operations remains germane and is central to India’s counter-terrorism strategy. Major flaws in its initial conception, including the proposal to subsume all intelligence and federal response systems under its ambit, led to its derailment. Concerns over dilution of policing powers of State Governments and maintaining sanctity of intelligence agencies are issues which need political solutions. There is scope for finer balance in facilitating greater integration of the counter-terror infrastructure and their effective coordination with the intelligence apparatus.
There are also murmurs about the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) lacking sufficient teeth or being hampered by the ‘turf battles’ that are synonymous with the Indian security culture. While political intervention might resolve these issues, there are other focal areas, like police reforms, which need major political resolve and impetus. The effort to spread out the National Security Guards (NSG) to regional hubs did not sound promising as it addressed only limited scenarios of terror aftermaths, and also diluted its mandate. A better alternative could have been the creation of highly-trained rapid action forces, embedded within the policing system. Similarly, greater effort and priority needs to be placed on strengthening the human and technical elements of the intelligence apparatus, which remains vital to develop capabilities for detecting and preempting emergent threats. last, but not the least, operationalising the NatGrid, as a comprehensive and centralised data collation system, is an unfinished task that needs to be taken up on priority.
Fixing the cross-border patron
It is a known fact that the genesis of the terror colossus that haunts the country has its sanctuary across the border. Despite this being the case for many decades, the country could not find suitable solutions to conclusively terminate this influx or challenge the perpetrators. An asymmetric nuclear equation, since the 1990s, is often blamed for this condition. After every major terror attack instigated by elements in Pakistan, the political leadership has considered various responses, but never pursued beyond the diplomatic ones. Different military options have also been debated, including a “proactive” military strike (Cold Start), a limited sub-conventional response (Special Forces) or through technological means (drone strikes) to destroy the terror camps that springboard terrorists into Indian territory. None of these options seemed feasible amid a fragile nuclear equation, and the lack of a political resolve to pursue them.
Following the 26/11 attacks and the Abottabad operation, there has been a lull in the cross-border terror influx, which though, may not last long. The only prospect of this trend continuing will depend on the resolve of the civilian Government to rein in these forces, which are also inimical to the democratic transition in Pakistan. A recent internal security policy document from the Pakistan Government talks of “isolating terrorists from their support system”, and announced a “deradicalisation” programme, stating that “terrorists have been brainwashed in madrassas”. While this might be an exercise to counter the extremism that is bleeding the country, it is unclear if this will also be targeted at the anti-India groups operating from Pakistani territory.
Certainly so, it is pertinent to ascertain how the NDA Government, in a new innings and under a new leadership, will respond in the event of another major terror attack, with signature of cross-border origin. Will it devise military means to destroy the terror infrastructure without hitting the nuclear tripwiresIJ Or will it plan a new strategy of coercive action that will deter the neighbour from assisting anti-India actionsIJ
The author is Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.
These are his personal views