It has sought help to tackle the devastating floods — a distinct departure from its nature of maintaining secrecy on national issues, writes Rajaram Panda
Days before North Korea carried out its fifth nuclear test on September 9, evoking outrage in major capitals, the country experienced the heaviest downpour since 1945, thereby flooding and devastating the northern part of the country. Such a visit by nature would not have attracted the kind of attention in normal circumstances had it happened in any other country, and the international community would have been forthcoming with aid, both in cash and kind, as it happens in cases of natural disasters such as earthquake, famine, cyclone and so on.
But what makes news about North Korea is that the Government made a public acknowledgment of this happening, a distinct departure from its nature of maintaining secrecy on national issues. There could be reasons for this and the international aid, when it comes, shall be under scrutiny and strings attached for the purpose it would be given and not otherwise.
The aid donors would be keen to know if aid, when delivered, shall reach the affected citizens or not. There are reports released by the official North Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) which says that “tens of thousands” of buildings have been destroyed, leaving people homeless and in great hardships. Such an uncharacteristic admission by the secretive nation that all is not well has deeper meaning, not just information sharing with the world. One immediate plausible reason could be to draw attention of the international community to evoke sympathy and subsequent offer of aid. But in case of North Korea, global aid donors are likely to show reluctance as it would remain unclear how much of the humanitarian aid, when given, would reach the people who are hardest hit. This apprehension is because North Korea often imposes conditions on international donors’ abilities to monitor aid.
The scale of disaster resulting in flooding that began on August 29 was the result of Typhoon lionrock. The United Nation’s Office of Humanitarian Affairs estimated that 130 people were killed, 395 are missing and 35,500 houses damaged, and over 140,000 people are in “urgent need of assistance”. Almost 69 per cent of the houses are completed damaged, rendering them unliveable. Though the economic situation of the country and its people does not seem to be healthy, it is difficult to understand the psychology of the regime to make this news public against its routine practice of boasting that its people lead a prosperous life.
As an immediate measure to address the grim situation, the Government’s Red Cross joined the UN assessment agencies to estimate the damage that nature had wreaked on the people so that food, nutritional supplements and other emergency and educational supplies could be released from the stockpiles. Relief materials were hard to reach the hardest hit areas, such as Musan and Yonsa counties and Hoeryong City in North Hamgyong province, which remained inaccessible.
The Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) also launched a nationwide 200-day mass mobilisation campaign aimed to boost the economy and help flood victims. In the typical arrogant way, the ruling party urged citizens to “achieve the miraculous victory of converting misfortune into favourable conditions... with the tremendous might of single-minded unity!”
Experience of 1990s
This is not the first time North Korea has appealed to the international community, albeit indirectly, for assistance. In 1995, when North Korea faced a severe famine in which over two million reportedly died, the then leader Kim Jong-Il appealed to the international community to come to its rescue. This was the first time the country, that takes pride in its dignity and self-respect, asked the World Food Programme (WFP) for help. That time, the WFP estimated that North Korea needed $100 million to battle food shortage. The United States gave more than $1.1 billion since 1995, 60 per cent of which went for food aid, till North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in 2006. The US had negotiated with North Korea to help in the generation of energy by providing twin energy reactors in exchange for a shutdown of its nuclear programme and almost 40 per cent of the aid went for energy production.
In 2006, the US was forced to cut down donations when North Korea ordered the WFP to slash the size of its mission in Pyongyang from nearly 50 people to 10, and shut its five regional offices. North Korea did not want the WFP inspectors to monitor distribution. When North Korea finally conducted its first nuclear test on October 9, 2006, South Korea too suspended food aid, sharply reducing food donations. North Korea was dependent on the South to make up a shortfall of more than one million tonnes of rice, the largest source of food for the North after China. Even China sharply cut shipments on the monitoring issue, though both China’s and South Korea’s aid programmes were entirely independent of the WFP.
