Donald Trump’s intentions could be to prick China by using Taiwan’s status as a bargaining chip in negotiations. But Beijing is unlikely to make any concessions on Taiwan, writes Rajaram Panda
Then US President-elect Donald Trump’s 10-minute telephone talk with Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen on December 2, followed by a quick sharp reaction from Beijing, has injected a new dimension to diplomacy that may shape power relations and reshape power equilibrium between countries in Asia during Trump’s presidency.
This is a pointer to potential turbulent times ahead. It is amazing that an innocuous telephone conversation between two leaders from two continents can hugely impact the relations between other countries with wide ramifications. Enmeshed in this turbulent situation is the status of Taiwan, which China considers as a part of its own. Since the days of the Civil War in China in 1949 when Chiang Kai-shek fled China for Taiwan, Beijing has questioned the status of Taiwan as a separate nation and has consistently been working for its isolation, with contemptuous threat to integrate it with the mainland by peaceful means and, if necessary, by force.
Questioning ‘One China’ policy
China scored a major diplomatic victory when the US acceded to the ‘One China’ policy in 1979. Since then, China has leapfrogged successfully at the world stage economically and politically and is now a major player in world politics. In the Asia-Pacific region, it has emerged as the centre of gravity by developing strong economic interdependence by trade, investment and collaborative projects. The strong trade ties that China has developed with major powers, besides Asia, now come under attack if Trump-Tsai telephone talks are going to adversely impact US-China relations. Besides, Trump has also questioned China’s numerous trade practices, including the allegation that Beijing has been manipulating its currency.
While it can be expected that leaders would work out some arrangement if their mutual economic interests are hurt because of allegations and counter-allegations, the Taiwan issue is different, which China has made one of its “core interests”. Trump’s intentions could be to prick Beijing by using the question of Taiwan’s status as a bargaining chip in negotiations with China on other fronts. Beijing, however, is unlikely to make any concession on Taiwan.
Even with its status remaining unclear, Taiwan has developed strong economic ties with many countries in the world and would not rejoice at the prospect of being caught in the US-China political battle as they engage to settle their bilateral scores. A direct confrontation with Beijing even with Trump’s backing would be detrimental to Taiwan’s interests. Beijing is likely to continue invoking options on dealing with Taiwan, such as working for its diplomatic isolation, military intimidation, and targeted economic coercion to increase pressure on it.
If Beijing alters its course and implements its threats to use force to integrate the island with the mainland, a conflict situation in the region would look real as it would inevitably draw other nations to intervene. China is expected to act as a mature power to prevent such a situation.
Taiwan’s identity crisis
Taiwan can be defined by its conflicted identity and diplomatic isolation. It has no membership in the United Nations; it competes at the Olympics as ‘Chinese Taipei’. Most nations do not recognise it as a country. In global norms, Taiwan is not a sovereign nation, though the self-governing island is democratically dynamic with strong economic foundation and interconnectedness with major powers. It has been enjoying de facto independence from mainland China but not formalised. Technically, therefore, it remains a part of China.
Taiwan retains its official name Republic of China. Its Constitution defines its territory as encompassing all of mainland China. For Beijing, Taiwan is an integral part of mainland China waiting for unification by peaceful means, and if need be, by the use of force.
Taiwanese people realise that Taiwan is too weak to take on powerful China and see no merit in confronting Beijing. Therefore, consensus among the majority of Taiwanese is to maintain the status quo of de facto independence. Such could be the stance of Taiwan’s 23.5 million people, but the political parties have their own agendas. The present President Tsai of the DPP is in favour of greater independence, which is what complicates the issue. Taiwan’s complicated identity takes centrestage when a pro-independent party assumes power.
Beijing’s isolation strategy
Beijing is unlikely to yield from its stated stance. It is determined to isolate Taiwan further. It would not hesitate to work to strip Taiwan of its 22 remaining diplomatic allies, leaving Taiwan more of an international orphan state than ever. Though Taiwan remains economically dynamic, Beijing is unlikely to loosen its hardline position to allow Taiwan to get out of its conflicted identity and could work further towards its isolation by adopting aggressive economic diplomacy with countries that maintain ties with Taiwan.
