The nations will focus on ways to expand the strategic partnership across the sectors of defence, nuclear energy, maritime security, and investments, writes RAJARAM PANDA
In continuation of the annual summit alternatively held in New Delhi and Tokyo, it is Japan’s turn in 2016 to host Prime Minister Narendra Modi on November 11-12. This will be the second visit of Modi as PM, the first being in 2014 when he chose Japan for his first bilateral visit outside India’s immediate neighbourhood in August-September after assuming office.
During that visit, he visited Kyoto before travelling to Tokyo. Modi’s gesture to visit two ancient Buddhist temples in Kyoto was more than symbolic; it reconnected and reinforced the centuries-old civilisational bond that remains deep-rooted between the two countries, and therefore, found instant resonance among people. In a clear departure from protocol, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was in Kyoto to receive Modi.
During Modi’s visit in 2014, the relationship was upgraded to a ‘Special Strategic and Global Partnership’, and the leaders outlined a vision of working together for peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and the world. Ever since, both PMs have met a number of times on different forums — regional and global — and strengthened their bond by sharing common viewpoints on bilateral, regional and global issues. The summit in the upcoming visit is likely to focus on ways to expand the strategic partnership across the sectors of defence, nuclear energy, maritime security and investments.
Both the PMs are expected to have “in-depth exchanges on bilateral, regional and global issues of mutual interests to further deepen the broad-based and action-oriented partnership” between the two countries. The leaders are also expected to explore ways to boost ties in trade, including in high technology area, security and infrastructure. There is also high expectation that the summit might see a civil nuclear cooperation pact inked. During their last summit in December 2015, when Abe had visited India, the two sides had reached a basic agreement on the pact and agreed to continue to discuss the international civil nuclear cooperation framework with respect to India.
Stitching a civil nuclear cooperation agreement has remained high on India’s agenda relating to its relations with Japan. Officials from both sides are engaged in making sustained efforts for sealing the pact, paving the way for Japan to export nuclear power plant technology to the fast-growing Asian economy. Being the first and only country to have been a victim of a nuclear attack, the pacifist clause in the form of Article 9 in Japan’s Constitution has remained the guiding principle behind its N-policy. The pacifist and anti-nuclear sentiment was further fuelled by the Fukushima nuclear accident of March 2011.
India being a non-signatory country of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) remains the only hurdle to convince Japan of its No First Use (NFU) principle. Japan remains unconvinced of India’s commitment to not conduct further nuclear tests, and that it will not be used for military purposes. If diplomacy triumphs, and Modi and Abe succeed in sealing the pact this time, it would be Japan’s first civil nuclear cooperation agreement with a country that has not joined the NPT.
While negotiations remain sustained on the nuclear issue, the difference in perspectives has not come in the way of deepening and expanding ties on the security and defence front. In fact, as China continues to expand its military and strategic footprints across Asia, including increased activities in the East and South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, India and Japan find compelling reasons to strengthen bilateral coordination in maritime security, while keeping their commitment for the maritime trilateral with the US. Relations on the economic front have also improved with increased involvement of the Japanese Government and corporates in the form of aid and investment. Trade remains low key.
As the Indian economy continues to surge, demand for energy continues to rise. Though India has put in place a strategy to draw its energy needs from a variety of sources, such as petroleum, renewable and non-renewables, hydro, and solar, nuclear remains the most attractive, clean and safe source with stringent safeguards in place. Despite the size and demand for energy, nuclear as a source accounts for less than two per cent of the country’s total energy supplies. India has plans to increase the share of nuclear in its total energy mix, which is why a deal with Japan is important for us. A nuclear pact with Japan would dramatically transform the economic component in the bilateral ties. leading nuclear companies in Japan shall jump into the Indian market to reap the economic dividend once an agreement is cleared at the political level.
Despite the staunch anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan, there is political willingness to enter into a civil nuclear pact with India. However, the Government in Japan has to steer its policy carefully, taking into consideration the sentiment in the domestic constituency. The fact that the Abe Government has offered support to the deal is a demonstration of the importance that Japan accords to relations with India. If both India and Japan seal the pact during Modi’s forthcoming visit, it could facilitate the former’s acceptance to the NSG as a member.