Though South Korea wanted to continue humanitarian aid, it faced barriers because of the UN resolutions. The problem of transparency in monitoring distribution of aid was also an issue, which played a significant role in other donors’ willingness to offer aid. In particular, the US was annoyed with the conditions imposed by North Korea.
It was a different matter that at that time the UN Security Council resolution exempted humanitarian assistance from the categories based for shipment to North Korea, ranging from luxury goods to components for missiles, nuclear warheads, and other heavy weapons. North Korea probably assumed that harvests would improve and therefore wanted to keep the foreign presence to the minimum as dependence on external food aid would be lessened. As it transpired, it did not happen and North Korea’s food situation worsened.
In the 1990s, when North Korea faced the famine, it was at the same time pursuing its nuclear programme. With a view to stem this drift towards nuclear weaponisation, then South Korean President Kim Dae-jung launched the Sunshine Policy aimed at North-South reconciliation as well as help for economic development of North Korea. Though the US had reservations and was reluctant to reach out to North Korea, President Kim reasoned that if the US and South Korea adopt a tough stance, then North Korea would get closer to China, Cuba and Venezuela for help. President Kim feared that sanctions would invite “strong responses” leading to an escalation of tensions. Unlike the US which had always other considerations, other aid givers’ overriding concern was to help starving people regardless of sanctions and President Kim’s perspective was in the latter category of thinking people.
Monitoring food aid was important especially when complaints surfaced that refugees did not receive any humanitarian assistance as food was diverted after the monitoring group had left. It was suspected that resources were diverted from feeding its people towards developing nuclear weapons.
Current situation
When the current situation assumed serious proportion, the aid donors were reminded of their previous experience on how to disburse aid even if they wanted to do so. It always weighs in the minds of the donors if they would be able to monitor aid distribution. It is an irony that countries such as North Korea or semi-democratic states such as those in Africa rarely admit to the existence of a problem for loss of credibility and image in the world even if the cause for the creation of such a situation need not necessarily be because of the policy of the state, as is the case this time in North Korea. Here, the havoc is because of nature’s fury and not man-made. It is possible to accept state secrecy in the case of, for example, famine when that occurs, would expose the inefficiency of state apparatus to handle the situation. In such situations, the Government of the time might be unwilling to acknowledge the gravity of the situation for fear of losing prestige and dignity.
For example, when Ethiopia faced a severe famine in 1984, the then Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was said to have observed that begging for help from the outside world was worse than accepting the death of thousands of people. This was the typical response of an authoritarian regime. Compare this with North Korea this time; a mere acknowledgement of a grave situation is being interpreted as a call for international aid. But having conducted the fifth nuclear test days after the country faced the natural disaster and further sanctions becoming inevitable, it remains unclear if food and other forms of aid would be forthcoming with tough conditions in place.
Notwithstanding the fact that a large section of people in the country remain impoverished, the regime in Pyongyang projects itself to the world as a fully functioning workers’ paradise. But the admission of the natural calamity shows that not everything is well. The open and public call for assistance is rather rare for the North Korean Government. Known for its exceptionally bad human rights record, major prison camps are located in the areas affected by the flood. Since the regime is more concerned about its survival than the real well-being of its people, it is more fearful that increasing social discontent could provoke an uprising, which is why relief measures are felt necessary to assuage the dissatisfaction. But providing humanitarian aid to a country like North Korea is a supremely delicate business for potential donors.
It would be in the interest of North Korea and its people if the regime adopts an open door policy, engages with the world and removes restrictions on monitoring aid distribution. The international community will be willing to come to North Korea’s rescue in this time of distress. Notwithstanding its militarisation and nuclear programme, this is an occasion for the regime to gain some confidence of the international community if it promises that the aid would reach the victims and won’t be diverted to the military and the party.
The writer is ICCR India Chair Visiting Professor at Reitaku University, Japan. rajaram.panda@gmail.com