Taiwan’s diplomatic strategy and standing in the world, however limited, received a severe setback when on December 21, 2016, a Western African country, Sao Tome and Principe, decided to severe its diplomatic ties with Taiwan, thereby ending a 19-year-old friendship. A week later, Sao Tome and Principe resumed official relationships with the PRC, the first case of diplomatic switch from the Republic of China (Taiwan) to the People’s Republic of China (China) after Tsai of the DPP took office in May 2016, causing a virtual shock in Taiwanese society.
It appears that the African nation requested for “an astronomical amount of foreign aid”. Taiwan refused to play the so-called “chequebook diplomacy”. Taiwan blamed Beijing for orchestrating diplomatic warfare between Taiwan and the African nation. Taiwan felt betrayed as it had economically supported Sao Tome and Principe through projects in various sectors such as education, healthcare, and infrastructure over the past decade and felt sorry that the African island nation fell to the pressure from Beijing.
The timing of this diplomatic switch coincided with Trump-Isai telephone talk and Beijing timed it well to play the Sao Tome and Principe card to reinforce its ‘One China’ principle to achieve its twin objective: To isolate Taiwan further, and snub Trump who had announced his preparedness to abandon the three-decade-old ‘One China’ policy.
If Beijing indeed wants to ‘punish’ Taiwan by claiming a diplomatic victory, it can have two consequences — domino effect, leading to more diplomatic switch between a few countries having diplomatic relations with Taiwan towards China, and making Taipei-Beijing ties more fragile, thereby drifting the cross-strait relations to an uncertain course. Though Beijing is unlikely to loosen its drive to deny Taiwan any international space, it is likely to work to further squeeze the existing space and nullify Isai’s “smart power diplomacy”.
After this diplomatic switch by Sao Tome and Principe from Taipei to Beijing three years after another African country, Gambia, cut off ties with Taiwan for Beijing, China now would feel emboldened in its diplomatic drive to further isolate Taiwan. The state-controlled The Global Times in a report on December 26, 2016, observed that Beijing is in close touch with the Vatican regarding diplomatic ties.
A suspicious China
Since Tsai came to power, China has been deeply suspicious and thinks that she is keen to push for formal independence of Taiwan. Beijing is unprepared to review its stand that the self-governing island is a renegade province, ineligible for state-to-state relations.
Between January 7 and 15, 2017, Tsai is scheduled to visit four Central American countries (Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador), with a likely transit in Houston and San Francisco. China is infuriated and has urged the US to block the stopovers. If Tsai decides to attend Trump’s inauguration ceremony on January 20, and if another of the 21 countries having diplomatic relations with Taiwan follow Sao Tome and Principe, Tsai would not only face embarrassment but Taiwan would have been further isolated. Beijing seems to be working on such a possibility. In the mid-1990s, Taiwan had as many as 30 diplomatic allies, but now after Sao Tome and Principe’s diplomatic switch, it has formal relations with just 21, mostly smaller and poorer nations in latin America and the Pacific.
The Global Times warned Taiwan that if Beijing succeeds in executing its plan, Taiwan might feel not only further degraded in status while taking part in international events under the banner of ‘Chinese Taipei’, it may also risk losing even that qualification to attend international activities. Beijing’s next strategy could be to persuade, and if need be, cajole it by putting indirect economic pressure on countries that have allowed Taiwan to operate representative offices. The hardliners in Beijing have urged the Government not to waste more time and seek unification by the use of force as appeasement strategy has not yielded any result.
An Uncertain future
The impact of the Trump-Tsai telephone talk is so huge that Beijing is considering further measures to contain Taiwan. These could include conducting war games close to Taiwan and a series of economic measures to cripple it. No definite answer is available if Beijing is really serious about such measures. Beijing also might invoke the 2005 Anti-Secession law, which authorises the use of force against Taiwan in the event China judges it to have seceded.
Taiwan boasts of defending itself if Beijing attacks. However, its forces would be no match to China’s forces. Though costs for China also could be high, Beijing can have the capacity to absorb. The conflict, if it occurs, would not remain confined between Taiwan and China but could spill over and draw other nations.
Ultimately, diplomacy ought to prevail not to precipitate such a situation as it would not be in any nation’s interest. The problem is that the issue is so emotive in China that no amount of assurances by Taiwan to have peaceful relationships convinces Beijing. There seems to be no alternative to diplomacy.
The writer is ICCR India Chair Visiting Professor at Reitaku University, Japan.
The views expressed are personal and do not represent those of either the ICCR or the Government of India