If the pact is signed, India is likely to benefit from Japan’s expertise in high cutting-edge technology, safety parameters and critical parts needed for Indian reactors. Japan shall not be in a position to make these assets available without a pact in place. Any domestic effort to develop such assets by India will be no match to the high technology standards achieved by Japan. In the absence of a pact with Japan, India’s civil nuclear deal with the US remains hamstrung as the current discussions for six reactors in Andhra Pradesh with Westinghouse are owned by the Japanese company Toshiba.
The main sticking point has been India’s refusal to sign the NPT, which it considers as discriminatory and therefore rejects to join. India expects Japan to trust its commitment to the NFU and self-declared moratorium on testing. Japan insists on inserting a clause in the pact that it would be nullified if India ever conducts another test. India’s nuclear liability issue is another hurdle. But the Japanese manufacturers will be expected to be more generous with India on the liability issue, given their own experience with the enormous cost of cleaning up post-Fukushima.
Japan does not want India to reprocess spent fuel, even for peaceful purposes, from any reactors that may have Japanese parts. It also wants inspections from its own team overarching the IAEA inspection. The MoU, which was signed in December 2015 during Abe’s India visit, clearly stated that “Japan is satisfied by the fact that India has a voluntary moratorium on further nuclear testing”. Earlier, India separated its military and civilian nuclear programme, and that apart appreciated India’s policy on reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel which provides further safeguards. Abe faces the challenge to get the legislation through the Diet.
India is also unwilling to give any assurance on signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as, like its stand on the NPT, it considers it discriminatory in its present form. India is the only country which believes in strengthening its security in the world free of nuclear weapons. India also does not agree to the ‘non-reprocessing’ clause of spent fuel as its entire nuclear power generation strategy is based on this premise and cannot exempt the Japanese on inspection processes. If Modi and Abe succeed in inking the pact during the forthcoming visit, the world’s confidence on India would get a fillip, but India must not see this success, if happens, as a grant for entry into the NSG. China is unlikely to support and shall stick to the position it took in Seoul, successfully blocking India’s bid.
As technology upgradation is a continuous process, India should expect to develop critical components domestically, if not in the short term, in the medium term, within a decade or so. In that case, even if India agrees to inset the ‘nullification’ clause in the pact with Japan, it would have lost its relevance by this time. There would also be a compelling push to develop critical components within a fixed target than having open-ended time schedules as is at the present time. India need not stick to the nullification clause and there is merit to acquiesce to the Japanese demand.
As things stand now, there seems to be a lot of euphoria in India that the nuclear cooperation agreement would be signed this time. Such optimism rests on the belief that breakthrough on several contentious issues, including the ‘nullification’ clause, has already been reached. If the legislation goes through the Japanese Diet, contracts with Toshiba-owned US company Westinghouse can come through by June 2017.
One hopes such an optimistic picture comes true. But the truth is that the issue is too sensitive in Japan. Whenever this writer has interacted with any citizen during his previous and present stay in Japan, an aversion to anything nuclear comes out loud and clear. Though Abe has secured majority in both Houses of the Diet, it remains to be seen if he overlooks overwhelming public sentiment that rejects nuclear as an option, and rushes through the legislation for a pact with India. The ruling liberal Democratic Party seems to be inclined towards investing in Abe’s political leadership. It wants to amend the party rule by according him a third term as president of the party, thereby ensuring not only a record term for him in office, but also securing political stability in a country that has seen many ‘revolving’ PMs in recent times leading to policy paralysis. That prospect should be welcome for India.
If the deal comes through, India’s nuclear power industry would receive a huge boost and will also facilitate US companies — GE and Westinghouse — both Japanese owned, to build plants in India without any hurdle. Therefore, an India-Japan deal would also benefit the US firms. India has already allotted land for nuclear plants to GE-Hitachi — an alliance between the US and Japanese firms — and to Toshiba’s Westinghouse Electric Company. As Japanese manufacturers hold a virtual monopoly over several critical parts and forgings needed by the Indian reactors, a pact would enable the US companies to build the reactors in India and address issues concerning India’s energy security. It is to be seen if Modi succeeds in doing what his predecessors could not, and if so, India will elevate its standing in the world as a trusted business partner.
The writer is ICCR India Chair Visiting Professor at Reitaku University, Japan. rajaram.panda@gmail.com